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Non-repudiation techniques are to ensure any communication taking place between two 
or more parties will be undeniable. Therefore it is crucial to include digital signatures of 
the involving parties while the communication is taking place. In medical practices, 
involved parties include; patient(s), doctor(s), pharmacist(s), who are involved in series 
of visits, diagnosis, prescriptions, and possible operations. To avoid possible conflicts, 
deploying non-repudiation techniques help immensely. This thesis considers this issue in 
a wireless medium and studies the Quality of Service (QoS)/Security requirements in 
terms of network parameters and performance metrics.  
 
In terms of research contributions, this thesis embodies a thorough research on layered 
and cross-layer QoS and security schemes, in particular, featuring an adaptive Forward 
Error Correction (FEC) at the application layer, adapting to channel conditions. This 
leads to a cross layer design, which considers various QoS and security parameters export 
and import to and from various layers with a special focus on the application layer.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to consider a practical implementation and associated 
complexities of a non-repudiation system, including analytical and experimental testbeds 
and results. The security schemes are based on Suite-B cryptographic algorithms, 
including: The Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) for key agreement, the Advanced 
Encryption Standard - Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) for encryption and 
authentication, the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for digital 
signatures, and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) for integrity. A key aspect of Suite-B 
is the deployment of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). 
 
The non-repudiation aspect of this thesis is based on the Suite-B’s digital signature 
scheme; ECDSA. The digital signature and the hashing function target the entire 
multimedia data (i.e., text, video, and voice) and the challenge is to offer such extensive 
security treatment, while guaranteeing certain Quality of Service settings. These settings 
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The goal of this thesis is to present a novel and systematic approach to a P2P (Point-to-
Point) non-repudiation and adaptive-multimedia-based communication. A non-repudable 
communication often involves a transparent mechanism through which, no party involved 
in the communication can deny having participated in the whole or a part of the 
communication. Therefore security is one of the key points being considered in this thesis. 
As traffic between involved parties is multimedia-enabled, (including voice, video, text, 
file-sharing.), another important key point is Quality of Service (QoS). Quality of Service 
guarantees certain performance measures from both network and user points of views. 
Such a guarantee of service is of great importance due to the fact that many 
communications conveying multimedia traffic payloads are often time-sensitive and 
require certain network-centric performance guarantees. These network-centric 
parameters include; delay, jitter (variable delay figures) and bandwidth, which require 
guaranteed maximum delay and jitter figures and minimum bandwidth for proper 
performance.  
   
The multimedia-enabled, non-repudiation system under consideration, involves at least 
two communication parties; namely Party A and Party B. The traffic flows between these 
two parties will include a number of QoS- and security-based elements, with varying 
payload sizes, depending on the specific QoS/security settings. Through traffic analysis 
and traffic classification concepts, the average packet payload sizes on both wired and 
wireless links are evaluated and compared to the proposed system’s varying packet 






1.1 Problem Definition 
 
Security requirements for current communication systems are becoming more 
demanding as the nature of attacks has become more complex, requiring more versatile 
security audits and measures. Taking QoS into account adds more to the complexity, due 
to the fact that security measures usually add redundant information (overhead) and delay 
figures, which may undermine QoS schemes. Therefore having a system where both 
security and QoS can coexist may be a challenge and involving power consumption 
constraints to the picture will add more dimensions to the mentioned challenges. The 
challenges involving security, QoS, and power consumption figures will always exist, as 
long as both wireless broadband communication systems (with limited power resources) 
and the associated level of attacks, are progressing alongside one another. 
 
A challenge is to maintain an application layer, offering an end-to-end adaptive QoS 
scheme and simultaneous security supports for a P2P-non-repudiation system, within 
acceptable power consumption figures, where both security-related data (e.g., integrity, 
authentication, non-repudiation) and multimedia-based (e.g., audio, video, text) traffic 
payloads are transmitted simultaneously. An application layer-based provisioning 
provides flexibility and increased performance compared to lower layer provisioning 
schemes and to add more flexibility, an adaptive scheme based on the quality of the 
channel is added to accommodate multimedia encoding quality with the channel capacity. 
 
National Security Agency (NSA) initiated three efforts to address widespread 
cryptographic interoperability and security issues, one of which is [1]; Cryptographic 
Interoperability Strategy (CIS) in which, Suite-B algorithms are one of CIS’s core to 
protect both classified and unclassified information. An end-to-end security mechanism 
may include the deployment of Suite-B cryptographic algorithms, including: the Elliptic 
Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) for the key agreement, the Advanced Encryption 
Standard - Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) for the encryption-authentication, Elliptic 
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for the digital signatures, and the Secure 
Hash Algorithm (SHA) for message digest and integrity schemes. Suite-B uses Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC) exclusively for key exchange and digital signature [2]. 
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The system under consideration accounts for a P2P (which can be extended to cover 
Point-to-MultiPoint “P2MP” and MP2MP) communication, which uses UDP (User 
Datagram Protocol) as its transport engine between Parties A and B, transporting QoS- 
(cross-layer) and security- (hash, encrypted data, and digital signature) related parameters, 
offering a secure bounded delay, jitter, with minimum throughput communication.  
 
This thesis features a multilayer Suite-B support, which addresses various security 
requirements at the application, transport, and network layers. The added overheads and 
incurred delay figures related to such a deployment are calculated and compared with 
experimental results using Crypto++ 5.6.0 codes based on C++ [3] and Labview V.8.5 [4] 
(which is a real traffic simulator) implementations. Comparisons between experimental 
and theoretical results, as well as possible attacks on the system are also provided. Many 
current researches offer limited performance analyses, therefore a thorough end-to-end 
performance analysis for a system offering QoS to support multimedia-enabled traffic in 
the presence of security has so far not been considered in the literature, which is being 




The contributions of this thesis are listed in the following categories: 
 
1.2.1 Application Layer Provisioning 
 
This thesis covers details on a well organized QoS and security enabled application 
layer-based system, where QoS and security related parameters are exported from 
different layers and imported at the application layer, while incorporating multimedia-
enriched traffic in the presence of security-enabled data with an emphasis on the non-
repudiation support.  
 
1.2.2 Novel Cross-Layer Design 
 
In the structure of the proposed system, a novel cross-layer design approach is deployed, 
which serves for both application layer-based QoS and security purposes.  
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1.2.2.1 QoS-based Cross Layer Design 
 
In the cross-layer QoS-based system, a number of QoS-related parameters (e.g., 
Received Signal Strength Indicator “RSSI”, Signal to Noise Ratio “SNR”, Wireless 
Multimedia, “WMM”, and Differentiated Services Code Point “DSCP”) are gathered 
from three layers and imported at the application layer. The current values of these three 
parameters define the quality of the wireless link and are used to determine the quality of 
the multimedia encoder. This way, an adaptive multimedia encoder/decoder system is 
designed and deployed, which adapts its coding quality to the quality of the environment 
and adjusts the encoder bit-rate and the integrated Forward Error Correction (FEC) 
scheme accordingly. The values of these three parameters are transmitted alongside the 
rest of the data to the receiver and the receiver uses them to determine the correct 
decoding procedures. The effectiveness of the cross-layer design will also be evaluated.  
 
 
1.2.2.2 Security-based Cross Layer Design 
 
In the cross-layer security-based scheme, a number of layered-based security 
parameters are gathered from various layers (i.e., , MAC, network, and transport layers), 
which are accompanied with other gathered QoS-related parameters and fed into an 
application layer security-based module used by the multimedia encoder. The 
security/QoS cross-layer feedbacks at the application layer will determine the multimedia 
encoder quality, as well as the error correction scheme. 
 
 
1.2.2.2.1 Multilayer Suite-B Cryptographic Schemes Deployment 
 
A multilayer Suite-B support has been adopted in this thesis to address various security 
requirements at the application, transport, and network layers. A detailed analysis is 
provided to show the impacts of Suite-B deployment to the overhead and delay figures. 




1.2.3 Adaptive Forward Error Correction (A-FEC) Scheme 
 
The cross-layer parameters are imported at the application layer from lower layers and 
as mentioned, an adaptive mechanism is present at the application layer, which processes 
the cross-layer information and its outputs are directly used in the encoder (at the sender), 
decoder (at the receiver) systems, and in the Forward Error Correction (FEC) scheme, 
adapting to channel and network conditions.  
 
1.2.4 Adaptive Multimedia Encoder Selection 
 
As mentioned, based on the imported cross-layer parameters, multimedia (i.e., voice 
and video) encoders are selected according to the current quality of the channel/signal. 
 
Following the functions of the encoder and the FEC module, Suite-B algorithms are 
applied to the multimedia traffic.  
 
Finally, a thorough analysis is performed to investigate the performance of this system 
under various security and QoS conditions. 
 
1.2.5 Security System Analysis 
 
The security model of this system is discussed in chapter 3. This includes a thorough 
consideration of the security algorithms and protocols used in various layers as well as 
security analyses of the system. 
 
1.2.6 QoS-Security Testbed Evaluations  
 
Through analyses and experimental results using C++ based cryptographic codes and 
Labview testbeds, QoS capabilities offered by the system are investigated under various 
traffic flows, containing: Security-enabled data (i.e., authenticated, encrypted, hashed, 
and digitally signed information), multimedia data, and cross-layer information.  
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1.3 Thesis Organization 
 
Chapter 2 covers the background literature including: Traffic classifications, cross-layer, 
security (e.g., non-repudiation), and multimedia communication related concepts. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the security and QoS models. The security model discusses the 
various security parameters and algorithms used in this system and the QoS model also 
discusses the QoS-related parameters. 
 
Chapter 4 contains the analytical and experimental results. In this chapter we show that 
the proposed system is capable of offering simultaneous QoS and security capabilities. 
 





















Background and Literature Survey 
 
In this chapter, the legacy and current approaches to wireless QoS- and security-
enabled multimedia services are considered. In this chapter we will review the 
background literature of the following areas: QoS, security traffic classifications, wireless 
multilayer approach, wireless cross layer design, and non repudiation multimedia-based 
wireless systems. 
 
2.1 Quality of Service (QoS)  
 
In a best-effort scenario, all traffic flows have the same priority. QoS, on the other hand, 
provides priority for flows that fall in specific criteria or groups. QoS has become an 
important requirement in enterprise networks as well as in scenarios where both wireless 
and wired networks are deployed. This includes QoS schemes for transmitting 
aggregation of packets, admission control, and other scenarios where packets and flows 
may compete for channel access. 
 
QoS comes in two main forms; network-perspective-QoS [5] and user-perspective-
QoS; which is also known as; Quality of Experience (QoE) [6]. A few network-
perspective-QoS parameters include; throughput, end-to-end delay, and jitter, which are 
explained in the following subsections. 
 
2.1.1 QoS versus QoE 
 
QoS, as mentioned, is the network-centric performance consideration, including: Delay, 
jitter, bandwidth, etc. QoS measures are used to quantify the quality schemes configured 
at each layer and the results of layers interactions with one another and the impact on the 
overall delay/jitter/throughput figures for the purpose of improving data flows. 
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QoE, on the other hand, is the measure of the quality from the human experience point 
of view. Therefore what human hears and sees have direct impacts on the QoE. Therefore 
fidelity and latency (delay and jitter) are two very important factors characterizing QoE.  
 
There is usually a direct relationship between QoS and QoE in a sense that the 
improvement of QoS figures may result in a better quality perception by the user. This is 
due to the fact that some parameters (e.g., delay and jitter) are used in both to measure the 
quality, however different criteria are given for each. This thesis is more concerned with 
the QoS measurement. 
 
QoS schemes are used to actively measure the quality of voice in Voice over IP (VoIP) 
systems, using delay and jitter figures to calculate the MOS (Mean Opinion Score, 
introduced in section 2.5.2.3). QoE, on the other hand, uses a non-intrusive voice quality 
analysis for predicting MOS value using a passive voice clarity evaluation. This may 
involve measuring delays based on vocal methods, deploying audio recording and 
playback, and simple analyses that identify impairments in the voice quality. 
 
2.1.2 Bandwidth or Throughput 
 
The definitions for bandwidth and throughput differ in the sense that bandwidth is the 
maximum number of bits transmitted between two physical end-points per unit of time 
(second) [7], whereas throughput (effective bandwidth), is the actual payload 
transmission per unit of time [8]. Throughput is typically less than the related bandwidth.  
The difference between bandwidth and throughout becomes increasingly noticeable in 
the presence of noise. As the noise level increases, it degrades the throughput figures, 
while the bandwidth may not be noticeably affected. 
 
Throughput is comprised of actual data, control/parity bits, and other retransmission 
information. Goodput however contains useful bits transmitted per second. From the 
application perspective, throughput refers to the data rate (bits per second) generated by 
the application. Therefore application throughput and goodput are synonyms.  
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Throughput is sometimes called bit-rate, which is considered to be a network resource 
parameter that needs to be properly and efficiently managed and allocated. Most often, 
priority has to be assigned (through proper QoS provisioning) to ensure larger amounts of 
throughput are allocated to more critical data types [9]. 
 
2.1.3 End-to-End Delay (E2ED) or Round-Trip Time (RTT) 
 
Delay is the main parameter that directly impacts both network related QoS as well as 
the users' satisfactions, particularly for real-time applications. In real-time applications, 
data is required to be delivered from the source to the destination within a certain time 
frame. Long delays may increase the chances for network faults and error messages, such 
as: TCP timeouts and ICMP error messages (e.g., destination unreachable), which in turn 
reduce the efficiency of multimedia traffic transmission, thus resulting a reduction in 
audio/video fidelity [10]. Moreover, this can cause user frustration during interactive 
communications. While data traffic is transmitted through various segments and devices 
(e.g., switches and routers) throughout the communication networks that interconnects 
the source to the destination, every segment/device introduces a specific amount of delay 
figure. These delays include [11]: Source-processing delay (including packetizing and 
digitization delays), which is a delay introduced by the source that generates the packets, 
which also depends on the source hardware configuration (e.g., CPU, RAM, bus-rate) 
and the number of applications running at the same time. Transmission delay, which is 
the packet’s transmission time. This is a function of the packet size and transmission 
speed. Network delay, which is comprised of propagation, protocol, output queuing, and 
destination processing delays. Propagation delay is a function of the physical distance 
between the source and the destination. Protocol delay is a delay caused by the specific 
communication protocol executed in different network components such as; routers, 
gateways, and network interface cards. This type of delay depends on the protocol, the 
load of the network, and the configuration of the hardware that executes the protocol. The 
output queuing delay is the delay caused by the time duration that a packet spends in the 
output queue. For example, such a delay can be incurred at an intermediate router output 
queue. This delay depends on the network congestion condition, the configuration of the 
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hardware, and the link speed. The destination processing delay is a delay introduced by 
the destination processing components. For example, such a delay can be incurred in the 
packet reconstruction process. Similar to the source processing delay, this delay depends 




When discussing network-related parameters, latency is often presented as an average 
value. A multimedia protocol, such as VoIP, which is time-sensitive, uses IP for the 
control signaling and data transfer. In a scenario where packets are delivered using IP, 
there is no guarantee that every voice data packet will travel over the same path, unlike in 
the circuit-switched network scenario. Packet switched networks are comprised of 
numerous node and when two nodes wish to communicate, packets may be forced to take 
different routes, based on network conditions, unavailability of intermediate nodes, and 
the routing protocol in use. Therefore it’s common that some packets are forced to take 
paths with more or less hops than other packets, in which case, packet arrival times may 
encounter variable delays, causing much higher latency effect, called jitter [12]. 
 
Another issue that contributes to a higher jitter figure can be related to having too many 
packets processed at the intermediate gateways/routers, which may overwhelm the 




Security is a set of mechanisms, which provides the capability to support: privacy, 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-repudiation, authenticity, and access control, 
for the legitimate users and/or the information transmitted among them. 
 
There are interesting interactions between QoS and security, in which strengthening 
one may often result in weakening of the other [13], especially in wireless technologies, 
where resources are scarcer. This was traditionally the case as wireless systems had 
relatively limited powers to perform frequent extensive computational mechanisms and 
tasks and to serve best practices for simultaneous QoS and security deployments. 
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However thanks to the advances in the wireless broadband technologies, networks have 
evolved (e.g.., faster processors, cheaper memory, higher computational power 
capabilities, and higher bandwidth allocations), which help us design network structures 
with coexisting QoS and security schemes. From the infrastructural point of view 
(concerning bandwidth allocation), the realization of 802.11n, 3G and 4G access 
technologies contributed immensely to allocate enough bandwidth for security- and QoS-
enabled multimedia-enriched traffic payloads. 
 
Therefore the QoS-security coexistence and their possible implications are important 
aspects to be considered. In this thesis, security is addressed in a multilayer/cross-layer 
sense. The cross-layer mechanism will have the security/QoS parameters created at 
different layers accessible at the application layer. Therefore in the design of our system, 
security, QoS, and their coexistence will be considered step-by-step.  
 
The following subsections discuss the fundamentals of security. The most basic 
requirements of any secure system should include capabilities to prevent common passive 
and active attacks, through the following functionalities [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]:  
 
2.2.1 Confidentiality  
 
Confidentiality or privacy is the ability to secure the content of the information 
communicated among parties. Enabling confidentiality (through encryption) should 
prevent the intruder from recovering any data (data confidentiality). In a broader sense, 
an intruder should not be able to determine the parties involved in a communication (user 
confidentiality) or whether a communication session has ever been established. This can 
be achieved by encrypting the source and destination addresses or by using a VPN 
(Virtual Private Network) tunneling scheme, such as IPSec (IP Security) [19]. 
 
2.2.2 Data Integrity  
 
Integrity is a mechanism that safeguards accuracy, reliability, and completeness of 
information assets.  Data integrity, in its simplest form, prevents unnoticed modification 
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of the communicating data by an unauthorized user. In a broader sense, integrity should 
ensure that data is current, unaltered, and undamaged, therefore it guards against 
unwanted alteration (e.g., addition, deletion, and undue delays) [20]. 
 
2.2.3 Authentication  
 
Authentication is a very important security requirement, which provides the facility to 
verify the identity of parties taking part in a communication. There are three types of 
authentication procedures: Entity (user/address) authentication, where the identity of an 
entity, a device, or a person is checked to ensure legitimacy before the communication 
begins. Geo-authentication is a process by which the location of a node or another 
location-dependent attribute is checked before the actual communication takes place. 
Attribute authentication is a process of establishing confidence in an attribute, an action, 
or a certain property associated with an entity. Data authentication is the capability of the 
authorized parties to ascertain the authenticity of the received data. 
 
It is an important security requirement to have a mutual authentication scheme, where 
both communication parties are required to be authenticated to one another. This is to 
reduce the chances of a Man-in-the-Middle-Attack (MitMA) [21]. In a MitMA scenario, 
an illegitimate user is able to intercept communications between legitimate end-points or 
users and based on the information acquired, it can either take over the already 
established link or establish a new link with a legitimate user. In this scenario, the 
illegitimate user can act as either a client or a server and steal credentials of a legitimate 
client or server. 
 
2.2.4 Authorization 
    
   Authorization is a mechanism that checks the legitimacy of a device or process before a 
communication begins. In a client-server scenario, authorization gives the server 
permission to seek credentials from the client, however authentication proves the identity 
of the client to the server. It is possible to have authentication without authorization, 
however, one cannot have authorization without authentication [14, 22]. 
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2.2.5 Non-Repudiation  
       
A non-repudiation mechanism is the ability to prevent an authorized user from denying 
its involvement in a previous communication or activity. This is further subcategorized 
as: Protection against sender denial, which prevents the sender from denying its role in 
sending the transmitted information. Protection against forward denial that prevents 
against the denial of forwarding entities on the path, disputing the fact that they received 
any data to forward and the fact that they did forward the data. Protection against 
delivery denial, which protects against disputing final delivery of data to the destination. 
Protecting against receiving denial, which protects against the recipient’s denial of the 
fact that it has ever received the data [14]. Non-repudiation techniques may use hashing 




A Hash or a message digest is a mathematical function that takes a random number 
with bounded size (limited by the minimum and maximum number of input bits) and 
creates a fixed-length message-digest output string with the following general 
specifications: 
1. The output string is fixed length, independent of the input string length 
2. A single bit difference between two data inputs results in close to 50% change in 
the hash’s output strings  
3. Given the hash value, it should be computationally impossible to find the initial 
data prior to hashing. This is based on the current accessible computational power 
within the time frame that the message content is useable. 
4. A collision is a situation where two different input messages produce identical 
hash output message. The probability of finding such a collision, which depends 
on the type of hashing function and the number of output hash length, is generally 
very low. [23] 
 
A hash value derived from the message m is denoted by H (m). 
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2.2.5.1.1 Keyed versus unkeyed Hashes  
 
There are two different types of hash functions; keyed and unkeyed [24]. Keyed hash 
functions (e.g., Message Authentication Code “MAC” schemes) accept a secret key as a 
secondary input, such as block cipher-based MAC (DES-CBC-MAC) and Hash-based 
MAC (HMAC) schemes. 
 
An unkeyed hash function (e.g., Manipulation Detection Code “MDC”) requires no 
secret key input message, such as: One Way Hash Function (OWHF) and Collision-Free 
Hash Function (CFHF). 
 
A few hashing functions that are used in the construction of both keyed and unkeyed 
hash functions are: MD2, MD4, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. 
Almost all Message Digest (MD) versions (e.g., MD2 to MD5) have proven to be weak 
[25, 26, 27], prone to internal collisions. An internal collision is a situation where a 
cryptographic algorithm computes two different input arguments, however returns the 
same output argument.  
 
All hash functions are subject to the birthday attack. In a birthday attack, given a 
function g(x), the aim of the attack is to find the probability that two different inputs; x1, 
x2 would yield: g(x1) = g(x2). Then the pair; x1 and x2 is called a collision. In the 
cryptographic sense, the hashed value is known and in different scenarios, the message m, 
may or may not be known. In the worst case scenario, the message m is also given.  
 
Assuming function g(x) has an output space of N and N is large enough (larger than 
109), for an unknown x1 and known g(x1), it is expected to find x2, which satisfies the 
equation g(x1) = g(x2), after computing g(xi) for about N
2

 1.25. N  different 
arguments on average.  
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Brute-force attack is another group of attacks, which features traversing the search of 
all possible keys space until the correct key is found. This is used to break the encrypted 
information by searching every key combination to decipher the ciphertext. On average, 
half of all possible keys should be tried before a match could be found, therefore the 
complexity of a brute-force attach scales exponentially with the increasing key size. The 
strengths associated to the brute-force attack lie in the simplicity of the attack algorithm 
and wide applicability. On the other side, the weaknesses associated to the brute-force 
attack is the inefficiency of the attack algorithm; that it requires a long period of time 
before a result is yielded and the attack process is relatively very slow [28]. 
 
2.2.5.1.2 SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) 
 
SHA was originally introduced in 1993 (FIPS PUB 180), initiated by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and promulgated by the National Security 
Agency (NSA), which was called SHA-0. Later on, SHA-1 was introduced, which differs 
with SHA-0 in a single bitwise rotation in its compression function of the message 
schedule. Basically these two schemes take any arbitrary message length (of less than 264 
– 1 bits, less than 2 billion G bytes) and produce a 160 bit (fixed length) hash code [29]. 
 
Newer SHA schemes (SHA-2 family) were developed starting in 2001, including SHA-
224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. The development of SHA-3 family is underway 
and the publication of the new standard will take place in 2012 [29]. 
 
SHA-0 is considered to be the weakest of all SHA family and it was announced broken 
in 2004. SHA-1 is considered secure till mid 2010 [29]. Table 2.1 shows the security 
portfolio of SHA-0 and SHA-1. 
 
Table 2.1 Security portfolios of SHA-0 and SHA-1 
 SHA-0 SHA-1 
Secure or Vulnerable  Weak Secure till 2010 
Number of Operations 239 263 
Collision Probability 2-43 2-69 
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2.2.5.2 Digital Signature 
 
A digital signature is a mathematical expression intended to provide integrity and 
authenticity of the message and the person generating it. The generator of the message 
creates the digital signature and attaches it to the ongoing transmissions, which enables 
the recipient to correctly identify the real originator of the transmission and ensures that 
the message hasn’t been altered by an illegitimate user. In some schemes, encryption 
would also be required to ensure that the information was not revealed to outsiders. 
 
Before introducing a few digital signature schemes, it is necessary to discuss public and 
private key systems. Key exchange schemes are used when two parties (e.g., Alice and 
Bob) require exchanging keys exclusively and privately in an insecure environment. 
There are two main key exchange cryptographic schemes; Symmetric and Asymmetric 
Key systems. A symmetric key system (such as DES “Data Encryption Standard”) is 
based on a simple encryption system that requires both sender and receiver to use a single 
key to encrypt and decrypt messages.  
 
Therefore key exchange is an important step in symmetric key systems. One method to 
perform key exchange is through Diffie-Hellman (D-H) key exchange, which goes back 
to 1976 [30]. A D-H key exchange between Alice and Bob is shown in Figure 2.1, where 
a is Alice’s secret key and m, p are public key information, where p is a very large prime 
number and m is a primitive root mod p. Alice calculates the value D based on m, a, and p 
and sends D to Bob. Bob takes D along with the public key information (m and p) and its 
own private key; b, and calculates E and sends E to Alice. Now both Alice and Bob can 
calculate K based on the values received from the other person. The values of a and b are 
chosen in a way that even if a third party intercepts both D and E, it is computationally 
infeasible to calculate a, b, or K. 
 
An asymmetric key system, however uses two different keys for encryption/decryption. 
These keys are mathematically related to one another, forming a key pair; public/private 
keys. The private key should be kept private, while the public key can be available 
publicly. Thus a public key cryptosystem is an example of an asymmetric key system. 
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Figure 2.1 Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol 
 
A public key is typically used to encryption and a private key is used for decryption. 
 
An example of public-key-based system is the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which 
binds public keys with user identities through a certificate authority (CA). 
 
Symmetric keys are simpler compared to asymmetric cryptosystems, as they require 
just one key, however they require key exchange in a secure method through an insecure 
channel. A public key cryptosystem does not require key exchange, however it is more 
complex compared to a symmetric key system. Asymmetric key encryption is relatively 
slower than symmetric key encryption and therefore they are only used for key exchange 
and digital signature algorithms. 
 
A digital signature usually consists of three steps: 1). Key generation (public/private 
key pair), 2). Signing operation, and 3). Verification. 
 
There are several well-known digital signature schemes, namely; Digital Signature 
Algorithm (DSA) [31], RSA [32], and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA), which is based on DSA’s algorithm [33, 34].  
 
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA): The DSA in the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) 
was published in 1994 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and 
specified by Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 186-3. DSA is based on 
discrete logarithm problem, which tries to find the exponent value (E) in the equation: BE 
= P (mod M), where B is the base, P is the power, and M is the modulus. The key 
generation, signing, and verification procedures of DSA are given in the Appendix A. 
a, m, p 
 
D = ma mod p 
K = Ea mod p 
Alice 
m, p, D 
b 
 
E = mb mod p 




RSA: RSA cryptosystem is based on the assumption that factoring a very large number, 
which is the product of two very large prime numbers, and calculating those two prime 
numbers, is a very difficult task. The three stage (key distribution, signing, and verifying) 
are given in Appendix A.  
 
DSA versus RSA: RSA systems can be used for both digital signature and encryption, 
whereas DSA systems are only used for digital signature. The DSA signing is faster than 
verifying, whereas in RSA, verifying is much faster than signing. The precise signing and 
verifying delays for both schemes depends on the codes used to implement these schemes, 
the platform (e.g., OS) running the algorithms, and the hardware (e.g., CPU speed, RAM) 
on which the tests are carried out. 
 
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA): The ECDSA is the elliptic curve-
based version of the DSA scheme. It has been accepted in NIST and IEEE standards 
since 2000 [35, 36]. The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) utilizes the arithmetic 
operations and calculations of points, which are coordinates of an elliptic curve equation 
solutions defined over a finite field. The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA) has been explained in Appendix A [36]. 
 
The bottom line is that elliptic curve cryptography involves shorter signature messages 
compared to DSA and RSA, for the same cryptographic strength. For instance, RSA 1024 
bits and ECDSA 160 bits have the same cryptographic strength while the key length 
required for ECDSA is almost one seventh of the key length required for RSA [37].   
 
2.2.6 Access Control  
 
Access control is used to enable a legitimate user to have access to the resources. 
Access control uses one or more security mechanisms for granting access to the 
communication channel, application, and/or database. The following scenarios are 
categorized under access control: User identification, which is used to grant access to 
legitimate individuals. Emergency access, which is part of the access control scheme, 
where high-priority emergency access procedures (e.g., disaster relief) take precedence. 
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Data encryption-decryption, which are used for privacy and data integrity procedures to 
perform user- and application-dependent encryption/decryption schemes. Automatic 
logoff/logon, including shutting down parts of the network due to security breaches. 
Granting access permission to those parts is also within access control limits [14]. 
 
2.2.7 Availability   
 
Availability is a probabilistic measure of resources being available for possible 
communication upon request. The higher the probability of resources being available, the 
lesser is the chance that resources become unavailable. Denial of Service (DoS) attack 
lessens the availability of the channel and resources, therefore DoS and availability 
oppose each other’s effects [14]. 
 
2.2.8 MAC Layer Security Mechanisms 
 
In this section we briefly consider a few security mechanisms built around MAC layer 
mostly deployed in Wi-Fi systems. These include WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) [38], 
WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access), PSK-TKIP (Pre-shared Key - Temporal Key Integrity 
Protocol) [39], and WPA-AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) [40].   
 
WEP has shown to have serious security flaws, including [41, 42]: keys reuse and weak 
Initialization Vector (IV).  
 
2.3 Traffic Analysis – Packet-based Approach 
 
Traffic analyses can be categorized in three major classes: packet-, flow-, and 
application-based analyses. In this section, packet-based traffic analysis is considered. 
 
2.3.1 Packet Classifications Concept 
 
Traffic classification techniques are used to categorize traffic flows into tangible 
selections. These selections may be categorized in two major forms; packet information 
(e.g., packet size, flow duration) and packet representing the application in use. 
 20 
There are numerous categories of packet classifications, which are based on how they 
are observed and analyzed.  An observation can be made at the packet level, focusing on; 
packet size, duration, burstiness, and transmission patterns.  Another approach is the 
context and application-based packet approach, where the statistics of the packets are 
linked to the application, performance measures, and different underlying protocols 
stacks in use.  These will be discussed in later sections. 
 
2.3.1.1 Traffic Analysis in the Literature 
 
In the literature covering traffic classifications, a classical method of identifying flows 
is based on various parameters, such as IP and port addresses. Reference [43] proposes a 
method in which the first five TCP packets are observation to identify the application in 
use. The proposed classification technique in reference [43] operates in two phases; an 
online traffic classification phase and an offline learning phase. The offline learning 
phase uses the training data, checking the TCP flows to extract common behaviors. The 
traffic classification phase is used to extract the applications running above the TCP layer.  
 
Reference [44] discusses a new approach in traffic classification, which is called; 
BLINC; a multilevel traffic classification technique, which considers hosts flow activities 
instead of considering every individual TCP/UDP flows. The only limitation of BLINC is 
that it is capable of analyzing the statistics only after the connection is terminated. 
Therefore BLINC is incapable of analyzing the flows on the fly. 
 
Reference [45] presents a framework for traffic classification, which operates in the 
presence of packet payload. The scheme utilizes several building blocks that are used to 
create sufficient confidence for application identity. This is done by collecting packets 
with payloads collected on the Internet backbone and sorted based on the TCP/UDP 
flows and their port numbers. The results show that a classification based on simple port 
numbers will provide approximately 70% accuracy for the traffic classification. 
 
Reference [46] is based on NBAR (Network-Based Application Recognition), which is 
a traffic classification technique based on Internet applications (e.g., web-based), 
TCP/UDP port assignments, and other difficult-to-classify applications. 
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A few studies [47, 48] have shown that there are orthogonal correlations between four 
main traffic classification dimensions; rate, duration, burstiness, and size. These 
correlations are more accurate for heavy-hitters (e.g., long lasting connections), which 
contain DNS (Domain Name System) traffic.  
 
Reference [49] presents App-ID, which is an application security-based classification 
scheme, which operates by establishing application sessions and identifying different 
traffic flows using one of the following approaches: Protocol and port numbers, SSL 
(Secure Socket Layer) decryption, application decoders, or application signatures. 
 
In the study of traffic classifications, Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks are also important to 
consider where either TCP or UDP is used on top of IPv4 to convey file sharing data 
between individual users [50, 51, 52, 53]. P2P applications have gained popularity over 
the past few years and their usage is and will be on the rise. Reference [50] emphasizes 
on two main issues; the P2P traffic patterns and the fact that P2P applications use non-
standard and random port numbers, and the fact that conventional flow classification 
techniques are not adequate for proper classifications. Reference [51] demonstrates the 
accuracy, feasibility, and robustness of high speed P2P signature-based traffic 
applications. It discusses a number of P2P application protocols, such as eDonkey, 
BitTorrent, DirectConnet, Gnutella, and Kazaa protocols. The measurements show that 
by using application-level signatures techniques, less than 5% false position/negative 
ratios may be encountered.  
 
A few studies [52, 53] offer comparative approaches towards studying P2P traffic 
behaviors. Reference [53] offers three such approaches for P2P application 
classifications; port-based, application-layer signature, and transport-layer longitudinal 
approaches using empirical network traces over a two-year period. The results show that 
a classic port-based analysis is not accurate, which is inline with the results achieved in 
reference [50]. Application-layer signature approach, on the other hand, yields more 
accurate results, inline with the results achieved in reference [51]. 
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Reference [54] uses Naïve Bayesian estimator for Internet traffic classification analysis.  
With fine-tuning of the estimator’s variants, the results show 65% accuracy for a per-flow 
traffic classification technique. The accuracy can be increased to 95% when data from the 
same period is further analyzed using additional tools, such as Bayes based kernel-
estimator combined with FCBF (Fast Correlation-Based Filter). 
 
Reference [55] uses a supervised Naïve Bayesian estimator algorithm, which features 
building statistical models, describing the classes based on training data (machine learned 
classification). The results show an accuracy of 83% and higher for both per-byte and 
per-packet classifications. 
 
Reference [56] provides an accuracy of 82-100% based on an empirical evaluation 
technique, which models both host-specific- and aggregate-protocol behaviors. Such an 
accurate classification is independent of port label, which is not in-line with the 
traditional classification methods. The aggregate models are able to classify an 
unclassified server flow and determine whether flows this server match the behavior of 
previously seen flows from that server or not. The significance of these classifiers is the 
ability to augment traditional intrusion detection systems and detect artifacts of 
successful attacks.  
 
The performance of a traffic classifier directly depends on consideration of various 
traffic attributes. An example of such traffic attributes is flow size and failing to consider 
it effectively will contribute to the reduction of traffic classification accuracy [57]. Other 
attributes include; QoS measures and identifiers, which require CoS (Class of Service)-
based classifications [58]. 
 
Some protocols have certain attributes, which are suitable for traffic classification 
purposes. One set of protocols that are often noticed on the Internet backbone are routing 
protocols. Two different types of routing protocols are; internetwork and intranetwork 
routing protocols. Internetwork (e.g., Internet Autonomic System “AS”) routing schemes 
operate on larger scales, such as BGP (Border Gateway Protocol), whereas interanetwork 
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routing schemes work inside one network’s boundaries, such as OSPF (Open Shortest 
Path First). It is obvious that only internetworking routing schemes are observed on the 
Internet backbone. Flow classifications based on classifying BGP level prefix flows are 
one example of routing traffic classifications [59, 60]. Reference [59] uses a method 
based on Dirichlet Mixture Processes, which models flow histograms with a capability of 
examining macroscopic flows while distinguishing between various classes of traffic.  
 
An empirical approach to Inter-AS traffic classification [60, 61] includes extensive 
Internet-wide measurements and characterizing, classifying, and ranking them into 
individual ASs based on the utilities they derive (e.g., residential and business). The 
related scatterplots show that there are correlations between various pairs of utilities. 
 
Machine Learning (ML) methods have also been widely used in traffic classification 
techniques [62, 63], where traffic clusters are created based of various traffic 
characteristic. Early ML techniques mostly relied on offline and static analyses of traffic 
batch traces. However recent work is mostly based on real-time ML-based IP traffic 
classifications. 
 
Traffic classifications with various security measures in mind have been considered in 
various literatures [64, 65, 66]. It is shown that it is possible to classify and categorize 
Internet traffic flows without proper content analysis [54]. Using statistical signatures, it 
is possible to classify services even when they are running on non-conventional port 
numbers [65]. Reference [66] argues that the application of SSL (Secure Socket Layer) is 
on the rise and the characterization of SSL, which recognizes applications running on 
encrypted SSL connections based on the first packet size, provides an accurate traffic 
classification technique with more than 85% accuracy.  
 
Many of the parameters used in the study of traffic classifications, exist at the network 
layer. Therefore several studies [67, 68] included more focus on the Internet Protocol (IP), 
which operates at the network layer in the TCP/IP suite.  
 
More information on traffic classification is given in Appendix A. 
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2.3.2 Wireless QoS Requirements in the Absence of Security Mechanisms 
 
QoS in general falls into two categories; user perspective and network perspective. User 
perspective QoS refers to the quality as perceived by the user, including multimedia (e.g., 
video, audio, streaming, text, and file transfer) subjective quality. Other user perspective 
parameters in regards to QoS include: 
 
Connection Drop – When the delay or jitter figures increase passed certain limits, the 
link quality either becomes unbearable to the user or the underlying application drops the 
connection, causing a link failure. In either case, it will negatively affect the user greatly.  
 
Depending on the application in use (e.g.., audio, video, voice messaging, and audio 
streaming), the requirements for the subjective QoS (user perception) figures may change. 
For instance, if the end-to-end audio delay becomes more than 150 msec, the user level of 
discomfort starts to increase dramatically. 
 
In regards to network perspective QoS, disregarding security, the QoS-related 
parameters for multimedia applications include: Bandwidth or Throughput, Round-Trip 
Time (RTT), End-to-End Delay (E2ED), Bite error rate (BER), Packet Loss Ratio (PLR), 
Packet drop ratio (PDR), and Jitter [69, 70, 71, 72, 73]. A few of these parameters were 
introduced earlier in this chapter and the rest are defined as followed: 
 
Bit Error Rate – BER is the ratio of the number of error bits to the total length of 
information messages bits; such as sending 1 and receiving 0 at the receiver or vice versa. 
Channel conditions contribute to the value of BER, so when noise and/or interference 
levels rise, BER values rise as well.  
 
Packet Loss Ratio – PLR is a parameter that represents the ratio of the number of lost 
packets to the total number of packets sent. The performances of the link and the 
intermediate nodes have direct impacts on the value of the PLR. The higher the PLR 
value, the less efficient the communication path is between the source and the receiver. 
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Packet Drop Ratio – PDR is a performance measure that is mostly affected by the 
receiver’s input buffer. When the input buffer starts to fill up, a mechanism starts 
discarding (dropping) the packets. The lower the PDR value, the better is the quality of 
these buffers.  
 
2.3.2.1 Bandwidth Requirements 
 
Depending on the multimedia application in use, bandwidth constraints are different. 
Table A.1 (adapted from [74, 75, 76], Appendix A) shows bandwidth requirements for 
various MPEG formats (combination of video and audio).  
 
2.3.2.2 Voice over IP (VoIP) Bandwidth Requirements 
 
Voice over IP is an important multimedia application, which has become a dominant 
engine of transporting voice across IP networks [77]. 
 
VoIP systems deploy specific codecs to packetize voice messages. Each of these codecs 
has specific characteristics with unique bandwidth and delay requirements. The 
bandwidth requirements of a number of codecs are mentioned in Table A.2 (adapted from 
[78, 79, 80, 81]). The qualities of these codecs have direct effects on both user-perception 
(voice/video qualities), as well as network perspective QoS (e.g., overall delays). 
 
2.3.2.3 End-to-End Delay 
 
In a VoIP system, the transmission of voice data packets is not instantaneous and 
latency is the term used to describe the time durations that a voice packet is packetized, 
encoded, moved across the network to an endpoint, decoded and de-packetized, and de-
jittered, at the receiving end. 
 
As mentioned, the end-to-end delay has to be minimized for real-time and interactive 
applications. End-to-end delay reduction improves throughput figures directly. A 
thorough end-to-end delay analysis is needed for precise throughput calculations.  
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Total latency is so-called; end-to-end latency, mouth-to-ear latency, round-trip-delay 
(RTD), or round-trip time (RTT) [78].  
 
In VoIP, real conversations usually involve “turn-taking” with 200 msec breaks. When 
the latency of a network approaches the 200 msec limit, the conversation flow becomes 
distorted. The two end parties may interrupt each other by starting to talk simultaneously 
or remain silent at the same time. Higher delays passed the 150 msec (300 msec two-
ways) limit will affect the quality greatly [82]. Video codecs also have delay limits, for 
instance H.261 and H.263 are typically within the 200 msec to 400 msec limits. 
 
Multimedia applications often require bounded delay figures to offer seamless QoS. An 
end-to-end delay is comprised of the following delay figure combinations: Packet loss 
compensation, packet processing delay (comprised of; codec, serialization, queuing, and 
propagation delays), and dealing with the network jitter.  
 
Codec delay is the combination of frame processing and lookahead delays, which are 
defined as followed: 
 Frame processing delay is a delay of processing a single voice data frame.  
 Lookahead delay is the next frame processing delay, which is needed for 
algorithms with correlation schemes (e.g., ADPC) 
 
Table 2.2 Audio codec delays 
Codec Look Ahead Delay Codec Delay 
G.711 0 0.25 msec 
G.722 0.125 1.25 msec 
G.722.1 20 20 msec 
G.723.1 7.5 67.5 msec 
G.726 0 0.25 msec 
G.728 0 1.25 msec 
G.729 5 25 msec 
G.729a 5 25 msec 
GSM-HR 4.4 44.4 msec 
GSM-EFR 0 40 msec 
GSM-FR 0 40 msec 
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Table 2.2 (adapted from [83]) shows a few audio codecs delay figures. The processor 
for which the codecs are tested with are based on Packetcable audio and video 
Multimedia Terminals (MTAs) and Trunking Gateways (Media Gateway). 
 
The rest of the delays are from: BER, PLR, PDR, PRDeR, echo, and Jitter. Jitter is one 
of the most important phenomena affecting the quality of a VoIP system.  
 
Jitter happens due to the fact that there is no delivery guarantees for the voice packets 
across IP networks, therefore there are possibilities that not all voice data packets travel 
the same path, causing variation in the packet arrival times. This may happen because 
some packets may be forced to travel paths with more hops than other packets, depending 
on the routing decisions. Therefore packets arrive at the destination node with variable 
delays causing much higher latency effect, called jitter, which is calculated per seconds 
[84, 85, 86]. 
 
Too many packets being processed at the intermediate gateways/routers may 
overwhelm the processing duties momentarily. Both of these circumstances cause latency 
to become irregular and this irregular delay, as mentioned, is called jitter. To lessen the 
jitter’s effect, packets are gathered in jitter buffers in the intermediate transmission 
devices and at the receiving-end device. Table 2.3 (adapted from [87]) shows the 
acceptable VoIP jitter figures, which should be below the 70 msec level and for inter-
frame delay (frame delay jitter) in video, it should be less than 150 msec (for H.261). 
 
Table 2.3 Jitter figures in VoIP (Cisco-based) systems  
Jitter Quality 
Less than 40 ms Excellent                  (unnoticeable 
jitter) 
40-75 ms Acceptable                       (noticeable 
jitter) 





Table 2.4 Comparison of R-values and MOS scores  
Characterization MOS Value 
Very Satisfied 4.3+ 
Satisfied 4.0-4.3 
Some Users Dissatisfied 3.6-4.0 
Many Users Dissatisfied 3.1-3.6 
Nearly All Users Dissatisfied 2.6-3.1 
Not Recommended 1.0-2.6 
 
 
Table 2.5 Upper limits of codec’s MOS values 
Codecs Mean Opinion Score (MOS) 
G.711  (64 kbps) 4.3 
G.722 (64 kbps) 4.2 
iLBC (13.33/15.2 kbps) 4.14 
AMR (12.2 kbps) 4.14 
G.729 (8 kbps) 3.92 
G.728 (16 kbps) 3.9 
G.723.1 (6.3 kbps) 3.9 
GSM EFR (12.2 kbps) 3.8 
G.726 ADPCM (32 kbps) 3.8 
G.729a (8 kbps) 3.7 
G.723.1 (5.3 kbps) 3.65 
GSM FR (12.2 kbps) 3.5 
 
The combination of end-to-end delay, jitter, noise-levels, and other factors, are used to 
calculate a subjective measure for VoIP system, which is called; the Mean Opinion Score 
(MOS) value. MOS values vary from 5 (highest) to 1 (lowest). 
 
The quality of the audio codec has a direct impact on the MOS value (Table 2.4). 
Table 2.5 (adapted from [88]) shows a few codecs and their upper MOS limits. 
 
In general, multimedia traffic requires bounded limits on the QoS-related parameters 
(e.g., delay) to guarantee certain performance measures. Table 2.6 (adapted from [89]) 
summarizes general QoS requirements for multimedia traffic.  
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Audio Voice Conversation Duplex 4-64 < 150 < 70 < 3% 
Audio Voice Messaging Half 
Duplex 
4-32 < 1 < 70 < 3% 
Audio High Quality Audio 
Streaming 
Simplex 16-128 < 10 < 5  < 1% 
Video Video Phoning Duplex 16-384 150-400 < 30 < 1% 
Video Video Streaming Simplex 16-384 < 10 < 30 < 1% 
Data Web Browsing 
(HTTP) 
Duplex 10 < 100 N/A 0% 
Data Transaction (SSL) Half 
Duplex 
< 10 < 100 N/A 0% 
Data Control Duplex 1 < 250 N/A 0% 
Data Interactive Gaming Duplex <1 < 200 N/A 0% 
Data Telnet Half 
Duplex 





< 10 < 100 N/A 0% 
Data Bulk Data 
Transmission 
Simplex 10 – 
10,000 
< 60k N/A 0% 





< 10 < 60k N/A 0% 









10 < 10k N/A < 1% 
Data Background Priority Half 
Duplex 
< 10 < 30k N/A 0% 






In the previous section, QoS parameters were discussed without considering security 
mechanisms. In this section, requirements are considered in the presence of various 
security schemes. 
 
 The main security mechanisms are [14]: Confidentiality (data, address), integrity, 
authentication, authorization, non-repudiation, access control, and availability. 
 
 
Each of the above mentioned mechanisms will have effects on the latency, bandwidth, 
and processing power. In this section we will study these effects. 
 
2.3.3.1 Confidentiality (Privacy) 
 
Privacy is needed to protect the communication, both the communicating parties and 
the transmitted information among them. To keep the communication private, encryption 
schemes are used and for the privacy of the communicating parties, VPNs (Virtual 
Private Network), such as IPSec (IP Security), are used. VNPs are used to create secure 
tunnels from the source to the destination, in which they hide the real IP addresses of the 
parties and encrypt the payload transmitted between end-points. 
 
Such a deployment (VPN) has an overhead. In a non-interactive environment, such an 
overhead may not be critical. However for an interactive communication, such an 
overhead becomes critical [90, 91]. To carry-out real-time application, RTSP (Real-Time 
Streaming Protocol) is used which uses RTP (Real-Time Protocol) on top of UDP or TCP.  
 
RTP has a relatively large header with a minimum 12 byte length and is usually 
accompanied with IP (IP header of 20 bytes) and UDP (UDP header of 8 bytes), resulting 
a 40 byte header packet. This header could be extended by 20 to 800 bytes, depending on 
the codec in use. 
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There are various VPN technologies, including [92]: PPTP (Point-to-Point Tunneling 
Protocol), L2F (Layer-2 Forwarding), L2TP (Layer-2 Tunneling Protocol), IPSec, GRE 
(Generic Routing Encapsulation), MPLS (Multiprotocol Label Switching), ATM 
(Asynchronous Transfer Mode), and Frame Relay. ATM and Frame Relay are Layer II 
VPNs and GRE, MPLS and IPsec are layer III VPNs. 
 
Depending on the platform and implementation specifics, IPSec’s may have varying 
impacts on the throughput figure for both FTP and HTTP downloads in the absence and 
presence of other security schemes [93, 94]. 
 
2.3.3.2 Integrity  
 
Integrity is used to ensure the receiving partner that the data received has not been 
altered by any means after it has been transmitted from the sender. Integrity and non-
repudiation mechanisms are often provided at the same time. Therefore hashing schemes 
are used to provide integrity and are used in the mechanisms of digital signatures to offer 
non-repudiation capability. A few hash schemes are: SHA-1, -256, -384, and -512 [95], 
Message Authentication Code (MAC), and HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication 
Code).  
 
2.3.3.3 Authentication  
 
User authentication is a process by which, identity of an entity is confirmed.  Data 
authentication confirms what data belongs to which user, which is provided by 
certificates and digital signatures. Once a user has been authenticated with a server, the 
user remains authenticated as long as the session is ongoing. Once the session is 
terminated and reestablished, authentication may be required again, however there are a 
few mechanisms (e.g., key caching [96]) that may exempt an entity from requiring the 
authentication process after being authenticated at least once and session termination. A 
strong authentication mechanism involves two-way authentication handshaking to 
validate both client and server (or two clients in a peer-to-peer scenario) to one another. 
A few authentication mechanisms include: IEEE 802.1X (both wired and wireless), EAP 
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(EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, LEAP, PEAP and EAP-FAST, EAP-SIM), RADIUS, public key 
(X.509) [97, 98]. Depending on the authentication protocol, it can cause a delay between 




Non-repudiation is required so that none of the involved parties can later on deny their 
involvements in a communication, which has already taken place among them. Digital 
signature was introduced in section 2.2.5.2 Reference [99] discusses a few digital 
signature schemes and compares the performance of ECDSA and RSA. In the design of a 
non-repudiation system, it is vital to take the end-to-end (key distribution, signing, and 
verifying) delay figures into account. The end-to-end delay of a digital signature scheme 
has an impact on the system’s throughput, which should also be considered. 
 
2.3.4 IEEE 802.11i 
 
IEEE 802.11i is a security amendment for IEEE 802.11 standard with WPA (Wireless 
Protected Access) as its subset. IEEE 802.11i specifies a four-way handshaking for the 
encryption key distribution and includes a combination of privacy (encryption), 
authentication, integrity, and confidentiality. The standard specifies WPA2 (RSN-AES) 
on top of EAP using CCMP [100]. 
 
Each of the security mechanisms contributes to the delay and overhead figures, which 
reduce the performance. Authentication has an initial impact when client/server enter the 
authentication phase. Once authenticated, no more authentication procedure is required 
until device roams. Encryption and digital signature may impact all the involved packets.  
The impact of security has been investigated in various references [101, 102, 1103, 104].  
 
2.4 Wireless Traffic 
 
Wireless traffic differs from wired traffic in variety of ways. First of all wired data 
transmitted over a LAN is band/channel free. Therefore a wired packet analyzer is able to 
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monitor all packets simultaneously. However, wireless traffic is band/channel dependent. 
In general, for current Wi-Fi networks, there are two functional bands; radio b/g (2.4 
GHz) and radio a (5 GHz). Each radio has specific number of functional channels. 
 
2.4.1 IEEE 802.11 b/g 
 
IEEE 802.11 b/g radio operates at 2.4 GHz and the channels associated to these two 
radios are regional dependent. These regional dependent channel schemes are: North 
America: 11, Europe: 13, and Japan: 14 channels. The detailed regional schemes are 
depicted in Table A.3 [105, 106].  
 
Each 802.11b/g channel is 5 MHz apart from the neighboring channel and in order for 
two neighboring APs to be able to operate simultaneously without any RF interference, 
they are bound to transmit on two channels with at least 5 channel (25 MHz) separation. 
Therefore it’s a universally accepted scheme to label channel 1, 6, and 11 as the most 
frequently used or main channels. Any neighboring APs operating on these non-
overlapping channels can operate simultaneously. The rest of the channels are labeled as 
less frequently used or sub-channels. 
 
Due to the fact that in many geographical regions, main Wi-Fi channels are overloaded, 
some mobile carriers have started deploying sub-channels, such as; channel 5, 7 and 10 
on their Wi-Fi capable mobile devices.  
 
2.4.2 IEEE 802.11 a 
 
Each Access Point (AP) advertises its presence and capabilities through a short 
message it transmits, which is called a beacon. Beacons are usually 102.4 msec apart 
from one another. In a beacon one can find the wireless MAC address, radio and channel 
assignments, extended offering rates, SSID name, QoS and security capabilities and etc.. 
 
Radio a operates in the 5 GHz frequency band and is also regional dependent. Due to 
the wider frequency spectrum band compared to radio b/g, more channels are allocated to 
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this radio compared to radio b/g. Since each radio a channel is already 20 MHz apart 
from the neighboring channel, there is no restriction on the neighboring APs in regards to 
the channel usage. If two neighboring APs use even neighboring channels (e.g., 36 and 
40), they will still be able to operate without causing any interference on one another. 
Therefore there is no main-channel/sub-channel issue in radio a. However some channels 
are used more often. For example in North America, 9 channels out of 12 available 
channels are used more often. Table A.4 [105, 106, 107, 108, 109] shows the regional 
frequency allocations in IEEE 802.11a.  
 
Besides physical differences between wired and wireless traffic (e.g., channel, band, 
etc.), most of the attributes between wired and wireless traffic classification are very 
similar. 
 




Security and QoS provisioning and their co-existence are important aspects in the 
design of new protocol stacks. Such provisioning will become more critical for wireless 
systems as there are more limitations associated to wireless systems compared to wired 
systems. 
 
Security and QoS provisioning has traditionally been considered at lower OSI layers 
(e.g., MAC). However there is an increasing interest in provisioning shift from lower OSI 
layers to higher layers; ultimately to the application layer. It is believed that such a 
transition will add user-awareness and efficiency of the network with more adaptability to 
the current demands. 
  
This section will include discussions on QoS and security requirements at selected 
layers and in multilayer and cross-layer contexts and eventually we will study various 
criteria for considering such provisioning at the applications layer.  
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 2.5.2 QoS/Security Parameters at the Physical (PHY) Layer  
 
PHY layer deals with the actual transmission of bits and bytes on the physical medium 
(e.g., wire, air, etc.). The physical limitations of the medium usually prevent much 
maneuver in terms of applicable QoS and security schemes at the PHY layer. Therefore 
in most communication systems, as the information packets travel from the application 
layer towards the lower layer, most of the QoS and security mechanisms are being 
applied in higher layers before the information packets reach the PHY layer. The 
followings are the parameters related to QoS/Security at the PHY layer: 
 
2.5.2.1 QoS at the PHY layer  
 
At the PHY layer of wireless links, QoS-related parameters mostly deal with packet 
loss ratio rates and throughput rates, which are functions of the channel quality. One of 
the attributes of wireless channels is the continuously varying channel quality. The 
existence of this attribute makes it almost impossible to maintain constant date rate and 
low packet loss rate. The parameters that deal with QoS at the PHY layer include: Packet 
Drop Ratio (PDR) [110], Bit Error Rate (BER) [111], Signal to Interference Ratio (SIR) 
[112], transmission power, and built-in strengths for coding and modulation techniques 
(e.g., Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing “OFDM”, Direct Sequence Spread 
Spectrum “DSSS”, Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum “FHSS”, Infrared, etc.).  
 
2.5.2.2 Security at the PHY layer  
 
The security strength related to the PHY layer comes from its interactions with higher 
layers where security has been considered and the limited security features incorporated 
in PHY layer itself. The most prominent security threat in PHY layer is the Denial of 
Service (DoS) attack, where the shared physical medium (air) is used by an attacker to 
launch threats to the physical resources. DoS in its simplest form can be in the form of a 
radio jamming that causes the legitimate users to experience limited (or no) service from 
the radio transmitter. This is done when the attacker is located between users and the 
transmitter and is sending interfering and jamming signals [14]. Another PHY layer DoS 
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issue is tampering, where the attacker has physical access to the infrastructure. DoS is a 
multilayer security issue and we will be considering it in other layers as well. 
 
Therefore the security measures applied to the PHY layer is a guarantee of low-
probability-of-interception (LPI) [113], which is dependent on several transmission 
properties, including; modulation schemes, channel, and signal characteristics. 
 
2.5.3 QoS/Security parameters at the Data Link Layer  
 
In legacy wireless protocols, data link layer is the most important layer in terms of 
security and QoS realizations.  
 
2.5.3.1 QoS at the MAC (Medium Access) Layer 
 
In many current and legacy protocols, MAC layer plays major roles in terms of 
providing QoS. The following protocols provide wired-based QoS at the MAC layer: 
IEEE 802.1p – This is the standard providing 8 levels (3-bits) of user traffic classes.  
 
IEEE 802.1Q – This is the bases for VLAN (Virtual LAN) technology, where switching 
is done at the MAC layer. IEEE 802.1Q frame has the following fields: 16-bit Tag 
Protocol Identifier (TPID), 3-bit Priority Code Point (PCP), which is also known as IEEE 
802.1p, one bit Canonical Format Indicator (CFI), and a 12-bit VLAN Identifier (VID). 
 
2.5.3.1.1 QoS for Wi-Fi (EDCA Mechanism) 
 
IEEE 802.11e is an IEEE 802.11 amendment offering variety of enhancements 
including queue-based QoS functionality. Two new mechanisms were included in IEEE 
802.11e; EDCA (Enhanced Distributed Channel Access), which is based on DCF systems 
and HCCA (HCF Controlled Channel Access), which is based on HCF (Hybrid 
Coordination Function) for PCF mechanism. EDCF (Enhanced Distributed Coordination 
Function) combines the advantages of both DCF and PCF while operating in both 
contention free and contention periods. It provides guarantee of service with a much 
higher probability in respect to EDCA. Figure 2.2 (adapted from [114]) shows the 
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EDCA/HCCA block diagram in the IEEE 802.11e standard. WMM (Wi-Fi Multimedia) 
is another name for EDCF and HCCA is also known as WMM Scheduled Access. 
 
There are eight different User Priority (UP) schemes associated to the EDCA 
mechanism (Table 2.7 (adapted from [127]), including Background (BK), Best Effort 
(BE), Video (VI), and Voice (VO). In order to comply with the eight UP values in 
Ethernet frames (IEEE 802.1D) and Class Selector (CS) values in DSCP frame, these 
four QoS queuing schemes are repeated twice each, therefore the UP values are: 000 
(BK), 001 (BK), 010 (BE), 011 (BE), 100 (VI), 101 (VI), 110 (VO), 111 




Figure 2.2 IEEE 802.11e QoS system  
 
 





IEEE 802.1D Designation  Access Category Designation 
1 Background (BK) AC_BK Background 
2 - AC_BK Background 
0 Best Effort (BE) AC_BE Best Effort 
3 Excellent Effort (EE) AC_BE Best Effort 
4 Controlled Load (CL) AC_VI Video 
5 Video (VI) AC_VI Video 













Figure 2.3 Queue system in 802.11e QoS system  
 
 
2.5.3.1.2 QoS Scheme for IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX) Systems 
 
WIMAX systems follow the same principles as in Wi-Fi systems. For instance, as 
mentioned, IEEE 802.11e follows a four level QoS queuing system, whereas in IEEE 
802.16, there is a five level queuing mechanism offering QoS classes of services, namely; 
UGS (Unsolicited Grant Service), rtPS (Real-Time Polling Service), ertPS (Extended 
Real-Time Polling Service), nrtPS (non-Real-Time Polling Service), and BE (Best 
Effort) [115]. 
 
2.5.3.2 Security at the Data Link Layer 
 
Many current and legacy security/QoS systems have QoS and security mechanisms 
built-in to their MAC layers. Therefore a thorough observation of this layer is required.  
 
For each new access technology (e.g., Wi-Fi, WiMAX, etc.), MAC layer stack is 
updated, however LLC remains relatively unchanged. This is due to the fact that the 
interaction of upper layers (e.g., network) and the DLL should remain the same and 
independent of the underlying MAC/PHY technology in use. That is why the term MAC 
is used more often than DLL and LLC. 
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2.5.3.2.1 Logical Link Control (LLC) 
 
The only functional entities operating under LLC are: Service Access Points (SAPs) 
and flow control with minimal variations between different access technologies. 
Therefore there are no significant security/QoS-related parameters under LLC. 
 
2.5.3.2.2 Medium Access Control (MAC) 
 
Protocol stack variations between different access technologies are best visible under 
MAC layer, where most of the current and legacy mechanisms lie. For Wi-Fi systems, the 
two available security protocols include; WEP and WPA. 
 
WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy) – WEP was the initial scheme intended to bring 
access control, privacy and confidentiality for IEEE 802.11 legacy systems (Figure 2.4). 
WEP uses RC4 stream cipher and relies on a secret key being shared between the client 
and the server [116].  
 
There are number of security flaws associated to WEP, which makes it vulnerable to 
various attacks. Shared key authentication requires that a client uses a preshared WEP 
key for encrypting the challenge text transmitted from the AP to the client. The client is 
then authenticated by the AP by decrypting the shared key response and checking that it 
matches the challenge text. 
 
The process by which the challenge text is exchanged, takes place over the wireless link. 
An eavesdropper is able to capture both the plain-text challenge text and the associated 
cipher-text response. WEP encrypts using an exclusive OR (XOR) function on the plain-
text with the key stream, which produces the cipher-text. Therefore, an eavesdropper can 
use a protocol analyzer and easily derive the key stream by sniffing the shared key during 




The other vulnerability in WEP comes from the weakness in the IV (Initialization 
Vector) mechanism, which is 12 bits (for both 64 and 128 bits WEP schemes). This 
weakness involves the IV repetition in various WEP packets. Therefore the secret key can 
be found by analyzing the traffic patterns [116]. 
 
IEEE 802.11i and WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access) - IEEE 802.11i is the security 
amendment of IEEE 802.11 following the official acceptance of WEP’s weakness in 
2004. The Wi-Fi Alliance certification programs for IEEE 802.11i are called WPA. 
 
The 802.11i architecture is built around the IEEE 802.1X authentication scheme, which 
involves the deployment of EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol), Authenticator 
(e.g., Access Point “AP”), and the Authentication Server, RSN (Robust Security 
Network), and either TKIP (WPA) for authentication (entailing the use of EAP and an 
authentication server), RSN (Robust Security Network), which keeps track of 
associations, and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)-based CCMP (Counter Mode 
with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol, bases of WPA2), 
which provides integrity, confidentiality, and origin authentication. IEEE 802.11i 
authentication process involves a four-way handshaking scheme, which takes place 
between the wireless client station (STA) and the Access Point (AP) [117]. 
 
There are two types of keys used in this handshaking scheme, the transient keys 
(Pairwise Transient Key “PTK”) and the permanent keys (Pairwise Master Key “PMK”). 
In this process PMK is first generated and then a PTK is created by the concatenation of 
the following information: 1). PMK, 2). STA nonce (SNonce), 3). STA Wireless MAC 
address 4). AP nonce (ANonce), and 5). AP Wireless MAC address. Following the 
creation of PMK and PTK, a GTK (Group Temporal Key) is generated, which is used for 







2.5.4 QoS/Security Parameters at the Network Layer 
 
Network layer mostly deal with efficient routing of packets all the way from the source 
network to the destination network. There are network-layer schemes offering both QoS 
and security capabilities, which will be discussed in this section. 
 
2.5.4.1 QoS at the Network Layer 
 
Integrated Services (IntServ) is one of the earliest QoS schemes, where end-to-end QoS 
solution is provided using Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP)-flows. In this case all 
nodes between the source and the receiver had to agree on QoS specifics. This scheme 
lacked in scalability. Networks became very complicated when nodes were increased.  
 
Internet Protocol (IP) (both IPv4 and IPv6), which operates at the network layer defines 
an eight bit QoS related field; ToS (Type of Service). Differentiated Services (DiffServ) 
later on adopted a scheme based on the ToS field in which it renamed the field to DSCP 
(Differentiated Services Code Point). This way, when receiving packets, DiffServ-
enabled nodes can act independently from the other nodes, which is called Per-Hop 
Behavior (PHB), which is purely based on individual DSCP values given to every flow 
passing through each nodes. Therefore the DiffServ scheme solves the scalability issue of 
IntServ. 
 
2.5.4.2 Security at the Network Layer 
 
There are various security schemes and mechanisms operating at the network layer, 
which will be discussed in this section. 
 
2.5.4.2.1 IP Security (IPSec) 
 
IPSec (all versions) is a well known network layer security scheme, which possesses 




Figure 2.4 IEEE 802.11 security protocol stack 
 
IPSec’s mechanism works around the idea of using Security Associations (SAs) and 
cryptographic encryption/decryption keys (e.g., DES, 3DES, or AES) [119]. IPSec uses 
IKE (Internet Key Exchange) mechanism to manage (establish and change) keys, where 
IKE is a public key-based scheme. IPSec may use Certificate Authorities (CAs) or 
shared-secrets for the authentication purposes. IPSec uses Diffie-Hellman scheme for the 
security key exchange scheme. IPSec is able to detect and prevent message alteration 
using message hashing algorithms (e.g., ESP-SHA-HMAC). 
 
There are two flavors of IPSec mechanism; Authentication Header (AH) and 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). An AH scheme provides data authentication 
without encryption. Therefore AH-IPSec messages can be viewable by a third party. 
 
An ESP scheme also comes in two flavors; Tunnel mode and Transport mode. In tunnel 
mode, the IP header (e.g., source, destination, etc.) is encrypted in addition to what AH 
provides. Therefore in tunnel mode, headers require frequent decryptions/re-encryptions 
passing through each node and hub for routing purposes. 
 
In transport mode, the payload is only encrypted and the IP header is left unencrypted. 
Therefore in transport mode, normal routing procedure is in place and no extra operations 




2.5.5 QoS/Security Parameters at the Transport Layer 
 
Transport layer is responsible for the correct delivery of data all the way from the 
source to the destination. However most of the traffic flows on the Internet backbones are 
based on TCP (Transmission Control Protocol, RFC 793, created in 1981) and UDP 
(User Datagram Protocol, RFC 768, created in 1980) and in time of their creation, QoS, 
security, and wireless communications were not considered. Therefore in order to provide 
transport layer mechanisms offering QoS, security, and wireless capabilities, 
enhancements are required, which were not included in the legacy transport layer 
architecture, however added to the newer protocol versions, such as NSIS (Next Step In 
Signaling), AOTP (Application Oriented Transport Protocol), and SCTP (Stream Control 
Transmission Protocol), which are enhanced with QoS provisioning capabilities and 
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [120], which provides security at the transport layer. 
 
2.5.5.1 TCP versus UDP 
 
TCP is a connection-oriented protocol that offers the following features: Reassembly of 
the arrived data in order (though that they might have been received our-of-order), 
correctness of the received data, detection and correction of lost and duplication of the 
received data, and traffic congestion control. For these, TCP has a complex frame 
structure, featuring source/destination port, sequence, and acknowledgement numbers, 
window, control, option, payload, and other fields. TCP also features a three-way 
handshaking scheme to provide guarantee of delivery. 
 
TCP is used for important content delivery and the delivery of data with very low 
tolerance for lost packets. When TCP is used, guarantee of delivery is favored over 
transmission speed. 
 
UDP, on the other hand, is a connectionless protocol with a less complex frame 
structure, including source/destination port numbers, length, checksum, and payload 
fields. Applications running over UDP may be tolerant to some degree of packet loss and 
the speed of data delivery is the most important factor for these applications. Audio/video 
streaming is an example of an application that uses UDP as its transport protocol. 
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2.5.5.1.1 Challenges in deploying TCP and UDP 
 
For applications running over TCP, delay and speed are limited due to the complexity 
of the inbuilt mechanisms in TCP for the delivery guarantee. Therefore if speed, low-
delay figures, and guarantee of delivery are all required for an application, this may be a 
challenging task in the deployment of TCP. 
 
In regards to the deployment of UDP, as mentioned, speed of delivery and lower delay 
figures are provided, however there is no guarantee of delivery. Therefore in a busy 
network with numerous stations communicating simultaneously, chances will increase for 
packet loss and incurring congestions periods, which may become unacceptable. In such 
scenarios, there is no mechanism in UDP to correct these issues, therefore a separate 
mechanism, possibly in another layer (e.g., application layer), should be deployed to 
detect and correct such issues.  
 
2.5.6 QoS/Security parameters at the Application Layer 
 
In TCP/IP protocol suite, application layer covers all top three OSI layers (application, 
presentation, and session layers). In general, an application is the highest level of user-
interface interaction. Traditionally, less power was given to applications in terms of how 
the underlying layers (transport and lower layers) interact with the network parameters. 
However in recent approaches, it has become evident that more intelligence and control 
in the application layer will result in better performance especially for multimedia-rich 
mobile traffic contents. 
 
2.5.6.1 QoS at the Application Layer 
 
The application layer QoS’s objective is to create QoS-ready schemes at the application 
layer. At this layer, it is possible to have negotiation of applications on the run and 
transfer QoS-enabled parameters among different layers to create a soft-state QoS 
provision. In soft-state, QoS parameters can renegotiate during the application run, 
creating a dynamic QoS scheme. Soft-state QoS is particularly important during mobility 
and handoff for performance adaptation.  
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Application layer QoS requires the per-user-based traffic support of the QoS scheme 
[121] to enable different levels of qualities for different users. Table 2.8 (adapted from 
[122]) shows the application QoS requirements. The mentioned classes of service are to 
enable different levels of services to different types of services and applications.  
 
The application layer QoS includes [122] provisioning of QoS triggered by requests 
from a QoS policy manager in the network and provisioning of QoS on requests that are 
signaled to the QoS policy manager at the service layer. Such a signaling scheme can be 
originated either from outside of the wireless network, from the Subscriber Station (SS), 
from a host connected to the SS, or from an intermediate server. Another scenario is the 
provisioning of QoS by the QoS policy manager triggered by on-path signaling processed 
by policy enforcement points in the network, which in turn generate requests to the policy 
manager. Such a signaling can be originated either from outside or inside of the wireless 
network, the SS, or from a host connected to the SS. Application layer QoS should 
conform to the provisioning for Best Effort or Differentiated QoS across active service 
flows for backward compatibility and should be consistent to the Service Level 
Agreements (SLA) across Base Stations (BSs), including during handovers.  
 
Current application layer QoS applications include streaming video and video-
telephony applications. In video streaming, the application layer QoS controller resides in 
the streaming server and is fed by the compressed video/audio feeds and controls the 
transport protocols. The mentioned application layer QoS controller reduces the chance 
of congestion and maximizes the video quality in the presence of packet loss. This is 
done by delay-constrained retransmission and error-resilient encoding mechanism [123]. 
 
Application layer QoS is used in variety of applications for the mobile technology, one 
of which is SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) [124, 125]. The application layer QoS is 
responsible to grant QoS resources ensuring that both application service provider (ASP) 





Table 2.8 Application QoS requirements 
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Dynamic Rate Adaptation (DRA) is an application layer QoS mechanism where 
transmission rates are dynamically changed according to the application criteria. In 
particular, video and audio applications running on wireless links, use DRA schemes for 
more efficient bandwidth allocations. In a multimedia application offering DRA, the 
algorithms adjust the encoding parameters to achieve a target throughput dynamically.  
 
Efficient DRA provisioning at the application layer could lead to congestion control. 
Congestion control mechanisms are window-based or rate-based. For the rate-based 
congestion control, the sender should incorporate rate adaptation compression and rate 
shaping schemes. At the receiver, jitter, error, and delay concealment schemes are 
required for an end-to-end application layer congestion control system. 
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Application layer parameters include: Application QoS handler, QoS aware 
applications, and session-based priorities. 
 
Recent application layer QoS control techniques control packet loss and transmission 
delays due to network congestion, without any support from the network infrastructure. 
What we are intending to design is a cross-layer approach to have various feedbacks from 
other layer for an intelligent application layer QoS scheme.  
 
Application-layer-QoS includes Congestion Control mechanisms and Error Control 
schemes. Congestion control mechanisms can further be classified into Rate Shaping 
methods and Rate Control methods. Error Control mechanisms is comprised of: 
retransmissions, Forward Error Correction (FEC) coding, error resilient coding and error 
concealment. FEC schemes include: Hamming distance, Convolutional forward error 
correction (CFEC), Golay forward error correction (GFEC), and Reed-Solomon forward 
error correction with interleaving (RSFECI) [126]. Cross-interleaved Reed Solomon 
codes (CIRCs) are used in both error detection and correction mechanisms, specifically 
used for countering mixture of random and burst errors.  
 
We are specifically interested in RSFECI as we will be using an adaptive version of this 
in our system design. Reed-Solomon FEC codes use fixed (input and output) block codes 
structures. Most commonly used R-S code is the (255, 223) structure, which has 223 
input block of 8 bits long symbols producing a 255 encoded output symbols using a 
systematic conversion scheme. In a systematic conversion, some portion of the output 
symbols contains the original form of the input symbols. The R-S (255, 223) code can 
correct up to 16 R-S errors in each codewords, therefore the code can correct up to 16 
short burst errors. In general the format is RS (n, k, n-k+1), where n is the length over the 
finite field F and k is the dimension with a minimum distance of n-k+1. 
 
Rate control can be achieved at the source or receiver or at both of them. Source based 
rate control techniques are either model based or probe based. In model based approaches, 
they are based on the throughput model of the TCP, whereas in probe based approaches 
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at the source, which are experimental in nature and rely receiver feedbacks to adapt the 
sending rate to the network bandwidth. In a receiver based rate control mechanism, the 
source is required to transmit data in separate channels with different quality. When 
receiver detects no congestion then it will add a channel to improve the video’s visual 
quality. However if congestion is detected then the receiver drops a channel, which 
performs a degradation of the video’s visual quality. Besides these individual approaches 
a hybrid technique exists in which both source and receiver cooperate in achieving rate 
control. Another technique is the rate shaping that is used to provide congestion control. 
The basic idea behind rate shaping is to perform transcoding by using rate adapting filters 
for transmission between links with different bandwidth requirements [127]. 
 
2.5.6.1.1 Jitter and Delay Concealment 
 
Multimedia transmission over wireless access technology, in particular, audio 
applications are especially prone to quality degrading jitters and delays. Delay and jitter 
concealment schemes at the application layer may reduce such effects. Such schemes 
introduce adaptive packet-based time-scale modifications at the application layer using 
adaptive playout algorithms [128] that minimize packet drop, variable arrival delays 
(jitter), and packets arriving late at the receiver. These schemes maintain constraints on 
the end-to-end delay using voice segment length stretch and silence interval integration 
mechanisms. 
 
2.5.6.1.2 Program Clock Synchronization  
 
In the application process for decoding high quality audio and video transmissions, it is 
crucial to recover high-quality system clocks. For instance, MPEG-2 decoder contains 
audio and video sample clocks. A program clock synchronization is used to support a 
high quality application layer audio/video decoding scheme. 
  
There is a time-shift relationship between the maximum nominal bandwidth speed 
attainable in wired networks compared to that of a wireless network. Approximately there 
is a 10 year gap, therefore the maximum bandwidth attainable for current wireless 
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networks (802.11n and WiMAX at nominal speed of approximately a hundred Mbps) 
match the wired network speeds back in mid 90’s. The current line rates attainable 
according to the current Cisco System switch capacity, is in 5 Gbps [129].  This rate will 
be raised to 15 Gbps in less than a year. Processing of such a high speed requires 
hardware-based network processors and since the lowest speed in the 5 layer Internet 
protocol hierarchy is achieved in the application layer, for a system, in order to keep up 
with the extreme high rate of line, the application layer has to be implemented in the 
hardware or firmware. This transition from pure software to hardware is inevitable. 
Therefore ASIC-based chips will not only house network processors, they will also 
accommodate application processors as well. 
 
The increase of the line speeds, and as a consequence, the increase of the wireless 
bandwidths, have so far been incremental. This increase trend of speed will soon find a 
saturation limit, caused by the physical limitations of the channel and electronic parts. 
The remedy to this saturation of the line speed is the deployment of new communication 
strategies and devices. 
 
One method for the hardware-based fast application level switching is the deployment 
of the Network Based Application Recognition (NBAR) [130, 131] concept. NBAR is 
capable of recognizing packets with complex fields and attributes combinations. NBAR 
is able to identify if a packet belongs to certain traffic stream by performing a deep-
packet inspection and with an appropriate policy scheme, specific packets can be dealt 
with accordingly. An entity that works with NBAR is the Protocol Description Language 
Module (PDLM), which is an application signature. Another entity that NBAR works 
with is the Cisco Express Forwarding (CEF), which together with NBAR they provide 
deep-packet classification only on the first stream packet. 
 
The following approaches are the current application layer QoS frameworks: 1). 
Application Layer Dynamic Services [132], 2). MS-triggered and MS-initiated service 
flow creation [129], 3). QoS API over Socket (QAoS) Framework [129], and 5). QoS 




Figure 2.5 Server-to-application-to-transport level flows 
 
In these approaches, application layer agents work closely with agents operating in 
other layers (especially in MAC layer) and they pass information between each other. A 
few schemes include: Hybrid Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) and Error Concealment 
Jitter Concealment (Program Clock sync). Figure 2.5 (adapted from [134]) shows the 
approach from service- to application- and to transport levels. 
 
2.5.6.2 Security at the Application Layer 
 
There are various applications offering security modules, which operate at the user 
interface level. These applications may or may not interact with the underlying layer. The 
followings are a few application layer security schemes [135]: 1). Identity-based security 
scheme including authentication, authorization, and shared secret across security domains, 
2). Non-repudiation and accountability mechanisms including integrity, archived audit 
trails, and message level security, 3). Content-based security scheme including 
application specific security option and buffer-overflow protection scheme, 4). Proxy 
firewall filters, 5). Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [136], which provides encryption and 
authentication for electronic mail services. 
 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) [137] is another application layer security 
mechanism used in web services. SOAP relies on Extensible Markup Language (XML) 
for specification exchange structure. SOAP is able to encrypt messages at the application 
layer however it reduces the flexibility and interoperability [138]. 
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2.5.6.2.1 DoS at the Application Layer 
 
An adversary may overwhelm the network with application-layer queries, causing the 
network too many application messages between nodes and the base station. This type of 
attack wastes network bandwidth that drains energy.  
 
Another application layer DoS attack is the session hijack. For this, an attacker needs to 
locate all sessions and the participating entities and to hijack all ongoing sessions and 
keep the sessions ongoing as long as possible. This way all resources will be wasted with 
no useful communication taking place. 
 
The remedy for the session hijack is to use application layer encryption and 
authentication mechanisms. Another method is to run a watchdog application to cease 
applications, which are running open-ended processes aimed for resource drainage.  
 
2.5.6.3 FEC at the Application Layer 
 
Error control mechanisms are classified into four categories: 1).Transport-layer (FEC- 
and delay-constrained retransmission), 2). Error-resilient encoder coding, 3). Decoder 
error concealment, 4). Interactive encoder-decoder error control. 
 
Error resilient compression prevents error propagation by limiting the error damage in 
algorithms that are prone to error propagation.  
 
Application layer Forward Error Correction schemes incorporate content delivery 
protocols (CDPs) for reliable delivery [139]. In a CDP source blocks (SBs) are created 
using transport payload multiplexing from various flows.  
 
FEC integrates the following redundant messages into the original message for packet 
loss compensation: 1). Source-code FEC, 2). Channel code, and 3). Joint source and 
channel coding.  
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FEC CDP together with Service Discovery Data (SDD) form a complete FEC protocol 
suite that covers MPEG-2 (both multicast and unicast for RTP transport stream 
encapsulation). Another FEC scheme uses raptor codes [140]. Raptor codes repair data 
using a complex XOR operation sequence.  
 
Error control techniques use FECs with added redundant information to the bit-stream. 
This is used to facilitate the packet loss reconstruction. Retransmission mechanisms are 
applicable only in scenarios where obtaining lost packet through retransmission without 
violating its presentation deadline is possible. Error resilient techniques use multiple 
encoding description methods for packet loss compensation.  
 
2.5.6.3.1 Error Concealment 
 
Error concealment schemes are often applied at the receiving end where packet loss is 
detected and measured, using temporal and spatial interpolation algorithms. These 
schemes are able to estimate the amount of lost data to help conceal and hide the fact that 
any errors took place and remain transparent from the user and network point of views. 
 
For instance in video applications, error concealment methods use temporal 
interpolation and spatial techniques to reconstruct the lost information between or within 
frames. Temporal interpolation scheme copies the pixel information at the same spatial 
location as in the previous frame. In spatial interpolation, the algorithm operates by 
estimating the missing pixels using the same frame data. 
 
2.5.6.3.2 Processing Cost Associated to FECs 
 
Forward Error Correction schemes, as mentioned, operate with integrating a number of 
redundant code bits into the transmitting data streams. The inclusion of these extra 
redundant bits increases the overhead, as a consequence, impacts the total end-to-end 
delay figures, batter-power consumption, and throughput. The strength of the FEC code 
deals with the number of the bits and the type of code used in the FEC scheme. Another 
important factor in the performance of a FEC scheme is the types of encountered errors in 
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the transmission. The FEC codes suitable for a bursty environment may be different than 
those suitable for random single-bit errors. Reference [141] presents a Reed-Solomon 
(RS) FEC code system for bursty errors, featuring an IEEE 802.11a wireless link (5 GHz 
band). An FEC technique is used to provide means to reduce Bit Error Rate (BER) 
figures on an IEEE 802.11a link using Quadruple Phase Shift Keying (QPSK) 
modulation technique, which provides a good tolerance to noise and interference. The 
radio channel has a slow fading Rayleigh character. It shows for a burst length of 15 
symbols, the FEC scheme requires 73 machine cycles to decode. The number of decoded 
FEC machine cycles start to increase exponentially as the number of symbols in the burst 
length increases. As the number of symbols in the burst length increases to 30, the 
number of decoded FEC machine cycles increases to 450 (exponentially increasing). 
 
Reference [142] presents an application layer Hybrid Error Correction scheme based-on 
Reed-Solomon mechanism used for DVB (Digital Video Broadcasting) server. Some 
applications tolerate certain degrees of packet loss and the number of bits used in the 
HEC scheme (Redundant Information “RI”) is exponentially inversed proportional to the 
Packet Loss Ratio (PLR). 
 
Though the added required bits in FEC schemes may initially increase the end-to-end 
delay figures, however the total amount of delay may be far more due to the increased 
packet loss and retransmissions, in the presence of noise and errors. This is due to the fact 
that the presence of an FEC scheme may decrease the PLR and/or retransmissions 
requirements. However in good channel qualities with relatively less amount of 
interference and noise, the added overhead for FEC schemes may not be beneficial.  
 
The effects of FEC on battery and power consumption figures are also similar to those 
effects on the delay figures. The inclusion of redundant bits, increases the power 
consumption, however such an increase of power consumption effects can be equalized 
and even reduced in erroneous environments where FEC schemes are utilized to correct 
errors with requiring lesser number of retransmissions. This is due to the fact that in 
erroneous environment with relatively high numbers of bit error rates (BERs), the 
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application of an FEC scheme will add a fixed number of redundant bits, which are used 
to correct error bits without requiring retransmissions. However with the deployment of 
an FEC scheme, depending on the channel condition, unpredictable number of data 
blocks may be required to be retransmitted, which may increase the overhead much more 
than the overhead increase due to the FEC scheme deployment. Reference [143] presents 
a 4x4 64-QAM (Quadrature Amplitude Modulation) systolic soft detector scheme 
featuring a single detector used in a MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) system. The 
performance of this system is compared against two other schemes without FEC 
mechanisms. The performance measures includes power consumption and Energy per bit, 
which shows major power reduction in these two power-related parameters. 
 
Reference [144] presents an adaptive FEC scheme used in an interactive streaming IP 
application. This scheme takes aim at the packet loss rates and loss burst sizes by 
constructing a predictive adaptive scheme.  
 
2.5.6.3.3 Encryption/Decryption Interactions with FECs 
 
Several references [145, 146, 147] suggest the integration of encryption/decryption 
techniques with FEC mechanisms to optimize both functions simultaneously. In 
particular in the case of block cipher schemes, where a single error could propagate to the 
consecutive blocks, such as in Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Cipher Algorithm 
in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode (AES-CBC) or AES-Counter with CBC-MAC 
(AES-CCM) [148].  Such integration could prevent the error propagation, thus reducing 
large amount of retransmissions. Reference [149] presents the idea of integrating FEC 
(based on Reed-Solomon) and encryption (based on AES) at the MAC layer for 
telecommand and telemetry applications.  
 
2.6 Cross-Layer Wireless QoS/Security Provisioning 
 
In this section we will discuss QoS and security parameters that interact between 
various layers in a cross-layer context and eventually we will study various criteria for 
considering such provisioning at the applications layer.  
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2.6.1 Cross Layer Design 
 
In today’s wireless networks, in order to have maximal performance delivery; capacity, 
QoS, and security have to be maintained at high levels, while keeping the complexity and 
energy consumption at lowest levels. This is an extremely difficult task to do and one 
method to reach this goal is cross layer design. The idea of cross layer is similar to the 
idea of team-work, where each layer considers the current conditions at other layers 
before performing any process. 
 
The main objective of cross layer design falls into the following categories: 
 
Bounded End-to-End Delay – In order to decrease the overall time delay from 
application layer down to the physical layer, a suggestion would be to pass around delay-
specific parameters between layers to speed up processing in bottleneck layers. This is 
particularly efficient in the lower layers (Network, MAC, and PHY layers) 
 
Bounded Packet Loss – Some decisions made at certain layers may contribute to 
relatively more packet loss as the information moves down the layers. In order to find the 
best relative delay/loss figures optimized for most layers, cross layer design may be 
helpful.  
 
Bandwidth – The amount of data passing through each layer per unit time is one of the 
performance measures. Such a metric tends to increase at information moves down from 
application layer down to the physical layer. Parallel processing and pipelining schemes 
are available at the application layer and on the sender’s processing units, however 
bottlenecks are towards the MAC and PHY layers where resources are limited and access 
technologies deal with multiple access challenges. However using cross layer approaches, 
a more unified method can be utilized where all layers operate with enhancements 
destined for the lower layers. 
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Energy resource – Energy is scarce in wireless environments, therefore any schemes 
that preserve more battery resources for the same performance, would be welcome in 
such environments. Layers prone to Denial of Service (DoS) attack (e.g., PHY, MAC, 
network, and transport layers) are especially under consideration, due to the fact that 
power resources can be compromised easily in these layers. A cross layer design helps 
with a sound energy consumption scheme between these layers. 
 
Mobility – Mobility requires seamless connectivity while the client is on physically 
changing locations. This mechanism involves various layers, including PHY, MAC, 
network, and transport layers [150].  
 
2.6.2 Challenges in Cross-Layer Designs 
 
As mentioned in this chapter, one of the philosophies behind layered architectures is to 
assign specific tasks handled at each layer. The cross-layer design considers import 
and/or export of parameters to and from layers. One of the challenges is that gathering 
parameters may increase the delay figures. The other challenge is the extra overhead that 
passing cross-layer parameters will cause. This extra overhead can affect the performance 
of the communication system, including the throughput, delay, and jitter figures. Another 
challenge is that suboptimal performance of the cross-layer design. This is due to the fact 
that the functions performed at each layer are optimized in a traditional sense, therefore 
when those functions are affected by the cross-layer design, the resulting interactions 
usually increase performance in some areas and may cause suboptimal performance in 
other areas. Therefore finding a balance between performance, the number of gathered 
parameters, and the impact on the throughput and delay, is a challenging task. 
 
2.6.3 Cross-Layer Interactions between Layers 
 




2.6.3.1 Interactions and challenges between Physical Layer and Other Layers 
 
Mechanisms operating at the physical layer are often involved with power transmission, 
modulation and coding schemes, bit error rate (BER), and transmission rates. 
 
The adoption of higher power transmission may usually lead to the increase of 
transmission rates and decrease of the BER. However there are limitations to this, one of 
which is the presence of other transmitters in the proximity of the transmitter, specially if 
they are transmitting on the same or close channels, which in addition to the increased 
noise level, wireless collisions will also be increased, which drops the performance 
greatly. Therefore the challenge is to find the balance between the power, allocation of 
transmission channel, and optimal performance. 
 
Importing parameters from different layers down to the physical layer may increase 
adaptability of the system in a cross-layer concept. For instance Physical + MAC layers 
may adapt the transmission rates according to the channel access scenarios. Transmission 
rates at the PHY layer may inform the MAC layer to adapt the Maximum Transmission 
Unit (MTU) for better efficiency.  
 
At the network layer, physical layer information may be used for proper routing 
algorithm selection that suits the energy/bandwidth constraints at the PHY layer. 
 
At the transport layer, PHY layer parameters are used to adapt the retransmission 
schemes according to the power and bit-rate limitations. 
 
At the application layer, many multimedia encoding techniques can use rate adaptations 
according to the information imported from the physical layer [151]. 
 
All these transfer of parameters may increase the complexity of interfaces between 
layers, which may translate to higher delay and jitter figures and lower throughput 
numbers. In particular, the challenge is to find the optimum point for the highest 
transmission rate and the lowest transmission power which is the challenge that cross-
layer design faces at the physical layer. 
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2.6.3.2 Interactions and challenges between MAC Layer and Other Layers 
 
MAC layer is a very important layer in terms of the support for legacy protocols. This 
is due to the fact that many current and past protocols have extensive MAC layer QoS 
and security provisioning implementations.  
 
MAC layer security and QoS parameters can match with the rate adaptation schemes at 
the physical layer for a better QoS/security performance that matches the PHY rates. 
Another issue is energy where power level and rate adaptation are coupled [152]. 
 
MAC/network layers may involve efficient routing algorithm (e.g., for ad-hoc 
networks) selections based on MAC layer control signals. For instance one scheme [153] 
proposes a MAC/network layers interaction combining CDMA/CA, RTS/CTS, and 
scheduling algorithms, which all operate at the MAC layer to support a multicast routing 
protocol, which operates at the network layer. 
 
At the transport layer, MAC layer information can efficiently influence the TCP 
algorithm. For instance, the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) at the MAC layer can 
be coupled with the Sliding Window size at the transport layer. This way a fairly good 
wireless link with a large MTU size may also experience relatively smooth TCP 
handshakes. Therefore MTU information can be passed to the TCP algorithm for a faster 
Sliding Window size adaptation. 
 
At the application layer, QoS/Security parameters at the MAC layer can be imported to 
avoid applying more QoS/Security algorithm than needed. On the other hand, the lack of 
proper QoS/Security mechanisms at the MAC layer can be compensated at the 
application layer. 
 
The challenge of cross-layer design at the MAC layer is to make decisions based on 
QoS and security parameters, which usually negate one another. Finding an optimum 
scenario to take both QoS and security cross-layer parameters into consideration and to 
select appropriate actions (based on scheduling, queuing, security mechanism, etc.) 
within limited delay figures, is the real challenge of cross-layer design at this layer. 
 59 
2.6.3.3 Interactions and challenges between Network Layer and Other Layers 
 
Network layer is mostly concerned with routing. Therefore any optimization at this 
layer may have an effect on how packets are routed from the source to the destination 
networks.  
 
At the network layer, transport layer-based parameters can be imported to update 
routing information based on link quality. That is on a failing link, before application 
layer starts get impacted (user-experience dropping below acceptable range), the poor 
TCP performance can be monitored at the network layer triggering a route change. 
 
One of the cross layer interactions between network and application layers manifests 
itself in the QoS (Quality of Service) to QoE (Quality of Experience) relationship. QoS 
schemes at the network layer includes the DiffServ aggregation scheme and QoE directly 
deals with how quality is perceived by the user at the application layer. 
 
In the TCP/IP protocol suite, IP is the network layer protocol and the fields (processes) 
in IP header that can be used in the network-layer cross-layer design, include: DSCP, 
Identification (ID), Flags, Fragment Offset, Time-to-Live (TTL), Protocol, and Options. 
The DSCP field, as mentioned, plays a vital role in providing network-layer QoS 
provisioning. The ID field can be used to add packet-tracing information to datagrams to 
help trace back datagrams, which my be subject to spoofed source addresses. Flags are 
used to control fragmentation. This is particularly important during fragmenting large 
amount of continuous data. TTL is also used to limit the number of hops before the 
packet is removed to avoid packets entering in countless loops. The Protocol field defines 
the protocol used in the data field. The Option field is used in regards to the 
fragmentation functionality and routing capabilities (i.e., LSRR “Loose Source Record 
Route” and SSRR “Strict Source Record Route”). These parameters can be exported from 
the network layer and used in the cross-layer design. 
 
The challenge of cross-layer design at the network layer is to make fast routing 
decisions based on the parameters gathered from various layer. The type of application in 
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use may be important in the routing selection. For example the selection criteria of a 
route for a heavy multimedia-based traffic requires relatively high amount of bandwidths 
with limited tolerance for delay, is different than the route selection criteria for an email-
based traffic, which is non-interactive and allows extra delay. This information can be 
imported from the application layer. However the links are not usually dedicated to one 
specific application and the transmitting data is usually a mixture of various data types 
with various delay-bandwidth requirements, which makes the routing selection difficult. 
Therefore routing selections based on cross-layer design may encounter suboptimal 
decisions, which is another challenge of cross-layer design at this layer. 
  
2.6.3.4 Interactions and challenges between Transport Layer and Other Layers 
 
Link quality at the transport layer can trigger coding rate adaptation at the application 
layer. Therefore if the quality of the link is perceived to be high at the transport layer, 
then the application layer multimedia encoding schemes can adapt to higher rates or 
incorporate stronger encryption algorithms without compromising the mechanism at the 
transport layer. Application layer, on the other hand, may impact the way sessions are 
created and handled. The duration of a session may be limited or extended based on the 
application in use. Through cross-layer design, parameters from other layers may be 
imported and the decision over the session quality (e.g., duration, size of the sliding 
window) could be made based on the imported parameters. 
 
The challenges the cross-layer design face at the transport layer are based on the 
decision on the quality of the session. The feedback from the application layer may not 
always go hand-in-hand with the feedback from lower layers, therefore the decision may 
lead to a suboptimal selection of the session quality, which may have rather negative 
impacts on the quality of one or more layers. The challenge is to take all imported cross-
layer parameters and make the best possible decision that would have minimum negative 





2.6.3.5 Interactions and challenges between Application Layer and Other Layers 
 
The cross layer design, involving the application layer, is particularly important in this 
thesis due to the fact that this layer holds the key to a new paradigm shift. In this new 
architectural design, many important parameters belonging to various layers can 
efficiently be imported to this layer via cross layer interactions, particularly known to 
increase efficiency for wireless multimedia applications.  
 
There are two major application-layer cross layer interaction flows: Importing 
parameters from different layers to the application layer, and exporting processed 
information back to various layers. 
 
Application layer is an important layer for multimedia processing. Encoding, decoding, 
user-selective QoS settings, application-based encryption and security, and many other 
mechanisms could take place at this layer. These mechanisms can work more efficiently 
when they interact with the underlying layers. 
 
The challenges that the cross-layer design face at the application-layer are based on the 
fact that user-driven applications may be impacted by the import of parameters from 
lower layers, which in turn may not increase the QoE to the user. The challenge is to have 
a balance between the QoE-level and the feedback from lower layers. 
 
As mentioned, wireless multimedia applications require application-intensive 
processing for higher utilization and content-aware bandwidth usage, as well as processes 
done at the application encoder-decoder. Therefore many parameters are to be imported 
from various layers. These include: 
 
2.6.5.1.1 PHY-to-Application Layers  
 
Information about the signal strength and/or transmission rates can inform a dynamic 
application system to adjust the encoder quality according to the link quality. From 
security point of view, actual bit-level conversations (e.g., encryption, decryption, block-
cipher, etc.) are done at PHY layer.  
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2.6.5.1.2 MAC-to-Application Layers  
 
MAC layer features numerous performance metrics and parameters. From QoS point of 
view, MAC layer offers: Call Admission Control, MAC layer queuing (e.g., AC_VO, 
AC_VI for Wi-Fi). From security point of view, MAC layer offers frame structures for 
security protocols, such as WPA and 802.11i and works hand-in-hand with the PHY layer, 
where the bit-related mechanisms (e.g., encryption) are realized. A cross-layer scheme 
that transports parameters from MAC/PHY Layers to the application layer, is able to 
extend and optimize the security capability to the application layer.  
 
2.6.5.1.3 Network-to-Application Layers 
 
Availability of network layer QoS (e.g., DiffServ) and passing through high quality 
routes are valuable indications that can be used at the application layer, which can trigger 
optimized usage of the application encoder. From the security point of view, IPSec 
(Internet Protocol Security) operates at the network layer. The availability and 
deployment of IPSec (and VPNs “Virtual Private Networks”) poses some operational 
limitations to avoid any security compromises. These parameters are to be transported 
and used at the application layer. 
 
2.6.5.1.4 Transport-to-Application Layers  
 
A high sliding window size (transmitting a relatively large number of segments at once) 
is an indication of a high quality link with better than acceptable range of end-to-end 
delays. This is due to the fact that a large number of segments can be transmitted from the 
source to the destination before the source requires an acknowledgement from the 
destination. This can be transported to the application layer to inform the application 
multimedia loader to adapt to a better quality efficiency.  
 
2.7 Non-Repudiation Multimedia-based Wireless Systems  
 
We have so far had detailed discussions on both security and QoS requirements for 
secure multimedia communications. We also considered cross-layer approaches with 
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special focus on QoS and security. This is particularly important due to the fact that a 
new shift in the protocol design is required, by which higher layers are given more 




This section discusses the mechanism of non-repudiation systems. The doctor/patient 
pair is a good example for a medical environment, where there happens to be many 
scenarios where previous communications are needed to be verified in regards to the 
involving parties, such that no involved parties should be allowed to deny his/her 
involvements. For this a digital signature is accompanied on every transmission flow that 
conveys specific information about the sender. This piece of evidence can not be disputed 
later on by any involving parties.  
 
The effects of the addition of these signed information bits are required to be studied 
and the performance of this system should be discussed in detail. 
 
2.7.2 Non-Repudiation Existing Solutions 
 
Robust authentication for multimedia data in the presence of channel noise can be of a 
challenge in particular for multimedia-enabled wireless traffic [154]. The reference [154] 
integrates a signature-based authentication framework of Joint Source and Channel 
Coding (JSCC) for an adaptive approach achieve to efficient bandwidth utilization using 
authentication graph construction and optimal resource allocation. 
 
Such a signature-based authentication scheme is used to offer non-repudiation and 
integrity mechanisms while resisting packet loss. This is achieved through a resource 
allocation authenticity protection algorithm.  
 
End-to-end security for mobile application is another challenge including providing 
security for Short Message Service (SMS) and Multimedia Message Service (MMS). The 
end-to-end security scheme should address the needs for, authentication, confidentiality, 
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integrity and non-repudiation. Reference [155] uses an identity-based cryptography 
solution to provide Service Provider (SP)-based end-to-end security coverage, which 
covers SP-to mobile users (MUs) and MUs-to-MUs with limited on-device storage 
requirement and the ability of being integrated with the current and existing technologies.   
 
The proposed scheme provides only partial non-repudiation mechanism to the 
messaging services due to the fact that the SP provides private keys without any non-
repudiation assurance from the user, therefore the user may deny that it had submitted a 
message signed with its private key. To solve this issue a traceable path is required with 
mobile network’s access security agent. 
 
ESAWN-NR (Extended Secure Aggregation for Wireless Sensor Network) is a new 
scheme that offers data aggregation authenticity and the ability to prove aggregation 
forgery [156]. Therefore ESAWN-NR not only detects forged data but also automatically 
corrects it by excluding the compromised and illegitimate nodes and replacing them with 
non-compromised and legitimate nodes. A compromised node will be prevented from 
forgery repudiation in any given time. This is due to the fact that data is authentically 
transported end-to-end between any two nodes and all data aggregations are verified. 
 
Through theoretical analysis and simulations, ESAWN-NR presents a scheme, which 
has a power-save capability while maintaining non-repudiation functionality.  
 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an important VoIP application with lightweight 
computational requirements, which has become an attractive mobile-based application. 
Various multimedia services can be transmitted on top of SIP and since the user’s 
packetized voice is the predominant traffic in SIP, providing non-repudiation services 
become vital, which requires a special coordination between the application service 
provider and the user. Reference [157] presents such a service without requiring any 
additional time and power consuming processing and any additional modification to the 
existing SIP accounts. In this scheme an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting 
(AAA) agent is used to arbiter the public key of SIP proxy for the SIP service sessions.  
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Reference [158] proposes a mobile-based PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) 
authentication protocol scheme featuring digital signature and non-repudiation algorithms 
for AAA.  A single sign-on protocol is adopted to reduce the authentication latency and 
user intervention delay using proxy certificate delegation mechanism. Kerberos 
functionality has also been considered in this scheme. 
 
Sensor networks are deployed in variety of scenarios, especially in distributed wireless 
context, where each node has forwarding and processing capabilities. However security 
can become extremely difficult and crucial due to the complexity of the varying and 
exposed topology. The reason is that each node can be a potential attach target and all 
involved nodes can be targeted one way or another. A framework; Tara security 
framework has been proposed to not only achieve access control, authentication, and non-
repudiation services, but to offer security services with energy efficiency in mind [159]. 
Tara security framework is based on four main components; LSRP (Lightweight Secure 
Protocol), LKMS (Lightweight Key Management Scheme), LTMS (Lightweight Trust 
Management System), and LIDS (Lightweight Intrusion Detection System). It is shown 
that Tara security framework is capable of combating various attacks, including; bogus 
routing, wormholes, and etc.. 
 
2.8 Battery Consumption 
 
Battery power is a limited resource, in particular for wireless devices, and every effort 
has to be taken to reduce the battery consumption. There are many performance 
parameters that have effects on the battery consumption, including: security algorithms 
and average payload size. Figure 2.6 (adapted from [101]) shows the comparative battery 
consumption for the transmission of the same number of bytes that a wireless device 
sends, in the presence of WEP and no encryption. The performance results are carried out 
on a Toshiba 1200 series laptop featuring a Celeron M 1.2 GHz CPU with 256 MB RAM. 
Figure 2.7 shows the comparative battery consumption in the presence of AES 128, AES 




Figure 2.6 Effect of deploying WEP on increased battery consumption percentage 
 
Figure 2.8 shows the battery consumption (Toshiba 1200 series laptop featuring a 
Celeron M 1.2 GHz CPU with 256 MB RAM) against the packet size. It is 
understandable that as the packet size increases, for a constant file size, the number of 




Figure 2.7 Effect of deploying AES 128 and 256 on increased battery consumption percentage 
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In this chapter we reviewed the legacy and current literatures on QoS and security. We 
studied traffic classifications in three major categories: packet-, flow, and application-
based traffic classification techniques. Wireless multilayer and cross-layer design were 

















QoS and Security Models 
 
In this chapter, QoS and security models are presented, which will be followed by the 
design, implementation, analysis (e.g., performance and security analyses), and 
evaluation of an application layer non-repudiation wireless system, which features a 
cross-layer technique conforming to the traffic classification results. One of the main 
objectives is the transportation of full-multimedia contents (e.g., text, voice, and video) 
while supporting Suite-B cryptographic algorithms, offering various security mechanisms, 
specifically supporting a non-repudiation scheme. For both cases of wireless and wired 
access technologies, the traffic flows need to be monitored, which indicate the amount of 
bandwidth usage, connection time periods, average number of bytes per packet, and etc..  
 
Through traffic classification techniques, as mentioned, it would be possible to estimate 
a few essential flow parameters, including the average number of packets per unit of time 
on particular wireless and wired links. In the design of this system, the statistical values 
related to the traffic measures need to be in-line with the medium’s average traffic 
parameter ranges. If so then the deployment of this system will not likely contribute to a 
congestion scenario in the network. 
 
The traffic generated by this system will feature a few QoS and security related 
parameters, which will be packed in the UDP payloads and sent via a Wi-Fi link. The 
amount of added overhead and time delays should be bounded to both limits set by the 
multimedia performance and traffic classification requirements. 
 
Following wired and wireless traffic analyses, we will introduce QoS and security 




3.1 Traffic Classification – Real-Time Data Measures 
 
In this section we analyze real captured data using Wireshark and Omnipeek Software 
systems. Wireshark is used to monitor wired transmitted packets and Omnipeek is 
designed to monitor air transmitted packets (wireless) [160,161]. 
 
3.1.1 Wired (Wireshark) Data Analysis 
 
Wireshark is a special tool designed for line traffic monitoring. We have probed a data 
trunk (with prior permission) that is serving a network with tens of desktops, laptops, 
controllers, and access points (APs), dealing with multimedia-rich and real-time 
applications, as well as, non-real-time applications.  
 
For the validity of real-traffic monitoring, Wireshark was run for a long period of time 
capturing live traffic passing through the network. We noticed that four major time 
periods during a working day had significant unique traffic patterns: 
 
8 AM – 9 AM: During this time period, work-related (e.g., university-based) emails 
and text-based applications (e.g., remote login) are mostly being used by users. Therefore 
smaller packet sizes are encountered with less multimedia contents.  
 
12 PM – 1 PM: In this time period, messenger services (e.g., Yahoo, MSN), 
multimedia applications (e.g., YouTube) and fun-related data (e.g., online gaming), are 
mostly used. Captured packets show mostly large packet sizes with multimedia related 
payloads (including RTP, UDP, TCP, codecs, etc.). 
 
4 PM – 5 PM: During this period of time, the nature of the traffic is more of text-based 
and graphic-based attachments (e.g., Microsoft Word, Adobe Acrobat files, etc.). The 
sizes are again relatively large with less multimedia contents. 
 
12 AM – 1 AM: In this time frame, most of the data transfer includes backup 
information with average size packets. 
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Table 3.1 Average data statistics 
Traffic Parameter Parameter Values 
Packets 32,147 
Bytes 21,745,794 
Duration of Monitoring 411 sec 
Average packets/seconds 78 
Average Mbps 0.422 
Average bytes/sec 52,802 
Average packet size 676 bytes 
 
 
For traffic classification, 32,147 packets were randomly selected from a pool of 
captured data (+10 GB) from all four groups. The randomness guarantees a more realistic 
traffic selection. 
 
3.1.1.1 Data Analysis 
 
The traffic statistics are shown in Table 3.1. 
 
3.1.1.2 Connection Durability 
 
As mentioned in chapter 2, heavy hitters are categorized as per packet size and as per 
duration length. Ongoing connections are the flows which have increased duration 
lengths. Table 3.1 shows 32,147 packets were under observations, which are grouped 
based on the protocols in use. The protocols carrying data are: IPv4, TCP, and UDP. 
Table A.5 shows the protocol hierarchy used in the captured packets.. Table A.6 shows 
the Ethernet packet statistics ordered by the packet sizes. 
 
IPv4 - There are 28,166 packets out of 32,147 packets (87.62% of the total number of 
packets) using IPv4 and only 7 packets (0.02%) used IPv6. These 28,166 packets are 
generated by 305 individual IP addresses (end-points) on the network. Wireshark is able 
to classify the number of IP packets generated per node. Table A.7 shows the statistics of 
the nodes and the generated IP packets associated to each node, sorted from the highest 
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number of IPv4 packets (i.e., 25,903 IPv4 packets generated by one node) showing in the 
top of the list down to 27 packets. This list also represents the heavy-hitters. For privacy 
reasons the actual end-point IP addressed are removed. 
 
Most of the heavy-hitters on the top of lists are nodes participating in ongoing 
multimedia streaming over a large period of time. These nodes are not only categorized 
as heavy-hitters from the time period point of view, however they are usually packets 
with relatively large amount of payloads (mostly TCP or UDP based), which would 
qualify them as heavy-hitters from packet size point of view as well.  
 
As an observation, the first item on the list has transmitted 25,903 IPv4 packets 
carrying 21,066,311 bytes, each packet contains 813 bytes on average. Another 
observation points to the fact that this node has been receiving more packets (15,513 
packets) than transmitting (10,390 packets). A closer look at the traces shows that this 
node has received relatively a large number of packets (mostly containing multimedia 
payloads) in the receiving mode and in the transmitting mode has sent a relatively small 
number of packets (mostly containing acknowledgments). 
 
  TCP - The same scenario holds for TCP. Table A.8 shows ordered heavy hitter TCP 
end-points. It should be noted that besides IP address, TCP uses port numbers associated 
to specific applications. 
 
UDP - Both UDP and TCP are transport protocols with similar parameters. The UDP 
heavy hitter end-points are listed in order of the number of packets in Table A.9.  
 
3.1.1.3 Protocol Packet Scatter Plots 
 
Scatter plots are very useful in terms of representing the population of two and three 
dimensional data in respect to one or more parameters. Based on the Table A.6, the two-
dimensional (duration, number of packets) scatter plot for Ethernet traffic is shown in 
Figure 3.1 [162]. 
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Figure 3.1 Scatter plot of Ethernet packets, duration vs. the number of transmitted packets 
 
The pattern in Figure 3.1 shows that only a few heavy hitters exist (less than 5%). The 
average duration time is approximately 360 seconds. 
 
Each flow specified in Table A.6 may be associated to a different average packet size. 
Using the number of packets and the number of transmitted bytes, the average number of 
bytes per packet can be calculated. For example in the first flow item of Table A.6, the 
average number of bytes per packet is 20,079,465/15340 = 1309 bytes per packet, 
whereas in the second flow, we have: 948,450/10272 = 92 bytes per packets, which 
shows quite a large difference. The first flow may include more multimedia-rich payloads, 
which are often heavy in size, whereas the second flow may include more 
control/management frames.  Figure 3.2 shows the scatter plot for flow-based average 
bytes per packet, which shows a relatively high density graph around the 340-410 
seconds duration and average number of bytes between 150 to 250 bytes. 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the scatter plot for the number of transmitted bytes against the 
average bytes per packet per flow. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 are the same, except for the first 
three points (15340, 1309), (10272, 92), and (2262, 60). Without these three points, the 
rest of the scatter plot points are more expanded and visible. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show 
that the density of the graph increases from the (10, 100) point to the (50, 300) point.  
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Figure 3.3 Scatter plot of Ethernet packets, number of transmitted bytes per packet vs. average bytes 
per packet  
 
 
The average number of bytes per packet is 652  1 bytes/packet. This calculation will 
be explained in section 3.1.1.5. 
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Figure 3.4 Expanded scatter plot of Ethernet packets, number of transmitted bytes per packet vs. 
average bytes per packet (based on Figure 3.3) 
 
3.1.1.4 Throughput Graph 
 
Table A.5 shows the hierarchy of protocol, as mentioned before. Ethernet frames form 
99.6% of the total traffic. Cisco ISL (Inter-Switch Link) traffic form the other 0.04%. 
 
From the 99.6% of the Ethernet traffic, 87.62% belongs to IPv4 and the rest of 12.34% 
belongs to other traffic types, including: Logical Link Control, Configuration Test 
Protocol (loopback), IPv6, and etc..  
 
From the 87.62% IPv4 traffic, 78.81% runs on top of TCP, 8.36% runs on top of UDP, 
and the rest of 0.45% belongs to other types.  
 
Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 show the bandwidth usages for IPv4, TCP, and UDP. IPv4 and 
TCP graphs show high degree of correlation. This is due to the fact that the streaming 
data is transmitted using TCP on top of IP. Furthermore TCP is the main transport 
protocol used in HTTP connections. UDP on the other hand, seems to be less correlated 
to IPv4, due to the fact that UDP is mainly used for controlling purposes. Figure 3.8 
shows the comparative bandwidth usage between HTTP, UDP, and ARP messages. 
HTTP uses TCP and ARP is a layer II protocol (MAC layer service). 
 75 
 
Figure 3.5 IPv4 bandwidth usage 
 
 
Figure 3.6 TCP bandwidth usage 
 
Figure 3.7 UDP bandwidth usage 
 76 
3.1.1.5 Confidence Interval 
 
The line traffic traces were gathered over a time period of one month. The results were 
analyzed by the Wireshark software and the statistics were carried out. To represent the 
graphs, we have used a time-slot, which had the closest statistical variable to the overall 
statistics. The 400 seconds of time period for graphs 3.5 and 3.6 can be fitted by a 
Gaussian model. In fact we use Gaussian approximation to calculate the confidence 
interval. For this we use several statistics, including those of Table 3.1. These statistics 
are gathered randomly from different dates and daily time periods. These are shown in 
Tables A.13, 3.2, and 3.3. Table 3.2 shows the statistics about the average number of 
packet sizes and Table 3.3 shows the average flow durations. Figure 3.9 contains packet 
size distribution statistics measured using the entire 10 GB of data traces. Figure 3.9 can 
be approximated well with a Gaussian distribution. 
 
Table 3.2 Average packet size statistics 
Packet Size (Bytes) Number of Packets 









Table 3.3 Average flow duration statistics 











Figure 3.8 IPv4/TCP/UDP bandwidth usage 
 
The average packet sizes, variance, and standard deviation values can be calculated 
from Table 3.2 data. There are a total of 162,410 packets containing over 105,986,883 
bytes. The total average packet size = 652 (bytes), and Standard Deviation (STD) = 153 
bytes, and the average bytes per packet is 652  1 bytes. The same calculation is carried 
out for the flow durations (Table 3.3), which results 384 sec average flow durations. 
 
3.1.1.6 TCP Traffic versus UDP Traffic 
 
The data analysis of the wired traffic presented in section 3.1.1 showed that more than 
78% of the traffic was based on TCP (e.g., HTTP) connections. For this section, we 
analyzed a link mostly containing UDP-based streaming data. For this, more than 5 GB 
of data is captured and analyzed. The following statistics are observed: IPv4 (%96.91), 
UDP (%91.50), and TCP (%4.39). The average package size is 594.45 ± 1 byes (with 
99% CI) with an average connection time of 365.24 seconds (Table 3.4). The results are 
very close to the results presented in section 3.1.1. The difference is mostly due to the 
difference in the TCP and UDP header sizes. 
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Figure 3.9 Average packet size distributions 
 
3.1.2 Wireless (Omnipeek) Data Analysis 
 
Omnipeek is a special tool designed for wireless traffic monitoring. We have probed 
two diverse wireless environments (with permission) to find a few average values for the 
wireless traffic. For the validity of real-traffic monitoring, Omnipeek was run for a long 
period of time capturing live traffic on the air. We summarized our observations based on 
the following two batches of data collected from these two diverse environments: 
 
3.1.2.1 Batch 1 
 
For this batch of data, we ran the Omnipeek software system sniffing all 11 channels 
(North American) of IEEE 802.11 b/g band and 28 channels of IEEE 802.11 a band in 
random periods of times. Batch 1 was gathered in an environment with relatively less 
population of access points and relatively large population of mobile users and clients. It 
is obvious that the number of supported channels is less and we encountered no radio a 
services being offered. However we noticed limited IEEE 802.11a activities, which were 
generated by the mobile users. The radio a activities are related to the Probe Requests 
that the mobile users with IEEE 802.11a capability send on a regular basis. These Probe 
Requests generated from the mobile devices are meant to try to locate any available APs 
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advertising services on a specific radio/channel. Since there is no AP running radio a, 
these Probe Requests will not be responded by any Probe Responses. However based on 
specific scanning algorithm deployed on the mobile devices, these Probe Requests will be 
sent repetitively to locate the APs if they become available due to location change or AP 
powering up. Figure 3.10 shows radio b/g average activity for this Batch.  
 
 
Figure 3.10 Radio b/g Activity for batch 1 
 
 
3.1.2.2 Batch 2 
 
For this batch, the packet monitoring takes place in a highly diverse environment with 
many serving access points, as well as mobile users and wireless clients. Both IEEE 
802.11 b/g and a are actively available. From 28 valid IEEE 802.11 a channels (Ch 34 to 
Ch 165) on only 5 channels (44, 46, 58, 149, and 161), mobile systems were transmitting 
Probe Requests. 
 
Figure 3.11 shows major activities around channel 6 and interestingly enough it 
indicates a considerable activities in channel 5 and 7. These two channels are too close to 
channel 6 and the simultaneous usage of channels 5, 6, and 7 would increase the chance 
of wireless errors, collisions, and retransmissions. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 show Batch 2’s 
activities in radios b/g and a respectively. 
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Table 3.4 Average statistics for wireless and wired flows 
 Average Number of bytes/packet Average Flow Duration (Sec) 
652.588 (TCP Dominant Traffic) 384.24 (TCP Dominant Traffic) 
Wired 
594.45 (UDP Dominant Traffic) 365.24 (UDP Dominant Traffic) 
Wireless 197.206 bytes 412.53 Sec 
 
 
3.1.2.3 Average Packet Size and Flow Duration 
 
Averaging the entire monitored wireless traces show that the average packet size is 
197.206 bytes per packet and the average flow duration is 412.53 sec per flow.  
 
Comparing line and wireless traffic monitor results show a strong correlation of flow 
duration, roughly in the magnitude of 400 sec, however the average wireless packet size 
is less than one-third of that of the wired (Table 3.4). This is mainly due to the fact that 
wired environments can often handle larger packets without experiencing frequent 
collisions and retransmissions. In wireless environments, however there are relatively 
more retransmissions and collisions, which enforces lower packet sizes for optimum 
performance and efficiency. 
 
3.2 QoS-Security Models 
 
In this section, both QoS and security models are presented, which are comprised of 
QoS and security related cross-layer parameters that deal the quality and security 
strengths of this system. We discuss these models in terms of QoS only, security, only, 
and integrated QoS and security models [163]. 
 
3.2.1 QoS Model 
 
Cross layer approach is an important concept, which is used in this thesis. Such a 
deployment serves for both application layer-based QoS and security purposes, which is 




Figure 3.11 Radio b/g Activity for batch 2 
 
 
Figure 3.12 Radio a Activity for batch 2 
 
Rationale for Deploying a Cross-Layer Design – One of the reasons for deploying a 
cross-layer design in this system is for supporting QoS and security provided at the 
application-layer. If there is no cross-layer feedback providing parameters from lower 
layers, the decisions made at the application layer may not be optimized based on the 
lower-layer requirements. For instance when the signal strength of the transmitter (a 
physical layer parameter) drops, the system’s throughput capability may decrease, 
therefore the availability of the knowledge of the signal strength at the application layer 
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may be useful to adapt the coding scheme to the channel/signal conditions to avoid using 
high data-rate coding schemes when the signal strength is relatively low. The same 
argument is valid for other schemes at other layers. Therefore in order to provide the best 
decisions at the application layer, it would help greatly to have cross-layer information 
present.  
 
3.2.1.1 Cross-Layer QoS-based Mechanism  
 
The cross layer technique is used to gather parameters from three different layers. 
These parameters are then imported to the application layer, where they serve as inputs to 
a few algorithms and mechanisms. The cross-layered parameters are: 
 
Physical Layer - The RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) presents the strength 
of the Access Point (AP) signal. It is represented by dBm. The range is between -94 dBm 
up to -30 dBm. To present this value range, 6 bits are used. 
 
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) shows the relative ratio between the sender signal power to 
the noise level. This indicator is important because the higher the SNR value, the higher 
the bandwidth can get. To present this value range, 7 bits are used. 
 
MAC Layer - The WMM (Wireless Multimedia) is a three bit MAC layer QoS schemes 
used in Wi-Fi systems (IEEE 802.11e). Other types of MAC layer QoS metrics can often 
be translated to WMM. For instance wired MAC layer QoS scheme; IEEE 802.11p and 
IEEE 802.11Q have exactly 3 bits, which can be translated to WMM one to one.  
 
Network Layer – The DSCP (Differentiated Services Code Point) is an 8-bit field in 
the IP header (network layer). Not all vendors configure all 8 bits, however the first three 
bits, which are called “Class Selector”, are used by most vendors and they leave the rest 
of the 5 bits clear. Some vendors easily translate the Class Selector bits into WMM 3 bit 
values one-by-one. However we take the whole 8 bits. These 8 bits represent 64 different 
network-layer QoS treatments.  
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The multilayer QoS treatment has 24 bits (7 + 6 + 3 + 8) and there are 24 other bits 
gathered for the security side (discussed in section 3.2.2.3.1). These 48 bits are called 
Cross-Layered Parameters (CLPs). 
 
The CLPs, along with other data are packed in the UDP payload. The CLPs are checked 
by the both the sender and receiver encoder/decoder to adapt to the best possible coding 
rates. High quality indications of the CLPs can inform the application layer that the user 
requires high quality coding. This could also be an indication that the medium is able to 
handle high throughput requirements. In bad channel conditions, on the other hand, the 
CLPs values point to low qualities, which in term inform the application layer 
accordingly to avoid possible uneven drop of performance, congestion, or packet drops. 
 
There are various factors that can affect the measured SNR values. First of all the ratio 
of the signal strength to the environmental noise level tends to be variable in nature. 
Therefore such a ratio fluctuates continually and a high noise level in the channel, affects 
the SNR measurements negatively. As the noise level increases, the SNR reading 
precision decreases. RF collisions can also increase chances of incorrect SNR readings. 
In order to have a more reliable SNR reading, the wireless station’s distance should be 
within a few meters to less than 10 meters from the AP. Other APs/stations should be 
turned off to reduce noise sources and chances for RF collisions. More importantly, SNR 
readings should be grouped into small ranges for more accurate results. Therefore any 
values of the SNR, for example from -70 to -75 dBm should be in one group. This way, 
fluctuations (which are within ± 5 dBm range) have less effect on the precision. 
 
3.2.1.2 Adaptive Forward Error Correction (AFEC) 
 
An adaptive FEC scheme is used at the application layer, which uses the QoS-based 
parameters gathered through the cross-layer approach. This FEC scheme adapts its 
performance to the network and channel conditions in such a way that in relatively bad 
channel conditions, it uses more redundancy, which enabled higher ability to correct 
possible errors and in relatively good channel conditions, lower redundancy is used. 
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3.2.2 Security Model 
 
A system’s security model is based on two security subsystems: Security algorithms 
and security protocol. These two security subsystems are introduced in this subsection. 
 
3.2.2.1 Security Protocols 
 
A security protocol is the handshake and protocol flow between two and more end-
points, establishing a connection, securely exchanging key-information in an unsecure 
channel, authenticating each other (mutual authentication), and transmitting the 
information. The security protocol also defines other aspects of the communication, such 
as: How often the security algorithms are to be deployed and if they are applied to a 
stream of data or a block of data. The detail of the security protocol will be discussed in 
chapter 4. The other security subsystem is the security algorithms, based on Suite-B, 
which will be discussed in the following subsection. 
 
3.2.2.2 Security Algorithms 
 
The security model of this system, as mentioned, is built around cross-layer Suite-B 
cryptographic-based non-repudiation system in a P2P scenario between party A (e.g., a 
doctor) and party B (e.g., a patient or a medical storage device) (Figure 3.13). Party B is 
capable of decoding the signatures and linking the foregoing communication to the 
involved party (A) (Figure 3.14). The doctor/patient pair is a good example where this 
system can be utilized. In such a medical environment, there are many instances where 
previous communications are to be verified to identify the involved parties and the type 
of communications between parties. This way no party can deny his/her involvement, 
neither can deny the involved communication detail. For this, a digital signature is 
attached to the ongoing communication. This piece of evidence can not be disputed later 
on by any of the involved people.  
 
Suite-B only specifies a set of cryptographic algorithms. The security protocol specifies 
the handshakes and exchange messages between end-points. The security protocol is not 
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only capable of handling privacy, integrity, and non-repudiation mechanisms involving 
the data exchange between two end-points, it is also responsible to enforce how often 
these mechanisms should be carried out, based on the minimum security requirements. In 
the application layer, which is the main layer under consideration, we are dealing with 
messages. These messages may contain simultaneous transmission of multimedia. To 
provide privacy, integrity, and non-repudiation, all messages are tagged and hashed, 
however not every individual message requires signing. This is due to the fact that the 
process of signing and verification is relatively complex and consumes high power and it 
has to be done as infrequent as possible. For this, a signature is applied to the hashed 
value of a message, instead of the message itself. Then the signed hash is encrypted and 
transmitted to the receiver, where it is verified. 
 
The application layer security protocol (similar to S/MIME) requires a key exchange 
protocol and a certificate authority to provide key/certificate to both end-points. In a 
cipher block chaining mode, if a digital signature is used, it will be placed at the end of 
the last block. 
 
 Suite-B cryptographic algorithms can be utilized in various layers. At the transport 
layer, there is a scheme involving Suite-B Profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
version 1.2, which was proposed in RFC 5430 (introduced in 3.2.2.3.2). At the transport 
layer, we are not dealing with messages any more and sessions are being dealt with. A 
session is created between two end-points using sender and receivers' certificates. A 
session under TLS is an association between a client and a server, which is created 
following a handshake protocol.   
 
Suite-B algorithms are being incorporated into IPSec protocol. This has been 
considered in RFC 4869 (Suite B Cryptographic Suites for IPSec, introduced in 
3.2.2.3.1). As long as the validity period of a tunnel is not expired, one certificate suffices 
for the established tunnel. A general security analysis [163] can be generalized and used 
to study the security analysis of Suite-B cryptographic algorithms [164]. The detail of the 
security protocol, the handshakes, and protocol flow will be discussed in chapter 4.  
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Figure 3.13 Suite-B security schematics adopted in our system 
 
3.2.2.2.1 NSA Suite-B Cryptography 
 
A number of standards including IEEE P1363, ANSI X.9.62, X9.63, FIPS 186.2, 
specify aspects of Suite-B cryptographic algorithms. As mentioned, Suite-B is a 
collection of cryptographic algorithms, including; encryption, digital signature, key 
agreement, and message digest. National Security Agency (NSA) initiated cryptographic 
interoperability and security requirements issues, including Suite-B to protect both 
classified and unclassified information and national security systems and is the preferred 
security options for wireless applications. Suite B's algorithms are [165, 166]: 
 
Symmetric Encryption: AES 128 or 256 key sizes. For authenticated encryption purpose, 
AES should be used with GCM (Galois/Counter Mode), which is a 128-bit block cipher. 
 
Digital Signatures: This is achieved using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm 
(ECDSA). 
 
Key Agreement: This is achieved using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH). 
 
Message Digest: This is done using Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-256, 384, and 512). 
 
 Figure 3.13 shows the high-level end-to-end Suite-B-based security protocol used in 
this system. Note that the 256-bit key is used by ECDSA-256 and the 128-bit key is used 
by AES-128. 
ECDHC  
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3.2.2.2.2 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) 
 
The Suite-B key exchange agreement is based on ECDH, which uses elliptic curve-
based Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme. The ECDH protocol allows the two parties 
to establish a shared secret key over an insecure channel if they have an elliptic curve 
public-private key pair. This shared secret may be used directly or indirectly as a key. 
The ECDH scheme does not prevent man-in-the-middle attack because ECDH scheme on 
its own does not authenticate any of the two parties. For this, an authenticated Diffie-
Hellman key agreement protocol is required, which is usually achieved by two parties 
authenticating themselves to each other by the use of public-key certificates or digital 
signatures (signed Diffie-Hellman). Through the signed-ECDH adoption, ECDH 
handshake flows are signed and verified using ECDSA. However this scheme is wasteful 
of bandwidth. To overcome this issue, a session key is required, which can be derived 
using a static public key to obtain implicit authentication of the resulting session key, 
which is the approach used in the MQV (Menezes-Qu-Vanstone) protocol [167]. In this 
protocol, the assumption is that both parties have long-term static public/private keys. A 
modified version of the MQV protocol is based on the Elliptic Curve, resulting ECMQV. 
Both MQV and ECMQV feature an authenticated protocol for key agreement based on 
Diffie Hellman scheme, providing protection against the man-in-the-middle attack. Here 
is the protocol handshake flow: 
1. A has a key pair (Pua,Pra), where Pua, is A’s public key and Pra is A’s private key. 
2. Similarly B has a key pair of (Pub,Prb). 
3. A generates a session key pair (X, x) by calculating X=x*P, where x is a random 
integer and P is a point on the Elliptic Curve. 
4. B follows the same calculation as was performed in 3 and calculates Y=y*P. 
5. A transmits X to B and B transmits Y to A. It is assumed that A already has B’s 
public key Pub and B already has A’s public key Pua.  
6. A calculates Sa (known as the implicit signature) by calculating; SaPua =(x + x' Pra) 
mod m, where m is the generating point P’s order. 
7. B calculates SbPub=(y+ y Prb) 
8. Now both A and B have calculated a shared secret key; Sk. 
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9. Sk = CF * SPua (Y + y' SPub) = CF * SPub (X + x' Pua), where CF is a co-factor and 
x' and y' respectively represent the first L bits of the first X and Y pair component 
and where L = (logm 2 + 1)/2 
 
The problem with the deployment of ECMQV is that it is not part of Suite-B, therefore 
since the approach adopted in this thesis is based on Suite-B, therefore ECMQV is not 
used. For this we assume both parties have authenticated themselves to each other using 
public-key certificates (Figure 3.17).  
 
The application layer Suite-B key-exchange protocol will be further discussed in 
section 4.2.6.1. 
 
In this section, we will discuss the key establishment protocol (based on ECDH 
mechanism) further more:  
 
Key establishment protocol – Assuming Alice wishes to establish a shared key 
communication with Bob in a channel prone to third party eavesdropping. The initial 
domain parameters (p, a, b, G, n, h), which are defined as: p = a prime number, a and b = 
elliptic curve constants, G and n = G is a generator with an order that is the smallest non-
negative number n such that nG = O, must be prime. Finally h is |E|/n, where n is the size 
of a subgroup of E. These domain parameters must be agreed upon. Each party must also 
have a key pair suitable for elliptic curve cryptography, comprised of a private key d 
(which is selected as a random integer from the interval [1,n − 1]) and a public key Q 
(where Q = dG). If trusted or provided via a certificate, public keys will be static.  
 
Assuming Alice has a key pair of (dA,QA) and Bob has a key pair of  (dB,QB). Before 
any data can be exchanged between these the two parties, each of them requires having 
the other side’s public key, therefore key exchange must occur. Then Alice calculates 
(xk,yk) = dAQB and Bob calculates k = dBQA. Assuming x and y are coordinates of a point, 
then the shared key is xk and the number computed by Alice and Bob will be equal since: 
dBdAG = dBQA = dAQB = dAdBG. 
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Since solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem for a third party without 
knowing the private key is a very difficult computational task with the current 
computational power, therefore the protocol is secure. 
 
Reference [168] presents formal security analysis and proof for the security strength of 
Diffie-Hellman (DH) and DH-based protocols. This can be generalized to ECDH, which 
is also based on DH. 
 
3.2.2.2.3 AES-GCM versus AES-CCM 
 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with either 128 or 256 bits key size is used for 
the encryption in Suite-B cryptographic algorithms, mixed with the Galois-Counter Mode 
(GCM) block cipher mode for the authentication purpose. The AES-GCM algorithm is an 
extension of the AES-CCM (Counter with CBC-MAC), which used a 128-bit block 
cipher authentication scheme. AES-CCM has four inputs [169]: a nonce, an AES key, a 
plaintext, and an optional Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), generating two outputs; 
a Message Authentication Code (MAC), (also known as the Authentication Tag or “AT”) 
and a ciphertext.  
 
 
Figure 3.14 AES-GCM encryption/authentication schemes 
Data Block 1 Data Block 2 
AES 256 AES 256 
Ciphertext 1 Ciphertext 2 
AES-based 
Block Cipher 
GF (2128) hash 
key 
multiplication 








Hash 1 Hash 2 
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The AES-GCM is  a 128-bit generic authenticated encryption block cipher mode. AES-
GCM also has four inputs [169]: an initialization vector (IV), an AES key, a plaintext 
content, and optional AAD field, generating two outputs: a MAC (AT) and a ciphertext. 
 
Both of these schemes are very similar as they both perform authenticated encryption 
and accept AAD, however the GCM algorithm includes an authenticated encryption with 
one pass over the data, which allows a much higher throughput compared to that of CCM, 
which requires two passes. AES-GCM is shown in Figure 3.14 (adapted from [170]). 
 
The proof of security for AES-GCM has been studied in literature [171, 172]. AES is 
resistant against linear and differential cryptanalysis and when combined with GCM, the 
theorems provide proof of security. Reference [172] contains a combination of Lemmas 
and Theorems, indicating the security strengths of AES-GCM and GCM algorithms.  
 
3.2.2.2.4 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 
 
Another Suite-B component is the ECDSA scheme, which uses Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) in the structure of the digital signature analogous to DSA. With 
equal cryptographic power, ECC-based keys can be smaller than RSA-based keys. For 
example an ECC-based scheme with 224 bit key size is cryptographically comparable to 
both RSA and DSA with 2048 bit key sizes. ECC-based scheme with 256 bit key size is 
comparable to RSA- and DSA-3072. However it has been shown in reference [173] that 
ECC-based scheme with 224 bits key operates more efficiently compared to their the 
RSA-2048 and DSA-2048 equivalent schemes, which makes it a better fit for wireless 
applications [173]. The signature sizes for ECDSA-160, ECDSA-224, and ECDSA-256, 
are 320, 448, and 512 bits respectively, in which the first three correspond to signature 
sizes of RSA- and DSA-1024, 2048, and 3072 requiring 1024, 2048, and 3072 bits 
respectively. These comparisons show how the ECDSA scheme outperforms RSA and 





Table 3.5 SHA-2 family properties 






Message Digest Size 
(bits) 
SHA-256 128 < 264 512 256 
SHA-384 192 < 2128 1024 384 
SHA-512 256 < 2128 1024 512 
 
 
The signature key generation, signature generation, and signature verification 
algorithms are briefly described in Appendix A [36]. 
 
Reference [174] indicates the security strength of ECDSA as the best known algorithm. 
 
3.2.2.2.5 Secure Hash Algorithm 
 
The Suite-B hash algorithm is based on either SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 
algorithm. Secure Hash Algorithm is part of the Federal Information Processing 
Standards Publication 180-2 (FIPS 180-2) [175]. Table 3.5 (adapted from [175]) shows 
SHA-256, 384, and 512 properties. References [176, 177] examine the security strength 
of SHA-2 family.  
 
3.2.2.2.6 Suite-B Cryptographic Layered Applications 
 
The Suite-B algorithms can be incorporated at any layer, depending on the application 
and criteria. Here are some examples of such layered-based deployments: 
 
3.2.2.2.7 Suite-B for Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
 
Transport Layer Security (TLS), considered in a number of RFCs (i.e., RFCs 3268, 
4346, 4366, 4492, 5246, and 5430), is a protocol, which provides data integrity and 
privacy for two communication applications at the transport layer. The most current 




RFC 5430 [179] proposes a Suite-B profile-based TLS system, which makes use of the 
Suite-B algorithms (e.g., encryption, digital signature, message digest, etc.). RFC 5430 
mandates backward compatibility, which requires that both sender and receiver to either 
deploy Suite-B TLS or fall back to a non-Suite-B TLS mode. For this we support both 
sender and receiver to operate using the following profile: AES (128)-GCM, ECDSA-256, 
and SHA-(256, 384, and 512). 
 
3.2.2.2.8 Suite-B for IPSec 
 
Suite-B IPSec has been proposed in RFC 4869 [180] providing integrity and 
confidentiality protection for the ESP mode using 128-bit AES-GCM. This enhances the 
protections provided by IPSec. 
 
3.2.2.2.9 Cross Layer Security 
 
In this scheme, a number of security-related parameters are gathered from various 
layers, accompanied with other gathered QoS-related parameters, which are all used in 
the design and integration of an application layer security-based module. The following 
security parameters are gathered: 
 
IPSec/VPN capability: The availability of IPSec and VPN tunneling is an important 
factor in the system’s security portfolio. To present all variations in the encryption 
schemes and operational modes (e.g., AH, ESP, AES, 3DES, etc.), which includes Suite-
B IPSec algorithms, 8 bits are used. 
 
MAC layer security options: MAC layer security is a readily available security 
mechanism built in most wireless access technologies (e.g., WEP, WPA, WPA 2, etc.). 
To show the availability of the MAC layer security (e.g., scheme type, number of keys, 





Table 3.6 Reed-Solomon Adaptive Codes 
 R-S (n, k) Parity bits Bits/symbol Symbol Error Correction (#) 
Code 1 (255, 251) 4 8 2 
Code 2 (255, 247) 8 8 4 
Code 3 (255, 239) 16 8 8 
Code 4 (255, 223) 32 8 16 
 
 
Transport layer security options: Security schemes available at the transport layer, 
include; TLS (Transport Layer Security) and SSL (Secure Socket Layer), and Suite-B 
TLS algorithm. To show the availability of the transport Layer security, 8 bits are used. 
 
The availability of security at various layers indicates that the applications running on 
top of these layers may incur various delays to accommodate security requirements. 
Therefore such availabilities are informed to the application layer to adjust the 
performance accordingly. 
 
3.2.2.2.10 Cross-layer-based encryption/FEC mechanism  
 
This scheme integrates AES-128 bit – Galois-Counter Mode (AES-GCM) at the 
application layer with an adaptive Reed-Solomon code. AES-GCM provides encryption 
and message authentication mechanisms. We choose an 8-bit symbol code with 255 
symbols per block. The k design parameter is set to be adaptive with a cross-layer 
feedback inputs from various layers. The RS-codes (in Table 3.6) are being considered. 
 
Both the quality of the multimedia encoder and the adaptability of the encryption/FEC 
schemes, depend on the cross-layer feedback received from various layer at the 
application layer. Table 3.6 presents the effects of the cross-layer feedback to the AFEC 
scheme. The application-layer Encryption/FEC system is shown in Figure 3.15.  
 
According to Table 3.7, higher values of RSSI, SNR, WMM, and DSCP are indications 
that the communication wireless channel can handle higher throughput with lower error 
rates and the transmitting device has QoS-enabled markings, which can increase the 
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probability of better traffic handling. For instance, the effect of higher RSSI can result an 
increase in the encoding rate and an increase in the k factor in the adaptive FEC scheme. 
On the other side, the availability of security options (e.g., WPA, WPA2, IPSec, TLS, 
etc.) are indications that the system cannot operate with optimal throughput figures due to 
the delays incurred by various security algorithms.  
 
3.2.3 UDP Payload Discussion 
 
Once keys are agreed upon using an authenticated ECDH algorithm, encrypted traffic 
can flow between two end-points. In the considered system, UDP is the transport protocol 
conveying security and QoS-enabled traffic between the end-points. Therefore in this 
section, the UDP payload is going to be constructed based on the cross-layer information, 
digital signature, and the multimedia (text, voice, and/or video) information. 
 
3.2.3.1 Data Transmission Methods 
 
According to Figure 3.16, the UDP payload includes: Cross-layer, digital signature, 
hash, and A to B communication data, which are further specified in Table 3.8. The 
functional chart of the UDP payload construction is shown in Figure 3.17. It has to be 
noted that there are two hash functions; one used exclusively in the digital signature 
algorithm (ECDSA) and second one is used to create a digest of the UDP payload. The 
discussion over the authenticated key exchange protocol (based on ECDH) is presented in 
3.2.2.2.2 and 4.2.6.1 sections.  
 
From the security point of view, there are four methods to transport the UDP packet 
information from Party A to Party B. 
 
 
3.2.3.1.1 Method 1  
 
In this method we propose an application layer Suite-B cryptographic profile covering 
necessary data and functional entities (i.e., hashing, digital signature, cross-layer 
information, and communication codeword data), which are being pushed to the transport 
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layer and being packed in the UDP payload. Except for the communication data, the rest 
of the UDP packet contents are transmitted in the clear without any encryption. Therefore 




Figure 3.15 Adaptive/encryption FEC schemes 
 
Table 3.7 Cross-layer feedback to the application-layer 
Cross-Layer Parameter Layer Effect on the Encoder Effect on FEC Scheme Selection 
RSSI PHY Encoder rate increase  Increase of k 
SNR PHY Encoder rate increase Increase of k 
WMM MAC Encoder rate increase Increase of k 
DSCP Network Encoder rate increase Increase of k 
IPSec/VPN/Suite-B-IPSec Network Encoder rate decrease Decrease of k 
WPA2-AES MAC Encoder rate decrease Decrease of k 
TLS-Suit-B-TLS Transport Encoder rate decrease Decrease of k 
 
 



















Figure 3.17 UDP traffic payload construction 
 
 
Table 3.8 UDP payload details 
UDP Payload Functional Entity Details 
Cross-layer information CLP: 48 bits  
Digital Signature (ECDSA-256) 512 bits 
Communication data codewords Variable, depending on the input data 
SHA-256: 256 bits 
SHA-384: 384 bits 
 
Hash 
SHA-512: 512 bits 
  
 
Table 3.9 Security profile for method 1 
UDP Payload/Port Entities Privacy Integrity 
Cross-layer information No Yes 
Communication data Yes Yes 
UDP Source/Destination Ports No No 
IP Source/Destination Addresses No No 
 
 
Table 3.10 Security profile for method 2  
UDP Payload/Port Entities Privacy Integrity 
Cross-layer information Yes Yes 
Communication data Yes Yes 
UDP Source/Destination Ports Yes Yes 
IP Source/Destination Addresses No No 
Encrypted 
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According to Table 3.9, cross-layer information bits are packed into the UDP payload 
in the clear, therefore no privacy is provided. However since the entire UDP payload is 
being hashed, including the cross-layer information bits, therefore integrity is provided. 
The 256-bit key generator is used to feed the digital signature (ECDSA-256) and a 128-
bit key generator is used for the AES-128 mechanisms.  
 
The communication data bits are used as the data input to the AES-GCM-AFEC entity. 
This functional entity and hashing provide both privacy and integrity for the 
communication data. 
 
Both UDP and IP source/destination port/address information are all sent in the clear, 
therefore neither privacy nor integrity are provided for them. Therefore if no underlying 
(Network, MAC, and/or Physical layer) security is provided, an illegitimate user can have 
access to the packed information and is able to make unwanted changes. 
 
3.2.3.1.2 Method 2  
 
In this method, Suite-B security algorithms are applied to the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) [179]. In this method, the only mechanism provided at the application layer is the 
FEC. The cross-layer information bits are exported in the clear from the application layer 
to the transport layer. 
 
This method provides confidentiality and integrity to the UDP payload, as well as the 
source/destination port numbers. Table 3.10 summarizes the provided security functions. 
 
The two other methods are discussed with network and MAC layer security options. 
 
3.2.3.1.3 Method 3  
 
In this method, Suite-B security algorithms are present for IPSec [180]. In this method, 
the only mechanism provided at the application layer is the FEC. There is no security 
mechanism provided at the transport layer. The cross-layer information bits are exported 
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from the application layer to the transport layer and from the transport layer to the 
network layer, all in the clear. At the network layer, Suite-B mechanisms provide 
confidentiality and integrity to the entire IP information, including; UDP payload, UDP 
source/destination port numbers, and IP source/destination addresses. Table 3.11 
summarizes the provided security functions. 
 
Table 3.11 Security profile for method 3 
IPSec Payload Functional Entity Privacy Integrity 
Entire UDP Payload (FEC and Communication Data) Yes Yes 
Cross-layer information Yes Yes 
UDP Source/Destination Ports Yes Yes 
IP Source/Destination Addresses Yes Yes 
 
 
3.2.3.1.4 Method 4  
 
Suite-B cryptographic algorithms were discussed at application, transport, and network 
layers. However there is no standard specification for Suite-B at the MAC layer. 
Therefore we combine the cryptographic measures of Method 1 and the MAC layer 
security scheme available at the MAC layer. This method is based on MAC layer security 
options, therefore both parties have to be on the same WLAN unless these packets are 




3.2.4 Functions at the Receiving-End 
 
In this section we assume the traffic has been transmitted successfully to Party B, where 
appropriate mechanisms (reversed actions) are presented to decode the information 
accordingly. These reverse actions include: Decapsulation, decipher, reverse hash, 
signature verification, and multimedia content decode. The reverse functions will be 





In this chapter, the mechanisms concerning both QoS and security models were 
presented and studied. We studied the deployment of Suite-B cryptographic algorithms in 
application, transport, and network layers. 
 
 
3.3.1 Cross-Layer QoS Parameters 
 
Cross layer information bits used in this system are comprised of four fields (24 bits): 
RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator), Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), WMM (Wireless 
Multimedia) DSCP (Differentiated Services Code Point). The information bits in these 
fields are adjustable by the main or through a third-party application, therefore the 
application can change these values for a higher or lower QoS handling, depending on the 
channel conditions, where setting these values to high can also be an indication for a 
good channel quality, which can accommodate higher throughputs with higher than 
average number of bytes per packet. As indicated in section 3.1, the average number of 
bytes in a wireless packet was close to 200 bytes and depending on the channel condition, 
in good channel conditions, higher than 200 bytes of packet can be transmitted without 
encountering degradations (e.g., retransmissions, packet drops, packet loss, etc.). 
However for a relatively bad channel quality, the multimedia encoder can adapt to lower 
encoding quality schemes to reduce the number of bytes per packet transmission. 
 
3.3.1.1 Bounded Delay 
 
A thorough end-to-end analysis presents a bounded delay figures for the multimedia 
communication in the presence of security elements. These delay figures, which are 
discussed in chapter 4 show the minimum and maximum (bounded) delay figures, which 
play a major role in the VoIP-based communication performance.  
 
According to the literature, a 150 msec end-to-end delay is the maximum tolerable 
delay figure for VoIP communications. Through analytical, as well as experimental 
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results, it would be shown that the system under consideration will perform well within 
the permitted delay range even for the worst case scenario. The worst case scenario 
features a payload with the encapsulation of highest delay intensive elements. 
 
3.3.1.2 Minimum Throughput 
 
Guaranteed minimum throughput is a vital QoS parameter that is required for a high 
quality VoIP communication. Throughput and delay figures are usually conversely 
proportional to one another. Therefore a maximum bounded end-to-end delay and a 
bounded overhead are often vital requirements for a minimum throughout. Through 
experimental results presented in chapter 4 it will be shown that the performance of the 
system under consideration will perform well from the delay and throughput points of 
views even for the worst case scenario. 
 
3.3.1.3 Bounded Overhead 
 
Overhead and delay are usually directly proportional to one another and overhead and 
throughput are mostly inversely proportional. Through analytical, as well as experimental 
results it would be shown that the system under consideration will perform well within 
the permitted delay range even for the worst case scenario. The worst case scenario 
features a payload with the encapsulation of lengthiest multimedia/security elements. 
 
Table 3.12 Layered and cross-layer security feedback 
Layer Cross-Layer Parameter Export to 







SHA-(256, 384, 512) 
ECDH - ECDSA (256) 
Transport TLS-Suite-B Suite-B-TLS 
Network IPSec-Suite-B Suite-B-IPSec 




3.3.2 Cross-Layer Security Parameters 
 
Half of the cross-layer information bits (24 bits) are used to indicate the availability of 
security mechanisms in various layers, including: IPSec/VPN/Suite-B-IPSec at the 
network layer, WPA2 at the MAC layer, and TLS-Suit-B-TLS at the transport layer. A 
security profile is discussed, based on the Suite-B cryptography. This security profile, 
which is applicable to various layers, covers necessary data and functional entities (e.g., 
hashing, digital signature, cross-layer information, and communication codeword data) 
and is the preferred security mechanisms for protected wireless applications. Table 3.12 
sums all layered security model parameters. 
 












Analytical and Experimental Results 
 
In this chapter, we present the analytical and experimental results based on the QoS and 
security models that were presented in chapter 3. We will show that the performance 
parameters (e.g., end-to-end delays, packet overheads, etc.) are within acceptable ranges. 
 
In chapter 3, QoS and security models were introduced and discussed. The security 
model included the deployed security algorithms (based on Suite-B) and the security 
protocols in multilayer scenarios. The security algorithms included: encryption and 
privacy, integrity, and non-repudiation. The experimental results are based on the 
Crypto++ Library 5.6.0 cryptographic algorithms [3] running on an Intel® T2500-2GHz 
CPU and a 2 GB RAM on a Windows XP Service Pack 2 platform. The presence of these 
algorithms and the added overhead, introduce additional delay and cause an overhead 
increase, which should be considered in the performance evaluation in this chapter. The 
QoS model, involves a multimedia-based communication system offering security-related 
services. The inclusion of both security and QoS parameters increases the overhead in 
terms of the number of bytes per packet and delay. As mentioned in Chapter 3, digital 
signatures are not required on every message/packet, however we will consider the worst 
case scenario where all security algorithms are performed while the maximum amount of 
overhead is incurred in terms of payload bytes, which are transmitted and we show that 
this system is able to handle such a load and perform well in terms of acceptable 
delay/payload size values.  
 
Figure 4.1 shows the functional entities and algorithms in Application, Transport, 
Network, MAC, and Physical layers. The detail of the security protocol will be discussed 
later in this section. 
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Figure 4.1 Cross-layer QoS/security models 
 
4.1 Security/QoS Model Discussions 
 
In this section, we discuss security/QoS performance details, including processing 
delays, overheads, and other comparison measures. 
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4.1.1 Security Model Discussions 
 
We introduced the security model in chapter 3. In this section, the security model will 
be discussed in more detail. As mentioned, the security model is based on the security 
algorithms and the security protocols. In this section, the security algorithms are 
discussed, which are based on Suite-B algorithms adopted throughout various layers. 




The key exchange algorithm is the first step before party A and B transmit data to one 
another. This is done through the ECDH scheme, which is based on the scheme described 
in subsection 3.2.2.2.1. 
 
For evaluating the performance of ECDH protocol, the Crypto++ Library 5.6.0 [3] is 
used, which features a program that computes the time required for “Alice” and “Bob” to 
exchange key information based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). Table 4.1 shows 
the ECDH-256 public key operation delay cost based on the mentioned platform. 
 
 
Table 4.1 ECDH performance measures 
Scheme Key Pair Generation Key Agreement 
ECDH-256 2.62 (msec) 2.58 (msec) 
 
 
4.1.1.2 ECDSA – 256  
 
In this thesis, ECDSA-256 is being used for the digital signature purpose, which has the 
same security strength compared to DSA-3072 and RSA-3072, with lower overhead. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, ECDSA-256 has a signature size of 512 bits (64 bytes). The 
signature generation and verification delays are mentioned in Table 4.2 [3, 181, 182], 
based on the mentioned platform. 
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Table 4.2 ECDSA-256 Performance Measures 
ECDSA-256 Overhead/Delay 
Signature Size 512 bits (64 bytes) 
Signature Delay  2.63 msec 
Signature Verification  3.89 msec 
 
 
4.1.1.3 AES – GCM 
 
The AES-GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) (Figure 4.2, adapted from [183]), is an 
authenticated encryption block cipher mode, as mentioned in chapter 3. Though AES is a 
part of Suite-B algorithms, however AES-GCM has been considered in the Suite-B 
framework [184, 185], which have not been standardized yet. 
 
GCM combines a well-known encryption counter mode with the Galois authentication 
mode. The key feature of GCM is that parallel multiplications are easily computed in 
GCM, thus achieving very high throughput with a fast chaining mode authentication 
technique. Figure 4.2 (adapted from [183]) shows the GCM encryption and decryption 
modules. As mentioned, AES-GCM is suitable for high throughput communications. 
Therefore the overheads and delays in its implementation are relatively low [186].  
 
 




























Table 4.3 The AES-GCM performance 
Encryption Scheme Block Size Performance Delay 
AES-GCM 16 bytes  
(128 bits) 
18 Cycles per byte 




The multiplication complexity of GCM encryption algorithm involves a GF (2128) field. 
The decryption algorithm offers the same amount of delay as both algorithms are based 
on the same structure. 
 
The GCM’s main overhead is due to the authentication tag, which can be 128, 120, 112, 
104, 96, 64, and 32 bits, depending on type of application in use. The ciphertext is the 
same length as the plaintext, therefore there is no overhead in the ciphertext. For the 
highest security strength, 128-bit tag length should be used. 
 
Though AES-128 is based on a symmetric structure, however the decryption algorithm 
of AES is slightly slower than the encryption algorithm, due to the complexity of the 
inverse matrix calculations involved [187].  
 
The performance of the AES-GCM algorithm is based on Crypto++ Library 5.6.0 [3] 
C++ code running on an Intel Core 2 CPU at 2 GHz is mentioned in Table 4.3. Note that 
MiB stands for MeBiByte or Mega Binary Byte and 1 MiB is 1,048,576 bytes. 
 
 
4.1.1.4 Adaptive FEC based on Reed-Solomon (RS) 
 
The FEC mechanism features the inclusion of redundant bits into the input data for 
error correction purposes. The FEC scheme used in our approach (Table 4.4) uses four 
different values of k. All four cases have the same output of 255 bytes and depending on 
the value of k, with variable input data length. However since the input of the FEC 
algorithm is fed from the AES-GCM algorithm, we need to change the contents of Table 
4.4 in a way to show the input data length is fixed at 255 bytes. This way the output data 
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lengths will become variable. This is shown in Table 4.5., which shows that, for example, 
if code 2 is used, we need to use 264 bytes (255 bytes data + 9 redundant bytes) for every 
255 input data bytes and the relative overhead compared to (255, 255) scenario (without 
R-S coding) is 4%. 
 
The performance of R-S codes depends on the minimum correction capability (T) and 
the codeword length (W). It follows the following equation (adapted from [188]): 
 
Error Decoding Processing Delay 14
2
9  WT  
 
The latency for various values of T and W would require an average cycle count of 
6359, which corresponds to maximum 3.25 sec based on our platform. According to 
Table 4.6, different delay/overhead figures for various FEC schemes are shown based on 
the same platform.  
 
Table 4.4 R-S FEC scheme with fixed output 
Code Number R-S (n, k) 
Code 1 (255, 251) 
Code 2 (255, 247) 
Code 3 (255, 239) 
Code 4 (255, 223) 
 
 
Table 4.5 R-S FEC scheme with fixed input 
Code Number R-S (n, k) Relative Overhead 
Code 1 (260, 255) 2% 
Code 2 (264, 255) 4% 
Code 3 (273, 255) 7% 






Table 4.6 The adaptive Reed-Solomon (ARS) performance  
ARS Scheme Delay Overhead 
RS (260, 255) 11.30 nsec/byte 5 bytes 
RS (264, 255) 11.47 nsec/byte 9 bytes 
RS (273, 255) 11.82 nsec/byte 18 bytes 
RS (292, 255) 12.69 nsec/byte 37 bytes 
 
Table 4.7 SHA algorithms comparisons 
Hash 
Function 









(CPU 2 GHz) 
SHA-256 64 32 64 16 8.34 nsec/byte 
SHA-384 80 48 128 17.2 8.97 nsec/byte 
SHA-512 80 64 128  17.8 9.28 nsec/byte 
 
 
4.1.1.5 SHA – (256, 384, 512) 
 
Data integrity is offered through the deployment of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) 
functions. In Chapter 1 it was mentioned that SHA-1 may not be secure enough therefore 
other variations of SHA-2 family (i.e., SHA-256, -384, and -512) should be used. It is 
also important to note that SHA-2 family members have been mandated in Suite-B. 
 
The number of arithmetic calculations required to perform SHA hash functions varies 
according to the processor and the running application. For instance, based on the same 
platform, SHA-256 requires 16 cycles per byte to perform secure hashing algorithm. 
Table 4.7 captures the performance of the SHA-2 family [189].   
 
 
4.1.2 Multimedia Communication 
 
The following scenarios are considered in this thesis’s security profile: 
1. Method 1: In this method, Suite-B algorithms (ECDH, ECDSA, AES, and SHA) 
are performed at the application. No security options at the Network and MAC 
layers are available. 
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2. Method 2: In this method, Suite-B at the transport layer is used. 
3. Method 3 In this method, Suite-B at the network layer is used based on IPSec. 
4. Method 4: In this method, core UDP payload (mentioned in Method 1) is used 
with a MAC layer encryption technique (i.e., WPA-AES). 
 
Therefore it is essential to study security features applied to the Application, Transport, 
Network and MAC layers. First we start from application layer security entities. At the 
application layer, the following schemes are dealt with: AES-128-GCM, Adaptive Reed-
Solomon; ARS (255, k), ECDSA-256, and SHA (256, 384, and 512), therefore we will 
consider these schemes in a later subsection. 
 
The main communication data between two parties are in form of text, video, and voice, 
which are discussed in this subsection. 
 
Text: This can be non-interactive (email) or interactive (text-chat). In this case, 
keyboard key strokes are captures and placed in the UDP payload along with CLPs. 
 
Interactive typing requires a very low bandwidth. An average professional typist reach 
50 to 70 Word per Minute (WPM), usually less than 100 WPM. Therefore an interactive 
(two way) typing session transmitting 100+100 = 200 WPM (for half duplex PHY/MAC 
services) will require about 4 words per second, which requires less than 40 bps. In terms 
of the UDP payload per packet, this translates to only 1 byte of information on average.  
 
Voice: This is usually an interactive VoIP call or a normal voice-chat. In both cases, 
voices are captured and coded into a voice codec. For the best case scenario where the 
signal/channel conditions are very good, G.711 codec is used to encode the voice 
information and pack them into the UDP payload. G.711 packets run at 64 kbps. A 
typical G.711 packet runs for 30 msec with a payload of 240 bytes; (240 bytes X 8bits) / 




For the worst case scenario where signal/channel conditions are poor, according to 
Table A.2, the data rate of G.723.1 can be as low as 5.3 kbps, with a 7.5 msec look-ahead 
and 30 msec inter-frame delay and 20 bytes per packet. Therefore: 20 bytes x 8 bits / 30 
msec = 5.3 kbps. The summary of the voice codec delays and overheads are mentioned in 
Table 4.8. 
 
Video: Video can also be an interactive videoconferencing communication between two 
(point-to-point) or more parties (multicasting). This is often accompanied by voice and 
text. In this case, for the best case scenario, one of the well-known video codecs; H.262, 
H.263, or H.264 could be used. All three mentioned codec could be running at the 
minimum rate of 64 kbps. 
 
H.264, which is a newer and preferred codec compared H.263 and H.262, is able to 
generate video information starting from 15 fps (frame per seconds) at 177 X 144 (QCIF) 
resolution. H.264 (similar to MPEG-4) often uses RTP (Real Time Transport Protocol 
[190]) for video data transport. H.264 requires approximately 6500 bits per frame [191, 
192] with a minimum 10 msec of frame size [193], in which the result is 65000 bits per 
second or 64 kbps. There are 15 frames per second (fps) with 66 msec inter-frame delays, 
which will results 15 packets per second with each containing 546 bytes of H.264 
encoded video information (Table A.2). 
 
For the worst case scenario, H.263 with 120 x 90 frame size and 10 fps with 100 msec 
inter frame delay, running at 24 kbps, are used. In this case, 307 bytes are sent per packet. 
Table 4.9 summarizes the video codec data (based on our platform). 
 













G.711 64 kbps Best 0.125 ms 30 ms 240 bytes 


















H.264 64 kbps 177X144 - 15 fps 7.36 ms/f  66 ms 542 bytes 
H.263 24 kbps 120X90 - 10 fps 5 ms/f 100 ms 307 bytes 
 
 
4.2 Security Model Evaluation 
 
Before evaluating the security model, the entire protocols/algorithms need to be 
considered into various components and functional segments. For the security 
mechanisms, three sets of functions are considered, which are: Security handling at the 
sender, transmission of the security enabled payload, and the security handling at the 
receiver. Some security mechanisms, such as encryption, are relatively less 
computational intensive at the sender, however require more computational power at the 
receiver. In this case, delay figures at the receiver may contribute more to the overall end-
to-end delay measurements. In other instances, if multimedia-enriched traffic payloads 
are being transmitted, then large payload sizes and other factors, such as numerous 
fragmentations, retransmissions, and other issues may also contribute to delay figures. In 
these scenarios, the transmission of security enabled payloads will have considerable 
effects on the performance, delay, and jitter figures. 
 
Table 4.10 offers delay and overhead figures for various mechanisms and algorithms 
operating at the application layer. It should be noted that for voice and video categories, 
two codecs are mentioned for both the best case and worst case (channel/signal qualities) 
scenarios. The delay figure for text is negligible, due to the fact that text information is 
buffered and used in the payload of the UDP packet. The amount of text per packet will 
be discussed in the protocol section. 
 
The delay figures for video codes have been given per frame since every UDP packet 
may include at most one video frame data.  
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Table 4.10 Suite-B algorithms delays and overhead figures at the sender 
Mechanism/Data Algorithm Delay Overhead 
Text N/A  0 1 byte 
G.711 0.125 msec 240 bytes Voice 
G.723.1 7.5 msec 20 bytes 
H.264 7.36 msec/frame 542 bytes Video 
H.263 5 msec/frame 302 bytes 
Digital Signature ECDSA-256 2.63 msec 64 bytes 
Block Cipher Encryption AES-128 GCM 9.44 nsec/byte 0 
RS (255, 251) 11.30 nsec/byte 5 bytes 
RS (255, 247) 11.47 nsec/byte 9 bytes 
RS (255, 239) 11.82 nsec/byte 18 bytes 
 
Adaptive Forward  
Error Correction 
RS (255, 223) 12.69 nsec/byte 37 bytes 
SHA-256 8.34 ns/byte 32 bytes 
SHA-384 8.97 ns/blk 32 bytes 
 
Hashing 
SHA-512 9.28 ns/blk 64 bytes 
Cross-Layer Data CLPs  0 6 bytes 
 
 
The delay and overhead figures for encryption, forward error correction, and hashing 
mechanisms, have been given per block. Therefore to find the total amount of 
delay/overhead figures, depending on the specific payload size, those figures vary. The 
cross-layer parameters (CLPs) are also assumed to be readily available when a UDP 
packet is being constructed. Therefore no delay is incurred, however 48 bits (6 bytes) are 
the overheads. 
 
4.2.1 Method 1 Details 
 
Now we will discuss the details of the security protocol. At the application layer 
(section 3.2.3.1.1, Figure 3.17), the multimedia communication data is encoded and fed 
into the AES-GCM module. This will encrypt and authenticate the data. The output of the 
AES-GCM module will be fed to the Adaptive FEC (AFEC) module and also will be 
signed. Therefore non-repudiation mechanism is provided for the encrypted/authenticated 
multimedia communication data. The output of the AFEC and the QoS/Security cross-
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layer information are being used as inputs to the Hash function, providing integrity. The 
outputs of the AFEC, Hash, ECDSA, and the QoS/Security cross-layer information are 
transferred to the transport layer, where they are packed in the UDP payload. 
 
Based on Table 3.9, privacy is provided for the multimedia communication data only. 
Integrity is provided for both the cross-layer information and the multimedia 
communication data. Non-repudiation is provided for the output of the AES-GCM 
module (i.e., multimedia communication data). In this method, there is no protection for 
the UDP port/IP addresses. 
 
The overhead and delay measures indicated in Table 4.11 are calculated based on the 
measurements on every individual functional entity. For instance, the delay figure for 
best voice quality is comprised of; 0.125 msec and 240 bytes for G.711, 2.63 msec for 
ECDSA-256, for AES-GCM, the related delay is calculated from 9.44 nsec per byte. 
 
In the overhead calculation, in the worst case scenario, the instantaneous 
communication involves the simultaneous transmission of both multimedia and security 
data. In a scenario where the multimedia data contains a low rate codec information, such 
as in G.723.1, the data associated to the voice codec contains 20 bytes per frame. In this 
scenario the entire 256 byte ARS block does not have to be dedicated to carrying the 
G.723.1 codec only, therefore other data types may also be used in the ARS block. This is 
especially important to increase the efficiency of the ARS coding. 
 
For the G.711 data packet, which contains 240 bytes, less than two AES-GCM 128 byte 
blocks are needed, therefore the AES-GCM delay will be 2.266 sec. For the best case 
scenario, RS (260, 255) scheme is used and to preserve efficiency, G.711 data packets are 
fed into the RS coder in a pro-rata basis. Therefore for a 240 byte G.711 packet, the RS 
(260, 255) portion will be 244 bytes, 4 bytes overhead. The delay figure of the AES-
GCM scheme is 9.44 nsec per byte, therefore for the G.711 case, 2.303 sec delay is 
incurred. The SHA-512 hashing delay is 9.28 nsec per byte, however all other data (e.g., 
output of AES-GCM-ARS, ECDSA signature, and CLPs) input to the SHA algorithm 
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will be 375 bytes with the delay of 3.48 sec.  The total overhead is: 240 (G.711) + 64 
(ECDSA) + 0 (AES-GCM) + 4 (ARS) + 64 (SHA) + 3 (CLPs) = 375 bytes and the total 
delay figure is (in sec): 125 (G.711) + 2630 (ECDSA) + 2.303 (AES-GCM) + 2.712 
(ARS) + 3.480 (SHA) = 2763.49 sec or rounding to 2.764 msec. Note that the most time 
consuming algorithm is the ECDSA digital signature, which 800 to 1000 more time 
costly than the other algorithms. Therefore if digital signature is excluded from the 
calculation, the delay figure will be: 0.1335 msec.  
 
Table 4.11 Packet-based application layer Suite-B algorithms delays and overhead figures 
Channel/Signal Condition Communication Type Overhead (bytes) Delay (msec) 
Text 133 2.631 
Voice 375 2.764 




Text+Voice+Video 930 10.144 
Text 133 2.631 
Voice 154 10.132 




Text+Voice+Video 506 10.142 
 
For the scenario where voice, video, and text are being transmitted, as mentioned, we 
assume text is already available. To calculate the delay for video and voice transmission, 
we consider the most time consuming algorithm to be the delay figure. In this case 
between 0.125 msec and 7.36 msec, the resulted delay will be 7.36 msec. This is due to 
the fact that both video and audio codecs run simultaneously and during the time that a 
video frame is being created, the voice codec has already performed its function. 
 
For the case where G.723.1 is being transmitted, only 20 bytes of data will be produced 
for each frame, as mentioned. If no other data was transmitted, a smaller FEC block size 
is more efficient, such as an RS (32,28) [194]. However the assumption is that the rest of 
the RS (XXX, 255) block can be fed by other simultaneous data being transmitted, which 
preserves the efficiency of the scheme. It should be noted that according to traffic 
classifications performed in Chapter 3, average packet size in the wireless medium was 
197 bytes, therefore according to Table 4.11, only text and worst case audio fall within 
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this range.  The rest of the items require higher packet sizes, which may trigger errors and 
retransmissions in noisy or busy channels. 
 
 4.2.2 Method 2 Details 
 
In this method, Suite-B cryptographic mechanisms are considered for the Transport 
Layer Security (TLS). The most current TLS version is 1.2 [178]. The basic functionality 
of TLS includes data encryption and integrity. TLS provides encapsulation of application 
layer contents and has three basic properties: Identity authentication using public key or 
asymmetric key cryptographic systems, a mutual authentication scheme, and anonymous 
communication. Reference [178] proposes Suite-B cryptographic version of TLS, 
including the AES-128 scheme for the encryption algorithm, ECDSA scheme for the 
digital signature mechanism and ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman) for the key 
exchange scheme. The one of the main differences between the calculations in methods 1 
and 2 is that in method 2, UDP header (8 bytes) is also included in the calculation, 
therefore with a good approximation, the overhead calculation figures of Table 4.11 hold 
for this method as well [195]. 
 
4.2.3 Method 3 Details 
 
Suite-B cryptographic algorithms have so far been considered for the application and 
transport layers. In the network (IP) layer, they are being considered to interact with the 
IPSec mechanism. The current Suite-B IPSec draft has been introduced in RFC 4869 
[179] covering Suite-B-GCM and Suite-B-GMAC-128 to provide ESP integrity 
protection and confidentiality through the usage of AES-GCM-128 (RFC4106). The 
usage of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) for IPsec ESP and AH has also 
been mentioned in RFC 4543 [197]. We already discussed details about ESP and AH in 
section 2.7.4.2.1 in which we decided to use ESP as the preferred IPSec mode.  
 
Suite-B-GMAC is a new entity in the Suite-B mechanisms applied in ESP mode, where 
each ESP configuration requires a minimum of ten bytes of extra overhead in addition to 
its payload. In the structure of GMAC, an eight-byte IV is used in every individual packet, 
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therefore each GMAC-ESP packet requires an additional 18 bytes of overhead in addition 
to the 12-byte tag. Therefore a total of 30 bytes overhead is incurred. The header sizes for 
UDP and IP are 8 and 20 bytes respectively. Therefore in addition to the overheads 
calculated in Table 4.11, there are 58 bytes additional overheads. 
 
According to table 3.11, in method 3, the entire UDP payload, UDP source/destination 
port addresses, and IP source/destination addresses are protected thought privacy, 
integrity, and non-repudiation. 
 
At the network layer, we are dealing with the flow of IP packet between two logical 
addresses on two different networks. Using IPSec, we are dealing with a protected tunnel 
session between two ends of the IPSec tunnels. Therefore for one active IPSec tunnel, a 
digital signature is required to provide non-repudiation. Again it is essential to use a 
traffic classification analysis to calculate the average session duration of an IPSec tunnel 
in order to find the average frequency of applying a digital signature to a session. 
 
Reference [198] reveals that the IPSec latency depends on the packet size. The testbed 
involves the IXIA Traffic Generator linking two end-points using two security gateways 
via 1 Gbps Ethernet links, simulating the traffic scenario between the RNC (Radio 
Network Controller) and NodeB in UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunications 
System) architecture. The IPSec is based on the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP), in 
a Tunnel Mode, using AES encryption and HMAC-SHA authentication algorithms.  
 
The simulation results show that the larger the packet size, the lower the latency, 
therefore based on the platform used, Table 4.12 shows the number of cycles per byte 
versus the packet size, using IxChariot end-points, running a Tunnel Mode IPSec VPN, in 
an IEEE 802.11g network, based on T2500 Intel Core 2 platform. 
 
Table 4.13 provides the delay/overhead figures of the Suite-B mechanisms in the 
presence of IPSec. 
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Table 4.12 IPSec performance measures versus packet size 
Packet Size  
(bytes) 






64 352 11.26 1.3064 
128 346 22.14 1.3294 
256 338 43.26 1.3616 
384 202 38.78 2.2770 
512 67 17.15 6.8655 
640 64 20.48 7.1875 
768 62 23.81 7.4198 
1024 58 29.70 7.9304 
1280 55 35.20 8.3628 
1520 52 39.52 8.8458 
 
 
Figure 4.3 IPSec performance measures versus packet size 
 
 
4.2.4 Method 4 Details 
 
In this section, we consider MAC layer security delay/overhead in addition to the 
figures calculated in Table 4.11. We consider WPA-AES and its overhead and delay 
figure, which are given in Table 4.14. 
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Table 4.13 IPSec (network layer) Suite-B algorithms delays and overhead figures 
Channel/Signal Condition Communication Type Overhead (bytes) Delay (msec) 
Text 191 2.663 
Voice 433 2.918 




Text+Voice+Video 988 10.298 
Text 191 2.663 
Voice 212 10.168 




Text+Voice+Video 564 10.160 
 











WPA-AES AES + CTR MAC 256 16 
 
 
The WPA-AES mechanism involves AES-CTR and CBC-MAC schemes. Based on the 
platform used, AES-CTR uses 18.2 and CBC-MAC uses 15.2 cycles per byte. Therefore 
WPA-AES requires 33.4 cycles per byte. Note that the overheads mentioned in Table 
4.11 need to be increased by 28 bytes (IP + UDP headers = 28 bytes). 
 
The delay and overhead figures based on MAC layer WPA-AES are mentioned in 
Table 4.15. 
 
4.2.5 Summary of Layered Security Schemes 
 
We studied various implementations of Suite-B cryptographic algorithms in various 
layers, namely; application, transport, and network. For MAC layer, the current WPA 
mechanism is used in combination with the Suite-B-application layer algorithms. Table 
4.16 shows the layer security profiles. The only layers that do not have complete 
implementations of the Suite-B algorithms are MAC and PHY layers, therefore when it 
comes to the MAC layer, MAC and application layers are used together. 
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Table 4.15 Application layer Suite-B algorithms and MAC security delays and overhead figures 
Channel/Signal Condition Communication Type Overhead (bytes) Delay (msec) 
Text 161 2.634 
Voice 403 2.896 




Text+Voice+Video 958 10.285 
Text 161 2.634 
Voice 182 10.135 




Text+Voice+Video 534 10.151 
 
 
Table 4.16 Suite-B layered mechanisms 

















AES-128-GCM, RS (k, 255) 
SHA-512, ECDSA-256  
GMAC-ESP, ECDH 
MAC WPA + Suite-B-Application-Layer WPA2-AES 
 
 
4.2.5.1 Minimum/Maximum Delay/Overhead Figures 
 
In this section, based on the four methods described, minimum and maximum delay and 
overhead figures are compared. Based on delay figures given in Tables 4.11 and 4.12, the 
minimum and maximum delay figures can be shown on a single delay graph (Figure 4.4).  
Comparing the overhead and delay figures in all four methods, the application layer 
delay/overhead figures have relatively the lowest numbers and the network layer 
delay/overhead figures have relatively the highest numbers compared to the 
delay/overhead figures in other methods. Therefore the results obtained in methods 1 and 
3 (i.e., application and network layers) are to be considered for calculating the 
delay/overhead max/min figures. According to Tables 4.11 and 4.13, the Suite-B 
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algorithms delays and overhead figures are calculated for both the application (App) and 
network (IP) layers under the best (B) and worst (W) channel/signal conditions for Text, 
Voice, Video, or Text+Voice+Video (TVV). Therefore for each method, there are eight 
calculated values, four of which for the best and the other four for the worst 
channel/signal conditions. Therefore there are 16 calculated values for overhead and 16 
calculated values for delay figures. However since the delay/overhead values for 
communications based on text only are equal in both the best and worst channel/signal 
conditions, therefore there are actually 14 calculated values to be used for comparisons. 
These comparisons are shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5 for min/max delay/overhead figures 
respectively. According to the Figure 4.4 the lowest delay figure is related to the 
transmission of text using method 1 (application layer) and the highest delay figure is 
related to the transmission of TVV using method 3 (network layer) for the best quality.  
 
The following table shows the list of abbreviations used in Figures 4.4 and 4.5: 
 
Abbreviation Compete Definition 
App-Text Communication involving Text only at the Application layer, for both best and worst 
channel/signal conditions 
App-B-Voice Communication involving Voice only at the Application layer for the Best 
channel/signal condition 
App-W-Voice Communication involving Voice only at the Application layer for the Worst 
channel/signal condition 
App-B-Video Communication involving Video only at the Application layer for the Best 
channel/signal condition 
App-W-Video Communication involving Video only at the Application layer for the Worst 
channel/signal condition 
App-B-TVV Communication involving full multimedia content (Text-Voice-Video) only at the 
Application layer for the Best channel/signal condition 
App-W-TVV Communication involving full multimedia content (Text-Voice-Video) only at the 
Application layer for the Worst channel/signal condition 
IP-Text Communication involving Text only at the Network (IP) layer, for both best and worst 
channel/signal conditions 
IP-B-Voice Communication involving Voice only at the Network (IP) layer for the Best 
channel/signal condition 
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IP-W-Voice Communication involving Voice only at the Network (IP) layer for the Worst 
channel/signal condition 
IP-B-Video Communication involving Video only at the Network (IP) layer for the Best 
channel/signal condition 
IP-W-Video Communication involving Video only at the Network (IP) layer for the Worst 
channel/signal condition 
IP-B-TVV Communication involving full multimedia content (Text-Voice-Video) only at the 
Network (IP) layer for the Best channel/signal condition 
IP-W-TVV Communication involving full multimedia content (Text-Voice-Video) only at the 
Network (IP) layer for the Worst channel/signal condition 
 
 
Based on overhead figures given in Tables 4.11 and 4.12, the minimum and maximum 
overhead figures can be compared on a single delay graph (Figure 4.5). As shown in 
Figure 4.5, Network layer contributes to the highest overhead (988 bytes per packet) 
compared to the overhead figures calculated in other methods. The lowest overhead (133 
bytes per packet) occurs when text is transmitted using method 1 (application layer). 
 
 




Figure 4.5 Max/Min overhead figures 
 
4.2.6 Detail of the Security Protocol Handshakes and Flows 
 
We have so far studied the various security components at each layer. These 
components and algorithms should be utilized through a set of handshakes and protocol 
flows, which are discussed in this section. 
 
4.2.6.1 Application Layer Security Protocol Handshakes 
 
In section 3.2.2.2.2, the key exchange protocol (based on ECDH) was introduced. It 
was also discussed that ECDH is prone to man-in-the-middle attack, therefore an 
authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is required, For this we assume 
both parties have authenticated themselves to each other using public-key certificates.  
 
  Once the key is exchanged, A and B are able to transmit information to one another. 
Assume A is transmitting to B. As mentioned, at the application layer, we are dealing 
with messages and depending on the application in use and the level of the security of the 
transmitted information, a digital signature is applied to the ongoing traffic.  
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In regards to the frequency of digital signature deployment, ECDSA is able to sign 
messages as large as 264 byte in length, therefore to conserve battery power, the security 
protocol is set to sign a group of blocks instead of signing each block of data. The 
number of blocks used for one signature depends on the context of the multimedia data. If 
high critical data are being transmitted and the validity of the sender/data needs to be 
checked, the frequency of the digital signature deployment can be relatively higher, such 
as every minute or every 10 minutes once. On the other side if a low critical data is being 
transmitted, a digital signature can be deployed less frequently, such as once a day.  
 
In a bursty type of data transmission, there are periods of time that no data is being 
transmitted. To maintain data freshness each transmitted block of data should be 
accompanied by an encrypted time-stamp coupled to a sequence number and the actual 
time of all entities in the network should be synchronized. The sequence number is used 
to track every transmitted block of multimedia data. 
 
In an extreme case, a signature can also be used per packet. In this scenario, a more 
accurate delay/overhead calculation is required. It should be noted that both AES-GCM 
and ARS schemes operate in block-based algorithms, 16 and 256 bytes respectively.  
 
Figure 4.6 shows the application layer security protocol and functional entities. Figure 
4.7 focuses on the security protocol interactions between party A and party B. The 
protocol starts with both parties (A and B) authenticating themselves to each other, using 
public key certificates. Once authenticated, ECDH handshakes will start. Following the 
authenticated key exchange, adaptive FEC schemes is performed. Then a digital signature 
will be applied to the block of data, then encryption and a second hash function is applied 
to the data until the final code-word is transmitted and termination request is sent and 
accepted. 
 
The application-layer provisioning Suite-B algorithms provide:  
Authentication: This is provided for parties A and B through the usage of public and 
private keys and for the multimedia data through the deployment of GCM algorithm. 
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Figure 4.6 Application layer security protocol/functional entities 
 
Privacy: Privacy is provided through the deployment of AES algorithm. Following the 
cross-layer adaptive treatment of multimedia data, AES is applied to provide a strong 
encryption mechanism. 
 
Adaptive encoding: The authenticated and encrypted multimedia data and the 
QoS/security cross-layer information are used as inputs to the adaptive FEC scheme.   
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To transport layer 
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Figure 4.7 Application layer security protocol handshakes 
 
Non-Repudiation: Non-repudiation is provided through the deployment of the digital 
signature algorithm; ECDSA. ECDSA is applied to the output of the adaptive FEC code 
words. The deployment of ECDSA at the application layer provides a non-repudiation 
service for messages containing multiple blocks of data with a time-limit that is being 
imposed by the criticality of the data. For a very critical data, a signature can be applied 
to 1 to 10 minutes of data blocks. For a non critical data, a digital signature can be used 
for 1 entire day worth of data blocks. 
 
Integrity: Integrity is provided through the deployment of SHA-256, -384, and 512. The 
output of the adaptive FEC code words, the ECDSA digital signature, and the QoS-
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4.2.6.2 Transport Layer Security Protocol Handshakes 
 
Transport-layer Suite-B algorithms deployment involves treating sessions instead of 
messages. AES-GCM provides data integrity and encryption for session flows. ECDSA is 
used in TLS, however applies only for authentication handshake and public keys, not for 
session flows.  
 
 According to Table 3.10, cross-layer information, multimedia communication data, 
and UDP source/destination addresses are protected by privacy and integrity mechanisms. 
The IP source and destination addresses are not protected in this method. As mentioned, 
we are dealing with sessions at this layer. A session is an ongoing transmission of data 
between two ports on both the sender and receiver devices. Therefore since ECDSA is 
used in the session handshake, therefore as long as the session is active, one digital 
signature is sufficient.  
 
Suite B implementations of TLS has been mentioned in RFC 5246 [178] and RFC 5430 
[179]. For the 128-bit security level, the TLS-Suite-B scheme offers 
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256. During the TLS handshake 
protocol, Suite B algorithms utilize the form of key-agreement based on 
ECDHE_ECDSA (using the P-256 Elliptic Curve). This is the Ephemeral Unified Model 
key-agreement scheme where the server authenticates its part through the deployment of 
an ECDSA signature. The server must supply an X.509v3 certificate to the client, which 
contains an acceptable (accepted by the client) ECDSA key that will be used to verify its 
signature. That certificate must be signed using ECDSA by a CA. Figure 4.8 shows the 
protocol handshake flows between Ports A and B. Based on the certificates and the 
ECDSA signature, Ports A and B authenticate each other and the data flow starts 
(AES_128_GCM_SHA256) and continues until the termination REQ/ACK are 
transmitted. Optional functions are marked with “*”. 
 
The same process repeats for the client, which is required be authenticated during the 
TLS handshake (mutual authentication), then it must possess an X.509v3 certificate 
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containing an acceptable (accepted by the server) ECDSA key, signed using ECDSA by a 
CA. The client authentication is initiated by the issuance of “ECDSA_sign” certificate 
request message, which is issued by the server, requesting the client for an appropriate 
ECDSA certificate. 
 
In terms of overhead, the digital signature is the costliest algorithm in Suite-B and for 
TLS, one digital signature is required per active session. The duration of a session 
depends on various parameters, including: Link quality and session cease/start triggered 
by the application. For the application-layer security protocol, as mentioned, a critical 
application may require a digital signature every minute. For the same application 
running, the protocol for the transport-layer security is still dependent on the ongoing 
session. As long as the session is valid, one digital signature is sufficient. A session 
traffic analysis is required to find the average time of a session, which may be more than 
1 minute (assuming a good link quality). Therefore for critical applications, the overhead 
for the Suite-B TLS deployment may be less than the application-layer Suite-B 
deployment. However for non-critical applications, the sessions may be terminated and 
reestablished multiple times per day, therefore a digital signature may be required more 
than once a day, which increases the overhead for the Suite-B TLS deployment compared 
to the application-layer Suite-B deployment. 
 
4.2.6.3 Network Layer Security Protocol Handshakes 
 
Before an IPSec tunnel is established and data is transmitted through the VPN tunnel, 
the two parties at the two end of the tunnel (VPN client and server) should authenticate 
each other and exchange ephemeral ECDH keys. This is considered in the Internet Key 
Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol, specified in RFC 4306 [196]. IKE performs mutual 
authentication among two parties, by which an IKE security association (SA) is 
established, which includes shared secret information used to establish SAs for 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). A set of cryptographic algorithms, including 





Figure 4.8 Transport layer security protocol handshakes 
 
 
Figure 4.9 IPSec (IKEv2) security protocol handshakes 
 
 Party A Party B 
Application Data Flow Starts (AES-CBC-128, HMAC-SHA-256, 
HMAC-SHA-256-128) 
 IKE-SA-INIT (HDR, SA, KE, Ni) 
 IKE-SA-INIT (HDR, SA, KE, Nr, CERTREQ) 
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Encryption: This is done by AES with 128-bit keys in CBC mode (AES-CBC-128). 
 
Data Authentication and Integrity: IKEv2 uses the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for 
generating keying material for authentication of the IKE SA and integrity. This is done 
through the deployment of HMAC-SHA-256 and HMAC-SHA-256-128. 
 
Authentication: IKEv2 Elliptic Curve authentication is based on ECDSA-256. 
 
Figure 4.9 shows the IKEv3 protocol handshake flows. 
 
The deployment of Suite-B algorithms at the IP layer provides various security services 
(RFC 4869 [180]). For instance ECDH-ECDSA is used in the authentication handshake 
however does not provide non-repudiation services for the tunnel traffic.  
 
In terms of overhead, since the digital signature is the costliest algorithm in Suite-B and 
since for IPSec, one digital signature is required once per active tunnel and the duration 
of an active tunnel depends on various parameters, including link quality. For the 
application-layer security protocol, as mentioned, a critical application may require a 
digital signature every minute. For the same application running, the protocol for the 
network will require only one digital signature is sufficient. A tunnel traffic analysis is 
required to find the average time of a tunnel connection, which is expected to be more 
than 1 minute (assuming a good link quality) and it is also expected to be more than the 
session duration at the transport layer. Therefore for critical applications, the overhead for 
the Suite-B IPSec deployment may be less than both the application-layer and transport 
layer Suite-B deployments. For non-critical applications, the tunnel may be terminated 
and reestablished multiple times per day, however it is expected to last longer than a 
session, thus a digital signature may be required more than once a day. Therefore the 
overhead associated to the IPSec Suite-B deployment is expected to be more than the 
deployment of Suite-B at the application layer and less than the Suite-B deployment at 




4.2.6.4 Cross-Layer QoS/Security Parameters’ Liveliness 
 
The liveliness of the imported cross-layer QoS/Security parameters at the application 
layer determine how fast the system can adapt to environment changes. The variation of 
the environment’s quality is probabilistic in nature. Both slow and rapid changes to the 
quality are dependent on many parameters, including: The number of wireless 
clients/APs, the operational channels, the average distances between clients/APs, and so 
many other parameters. The protocol is designed to start probing the QoS/security cross-
layer information once every second. An adaptive scheme may be deployed to reduce the 
frequency of probing in an overall stable channel quality condition and to increase the 
frequency of probing in a rapid quality changes of the channel. Therefore the liveliness 
period of the cross-layer QoS/security parameters is set at once every second. 
 
4.3 Functions at the Receiving-End 
 
In this section we assume the traffic has been transmitted successfully to Party B, where 
appropriate mechanisms engage in the reversed algorithms take place. These reverse 
actions include: Decapsulation, decipher, reverse hash, signature verification, and 
multimedia content decode. Symmetric algorithms are schemes, in which both the sender 
and receiver have to perform identical functions both in the encoder and decoder. 
Therefore the incurred delay in both encoder and decoder is equal, such as in G.711 and 
G.723.1 codecs. Other schemes, in which the encoder and the decoder run different 
functions, are asymmetric schemes. For instance ECDSA signature (sender) is less 
computationally intensive than ECDSA verification (receiver), therefore it takes 
relatively less amount of time for the sender to sign. On the other hand H.264 and H.263 
require relatively less amount of time to decode at the receiver side. These are given in 





Table 4.17 Maximum decoding latency at the receiver 
Scheme Group Scheme 
Algorithm 
Relative Decoder- 
Encoder Delay  
End-to-End 
Delay 
G.711  500 sec 
G.723.1  15000 sec 
H.264 < 12300 sec 
 
Multimedia 
H.263 < 8500 sec 
Key Exchange ECDH < 5200 sec 
Digital Signature ECDSA-256 > 6520 sec 
Reverse hash SHA-512  18.56 nsec per byte  
Decryption AES-GCM > 23.46 nsec per byte 
Error Correction ARS > 41.24 nsec per byte 
IPSec Mode Tunnel   variable 
 WPA-AES  33.4 nsec per byte 
 
Table 4.17 summarizes the functions used in this thesis and the relative encoder-
decoder and end-to-end delay figures. For instance G.711 encoder and decoder have the 
same delay of 0.125 msec. Therefore the end-to-end delay is 0.5 msec. The ARS decoder 
is 2.25 times more time consuming than the ARS encoder.  
 
4.4 Security Analysis 
 
This section is concerned with the security strength of this system based on the security 
strength of the involved algorithms.  
 
The security mechanisms used in this thesis are based on Suite-B cryptographic 
algorithms. Numerous references [168, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177] provide formal security 
analysis and proof for the security strengths of the Suite-B algorithms, which are 
considered secure based on today’s computational power. These are explained below: 
  
Key-Size: The 128-bit key size when used with a strong encryption algorithm, such as 
AES, coupled with a message authentication technique, provided by the Galois-Counter 
Mode (AES-GCM), offers a very strong security algorithm based on today’s 
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computational power and is expected to remain unbreakable until 2030 [199, 200]. The 
256-bit key size is used in the operation of ECDSA-256, which provides a strong digital 
signature algorithm. The AES-GCM and ECDSA are two of algorithms used in Suite-B. 
 
Key Exchange: The ECDH scheme is based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and 
Diffie-Hellman (D-H) algorithm. Based on today’s computational power, Diffie-Hellman 
is secure against eavesdropping (passive attack), however without a strong mutual 
authentication mechanism, Diffie-Hellman is insecure against Man-in-the-Middle attack 
(active attack). Therefore the ECDH algorithm is considered secure based on today’s 
computational power [199, 200].  
 
Digital Signature Security Analysis: The digital signature scheme used in this thesis is 
based on ECDSA-256, which is cryptographically comparable to RSA-3072 and DSA-
3072. ECDSA is based on the DSA algorithm and despite the lack of a complete security 
proof, extensive attempts at cryptanalysis on either DSA or ECDSA have yet not yield 
any success [201]. Reference [202] has demonstrated that ECDSA is secure against 
forgery by adaptive chosen-message attack if the hash function is collision resistant and 
the elliptic curve group is modeled by a generic group. 
 
Hash Function Security Analysis: Though SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are not 
considered collision resistant functions, however they have still not been broken yet and 
are considered computationally secure with today’s computational power [203, 204].  
 
IPSec Security Analysis: As mentioned, IPSec can be used in two flavors; 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH). ESP protocol is 
the preferred choice as it provides authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. The ESP 
security strength is based on the security strength of AES, which is considered secure. 
 
Wi-Fi Security Option: At the MAC layer, the preferred security option is WPA-AES 




4.4.1 Possible attacks on the system 
 
The attack on the system can be in two forms; the attack on the Suite-B cryptographic 
algorithms and the attack on the security protocol. 
 
4.4.1.1 Possible Attacks on the Suite-B Algorithms 
 
The possible attacks on the Suite-B algorithms are directly related to the security model 
and may include the followings: Dictionary-, brute-force-, birthday-, replay-, Man-in-the-
Middle-, forged-certificate-, IP-fragmentation-, ping-of-death-, UDP-session-hijacking-, 
traffic-analysis, and other types of attacks. The security strengths of the security 
algorithms deployed by this system help withstand the combination of the mentioned 
attacks. These will be discussed in the following contexts: 
 
Attack on the Suite-B algorithms: Suite-B algorithms used in this thesis, which are: 
ECDSA-256, AES (128)-GCM, and SHA-(256, 384, and 512), are all considered to be 
computationally secure. The digital signature (ECDSA) is based on the Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) and one of the known classical attacks on the ECC algorithms is 
based on an exponential-search-algorithm with a complexity of )2( 2
n
O , which represents 
the square-root attack. The largest ECC-based cryptographic algorithm, which has 
publicly been broken, is the 109-bit ECC algorithm. Therefore a scheme with 256-bit 
key-size is still considered secure [205]. 
 
Attacks on the Digital Signature Algorithm: Though there are numerous attacks 
applicable to ECDSA, including birthday and brute-force attacks. However, as mentioned 
in this section, ECDSA-256 is considered unbreakable [206].  
 
Attacks on the Hash Algorithm: All hash algorithms are subject to birthday attacks, 
which include all versions of SHA family. SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 have still 
not been broken yet and are considered computationally secure with today’s 
computational power [203, 204,  207] 
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AES used in IPSec and WPA-AES: Both IPSec and WPA-AES use AES encryption 
algorithm. AES-128 is expected to remain secure till 2030 [208], however the method of 
attacking it is again through brute-force and birthday attacks. 
 
4.4.1.2 Possible Attacks on the Security Protocols 
 
The strength of the security protocol is required to be high enough to counter any 
possible attacks. Including: 
 
Man-in-the-Middle-Attack (MitMA): MitMA is when an adversary is located between 
legitimate parties; A and B and is able to intercept the communication. The ECDH key-
exchange algorithm is prone to MiTMA and to combat this security weakness, a mutual 
authentication scheme is required. An alternative scheme is to deploy ECMQV (Elliptic 
Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone), which is based on the parties preexisting static public 
keys. Once keys are safely exchanged, the ongoing communication will be encrypted for 
privacy, which limits the ability of the adversary. 
 
Forged Certificate: Through ARP poisoning, the illegitimate party; C can pose as B and 
direct the initial communication from A. Then C can reply to A by forging B’s certificate. 
The deployment of a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) solves this problem. 
 
UDP Session Hijack: Due to the fact that UDP does not deploy synchronizing and 
packet sequencing, it may be prone to session hijack. The adversary is simply required to 
forge a server reply to a UDP client request before the actual server responds. The 
deployment of TLS will however prevent such a security threat through the built-in 
session security of TLS. 
 
Data Block Injection or Data Block Deletion: As the transmitted data may become non-
streaming type, the flow of the information could encounter frequent breaks and sudden 
bursts. In order to provide data freshness and avoid any malicious activities, which may 
lead to deliberate deletion of information, an encrypted synchronized time-stamp coupled 
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to a sequence number should be accompanied with every transmitted block of data. This 
way the receiver is able to put together different blocks and execute various checks to 
ensure data has not been altered by any illegitimate party.  
 
Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack: DoS attack in a multilayer attack and could involve a 
continual transmission of queries targeting a specific application, session, port, MAC or 
IP address. At the application layer, any attempt to hamper the function of the protocol 
will result in a DoS attack. For example an adversary could target B and send many 
forged queries masquerading A. If each query is transmitted along with the digital 
signature of the sender, then the receiver can filter out the queries with digital signatures 
of any illegitimate parties. At transport and network layers, the same issue may take place 




4.5 An Experimental Setup and Results 
 
In this section, an experimental test is setup and results will be evaluated.  
 
4.5.1 QoS Analysis 
 
Table 4.18 shows QoS parameters for the QoS model. Table 4.19 presents the zones of 
operations based on the feedback received from lower layers. For instance Zone 8 
indicates very bad channel/signal qualities, which forces the selection of the lowest 
encoders for both voice and video, which are G.723.1 (6.4 Kbps) and H.263 4 (the lowest 
rate; 24 Kbps). On the same front, since the degrading channel/signal qualities may result 
in a relatively high number of errors and RF issues, a lower value for k is chosen (k = 
223), which may increase the error correction capability. On the other side, Zone 1 
indicates very good channel/signal qualities. 
 
The QoS and security models presented in this thesis are summarized in Table 4.18.  
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All parameters mentioned in Table 4.18 contribute to the Zone selection. To consider 
the impact factor of each parameter, we assign numbers to each zone, based on Figure 
4.10. Since the normal curve is used in many physical measurements (e.g., RF effects, 
traffic characteristics, etc.), we use this curve to represent the Zone variations. Therefore 
Table 4.20 summarizes the zones and their equivalent value ranges. 
 
Table 4.18 Cross-Layer QoS feedback to the application-layer 










Table 4.19 Zone-based encoder, FEC variations 
Zone Encoder (Voice-Video) - Data Rate FEC, k value 
G.723.1 – 5.3 Kbps  
Zone 8 H.263 – 24 Kbps 
 
k =  223 
G.729a – 8 Kbps  
Zone 7 H.263 – 28 Kbps 
 
k =  223 
G.726 – 32 Kbps  
Zone 6 H.263 – 32 Kbps 
 
k =  239 
G.728 – 16 Kbps  
Zone 5 H.263 – 36 Kbps 
 
k =  239 
G.729 – 8 Kbps  
Zone 4 H.263 – 42 Kbps 
 
k =  247 
G.722.1 – 48 Kbps  
Zone 3 H.263 – 48 Kbps 
 
k =  247 
G.722 – 64 Kbps  
Zone 2 H.263 – 56 Kbps 
 
k =  251 
G.711 – 64 Kbps  
Zone 1 H.264 – 64 Kbps 
 




Figure 4.10 FEC’s zone ranges 
 
 
Table 4.20 Zones and equivalent ranges 
Zone Range 
1 [1.0 - 0.92) 
2 [0.92 - 0.71) 
3 [0.71 - 0.46) 
4 [0.46 - 0.26) 
5 [0.26 - 0.11) 
6 [0.11 - 0.04) 
7 [0.04 - 0.02) 
8 [0.02 – 0.00] 
 
 
Each of the parameters specified Table 4.18 has a specific Impact Factor (IF) in the 
calculation of the Zone. For instance the value of the RSSI has a higher IF on the Zone 
determination compared to DSCP. These IF values are mentioned in Tables 4.21 to 4.27. 
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Table 4.21 Impact Factor for RSSI ranges 
RSSI Range Impact Factor (IF) 
Below -90 dBm 0.0 
-90 dB to -80 dBm 0.1 
-80 dB to -70 dBm 0.4 
-70 dB to -60 dBm 0.6 
-60 dB to -50 dBm 0.8 
-50 dB to -40 dBm 0.9 
Above -40 dBm 1.0 
 
Table 4.22 Impact Factor for SNR ranges 
SNR Range Impact Factor (IF) 
0 - 2 dB 0.0 
2 dB to 7 dB 0.1 
7 dB to 15 dB 0.3 
15 dB to 20 dB 0.5 
20 dB to 30 dB 0.7 
30 dB to 40 dB 0.8 
40 dB to 50 dB 0.9 
Above 50 dB 1.0 
 
Table 4.23 Impact Factor for WMM ranges 
WMM Range Impact Factor (IF) 
000 0.7 





Table 4.24 Impact Factor for DSCP ranges 
DSCP Range Impact Factor (IF) 
00000000 – 00011111 0.7 
00100000 – 10111111 0.8 
11000000 -11011111 0.9 
11100000 – 11111111 1.0 
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Table 4.25 Impact Factor for VPN/IPSec settings 
VPN/IPSec Impact Factor (IF) 
IPSec – ESP (Tunnel) 0.5 
IPSec – ESP (Transport) 0.6 
IPSec – AH 0.7 
None 1.0 
 
Table 4.26 Impact Factor for MAC-layer security settings 






To calculate the combined IF value, let’s assume that the schemes in Table 4.28 are all 
present simultaneously. The combined IF value is: 0.9 X 0.8 X 0.9 X 0.9 X 1.0 X 0.7 X 0.5 
= 0.204, which according to Table 4.20, it corresponds to Zone 5 and according to Table 
4.19, the codec selected are: G.728 (16 Kbps), H.263 (36 Kbps), and k = 239. 
 
Table 4.27 Impact Factor for transport-layer security settings 





Table 4.28 Cross-layer QoS feedback to the application-layer 
Cross-Layer Parameter  IF 
RSSI (- 45 dBm) 0.9 
SNR (38 dB) 0.8 
WMM (110) 0.9 
DSCP (11000000) 0.9 
IPSec/VPN Capability  (None) 1.0 
MAC-Layer Security (WPA2) 0.7 
Transport-Layer Security Suite-B) 0.5 
Combined IF value: 0.204 
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4.5.1.1 Impact Factor – Zone – MOS Value Mapping 
 
The effect of each individual Impact Factor (based on the imported cross-layer 
parameters) impacts the total IF. This leads to the selection of a specific Zone. Each Zone 
will enforce specific encoders to be used for both voice and video. Voice codecs being 
selected are: G.723.1, G.729a, G.728, G.729, G.726, G.722.1, G.722 and G.711. 
According to Tables 2.5, 4.19, and 4.20 and Figure 4.10, the relationship between the 
final IF, Zone, and MOS values are shown in Figure 4.11. 
 
As the cross-layer feedback indicates an improving channel/signal quality, lower Zones 
are selected, which then better voice codecs with higher MOS score values are selected. 
 
As mentioned in section 2.1.1, QoE measurements may use non-intrusive voice quality 
analyses for predicting MOS value using passive voice clarity evaluations. Once a MOS 
value is calculated this way, it will relate to specific Zone and Impact Factor, where were 
discussed in this section and also depicted in Figure 4.11. 
 
Figure 4.11 can be used to match a targeted MOS value to a Zone and eventually 
achieve an Impact Factor. For example if in a VoIP scenario, a MOS score of 4.10 or 
above is required, according to Figure 4.10, Zone 3, 2, or 1 can be used (Impact Factor of 
0.71 or better). This means on average, every individual Impact Factors should be 0.71 or 
above.  
 
4.5.2 Security Analysis 
 
For the security part, Table 4.29 sums all layered security model parameters. 
 
4.6 Experimental Results 
 
In this section we construct an experimental testbed using Labview 8.5 system design. 
Labview is capable of generating real-time traffic based functional elements and 
producing graphical and visual performance diagrams. 
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Figure 4.11 Total Impact Factor, Zone, and MOS value mapping 
 
Table 4.29 Suite-B layered mechanisms 
Layer Cross-Layer Parameter Export to 







SHA-(256, 384, 512) 
ECDH - ECDSA (256) 
Transport TLS-Suite-B Suite-B-TLS 
Network IPSec-Suite-B Suite-B-IPSec 




The delay and overhead effects of multimedia codes (i.e., G.711, G.723.1, H.263, and 
H.264), Suite-B functional codes (i.e., ECDH, ECDSA, AES-GCM, and SHA) and the R-
S code will be tested using a Labview testbed for evaluating the experimental results 
based on the analytical results found in Table 4.11. The end-to-end delay figures are also 
going to be evaluated.  
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The transport protocol conveying multimedia and security-enabled traffic is based on 
UDP and IP. Both sender and receiver have individual interfaces installed on the end-user 
PCs. The sender interface has selectors to select the type of digital signature (ECDSA-
256), encryption (AES-GCM), hashing (SHA-512) and etc.. At the receiver, the reverse 
processes will take place and the payloads are extracted with the processing delays. 
 
On the receiver side, following the correct decode of the payload, the Labview interface 
calculates and shows the following graphs (Figure A.2): Instantaneous and average 
packet delay versus time, instantaneous and average throughout, and instantaneous and 
average jitter versus time. 
 
The system was run numerous times, during a month period, under various channel 
conditions, and each time over 30 minutes of run time. The system is able to show 
instantaneous as well as average results in a discrete manner.  
 
Tables 4.30 and 4.31 show the CLP values in one of the testbed runs and the 
corresponding Zone and multimedia codecs in use. 
 
Therefore the sender selectors will automatically choose the parameters mentioned in 
Table 4.32. 
 
Table 4.30 Testbed CLPs values 
CLP value Impact Factor (IF) 
RSSI: -38 dBm 1.0 
SNR: 52 dB 1.0 
WMM: 111 1.0 
DSCP: 11100000 1.0 
IPSec: None 1.0 
MAC-Security: None 1.0 
Transport-Layer-Security: None 1.0 




Table 4.31 Zone 1 multimedia settings 
Multimedia settings (Zone 1) 
Video codec: H.264 (64 kbps) 
Audio code: G.711 (64 kbps) 
k (R-S code): 251 
 
 
Table 4.32 Zone 1 sender’s selectors 
ECDSA-256 
SHA-512 






The average analytical value for end-to-end delay is 19.64 msec on average on 930 byte 




Figure 4.12 Experimental and theoretical results for delay comparisons 
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According to the experimental results, given in Figure 4.12, for 500 test trials, the 
average delay is 20.12 ± 0.001 msec (99% CI) with the standard deviation of 0.081 msec, 
which results an average 2.44% (and 5.40% maximum) differences between analytical 
and experimental results, which validates our assumptions. The fluctuations in the 
experimental results are due to channel variations and retransmissions. 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Experimental and theoretical results for overhead comparisons 
 
 
Figure 4.14 Experimental results for overhead and delay figures comparisons 
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Figure 4.13 presents the overhead comparisons between the analytical and experimental 
results. It can be seen that the analytical results yield 930 bytes of total overhead, whereas 
the experimental results show an average of 946.5 ± 0.3667 bytes (99% CI) with 3.19 
bytes standard deviation and an average of 1.77% (and 2.69% maximum) increase 
compared to the analytical results. 
 
Based on Figure 4.14, which is an overlap of payload size and incurred delay figures, 
there is a direct correlation between the increase and decrease of payload size and the 
incurred delay figures, which depend on channel quality and retransmission occurrences. 
In both cases, delay and overhead figures are within acceptable ranges. 
 
4.6.1 The Effectiveness of the Cross-Layer Design 
In this section a few experiments are run to compare the results of this system in the 
presence and absence of the cross-layer design. For this, two different sets of tests are 
conducted. In the first set, total delay figures are compared between normal cross-layer 
operation and a scenario where cross-layer feedback is disabled. The same test is done for 
the Impact Factor index being set to 1.0 and 0.45. The IF index 1.0 selects k = 251, G.711 
for the audio and H.264 for the video codecs. The IF index 0.45 is associated to Zone 4 
which selects k = 247, G.729 for the audio and H.263 for the video codecs. 
To show the effectiveness of the cross-layer a new Labview module is added to 
calculate the jitter at the receiver. Since the calculation of delay was already part of the 
receiver’s building-block, therefore for calculating jitter (variations in the receiver’s 
delay), a slight modification is applied at the receiver. As mentioned, jitter is an 
important parameter that affects the quality of VoIP systems. 
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Figure 4.15 Experimental results for cross-layer jitter figures 
 
Figure 4.15 shows a sample of the jitter figures in one test run, gathered from the three 
experiments; normal cross-layer function (causing variable IF), disabling the cross layer 
feedback, and setting IF to 1.0 and 0.45. During the 100 second run of the experiments, in 
the first 30 seconds, both SNR and RSSI are kept within relatively stable conditions 
(keeping channel noise level and the distances between the sender/receiver laptops from 
the AP constant). Then from 30th second to 65th second, RSSI is kept steady and SNR is 
decreased by increasing noise levels in the channel (e.g., turning on various wireless 
propagation sources). From the 65th second to the 100th second, SNR is kept constant and 
the RSSI is decreased by gradually increasing the distances between AP/sender/receiver. 
 
The experiment is repeated for 500 times and yields the following average results: For 
variable IF, the average jitter is 11.47 ± 0.005 msec (99% CI), for IF = 1.0, the average 
jitter is 14.15 ± 0.007 msec (99% CI), and for IF = 0.45, the average jitter is 12.62 ± 
0.006 msec (99% CI). The experimental results shown in Figure 4.15 show that for the 
duration in which SNR and RSSI are kept stable, for all three experimental scenarios (IF 
= variable, 1.0, and 0.45), the performances of the system, from the received jitter point 
of view, are consistent. As the SNR is degraded, the performance for the IF =1.0 
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deteriorate more noticeable than that of IF = 0.45 and for IF = variable, it is least 
impacted. The reason for the highest impact on the IF = 1.0 scenario is the fact that the 
system starts loosing the capability of handling constant deployment of G.711 and H.264 
when the channel noise is on the rise. As the RSSI is degraded, similar outcomes are 
noticed as well and the best jitter values are seen for the IF = variable scenario where 
appropriate codecs are selected according to the channel quality conditions, which 
indicates the effectiveness of the cross-layer design deployed by this system. 
 
4.7 Power Consideration 
 
Power consumption is an important factor, especially for wireless systems, where the 
wireless devices are running on battery powers for prolonged period of times.  Therefore 
every effort has to be considered to keep the power consumption within specific levels. 
 
4.7.1 Suite-B on Intel T2500 Platform 
 
The Suite-B algorithms were used in this thesis and their performances were tested 
using Crypto++ Library 5.6.0 cryptographic algorithms running on an Intel® T2500-
2GHz CPU and 2 GB RAM using a Windows XP Service Pack 2 platform (laptop). We 
will show Suite-B’s cryptographic algorithms power consumption figures based on the 
same platform, captured in the literature [209, 210, 211] and also discuss the power 
consumption figures on other handheld wireless systems running on limited battery 
powers, as their computational powers and batter resources may far be less than a laptop. 
 
Table 4.33 includes the energy required to perform Suite-B cryptographic algorithms 
[209, 210, 211]. 
Table 4.33 Suite-B energy consumption figures 
Algorithm Energy Consumption 
ECDSA 154.3 (mJ) - Signing 207.33 (mJ) - Verifying 
SHA-512 0.55 J/Byte 
AES-GCM 0.72 J/Byte - Encryption 0.93 J/Byte – Decryption 
ARS (Adaptive RS) 0.66 J/Byte - Encryption 0.98 J/Byte – Decryption 
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For instance in the case of G.711 with 240 byte payload, the Suite-B algorithms energy 
consumption figure is: 362.68 mJ in 6 msec or 2.176 mW. 
 
4.7.2 Handheld Processors and Platforms 
 
Handheld devices usually deploy relatively less computationally complex processors to 
save power. The rule of thumb is, the less the computational power, the less the power 
consumption figures may be and since the wireless handheld devices run on limited batter 
powers, therefore it’s vital to deploy mechanisms that require less amount of power for 
their operations. 
 
ARM processors are the predominant processors used in many wireless handhelds 
[212]. The ARM features a 32-bit RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer) chip. ARM 
cores include family members of ARM 1 to ARM 11, StrongARM, XScale, and Cortext. 
Many vendors use one of the specific families of ARM processors in their systems. For 
instance, Blackberry Bold (9000 series) uses PXA270, which is an XScale ARM 
processor. Apple iPhone uses ARM1176JZF processor, which is a member of ARM11 
family, and Nokia N-Gage uses the ARM946E processor, which is a member of ARM9E 
family. 
 
Due to the processing and power restrictions of handheld devices, platforms with 
limited functionalities should run on these devices, including Windows CE, Windows 




4.7.2.1 Suite-B on Handheld Platforms 
 
Handhelds, such as the Blackberry Bold, which use PXA270 processors, have become 
increasingly popular, not only for their ubiquitous versatility, but also because of their 
security strengths. Security mechanisms are often involved with extra battery 
consumptions, delay, and overheads. The PXA270 ARM XScale family processor is 
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capable of performing 800 MIPS (Million Instructions per second) at 624 MHz clock 
speed, which is comparable to the 733 MIPS Pentium III [213, 214]. 
 
Reference [215] uses a testbed in which the PXA270 Processor is used (624 MHz) with 
192 MB total RAM memory on Microsoft Windows Mobile 2003 platform. The 
comparisons are made to a PC platform (Acer TravelMate 4020 with Pentium M 725, 1.6 
GHz, 400 MHz FSB, and 256 MB RAM). The cryptographic algorithms were created 
using C++. The encryption/decryption delays for an ECDSA 256 and the equivalent 
encryption scheme (AES-128), requires four times more time on the PXA270 compared 
to that of the Pentium M 725. 
 
Reference [216] runs a test on Dell Axim X30 Pocket PC, which uses the same 
processor (624 MHz PXA270) on a 950 mAh battery and the MS PPC 2003 SE as the OS. 
For a file size of 215 bytes, the encryption latency is 6.54 s/byte and the decryption is 
6.51 s/byte, which is about 1000 times slower than the performance measure compared 
to our T2500-2GHz platform. Reference [216] also provides measurements for the HP 
iPAQ 4150 Pocket PC, which uses 400 MHz PXA255 processor on a 1000 mAh battery 
cell. The AES-128 scheme based on the block ciphers operated in an Electronic Code 
Book (ECB) mode and based on a 215 byte file, requires 10.02 s/byte and the decryption 
scheme requires 9.94 s/byte. The power consumption figures are only provided for HP 
iPAQ 4150 Pocket PC, where AES on the same file size requires 2.524 J/byte and 2.505 
J/byte for the decryption, which consumes approximately 4 times more power compared 
to our T2500-2GHz platform.  
 
ARM7TDMI is another ARM-based processor used for cryptographic purposes [217]. 
There are numerous editions of ARM7TDMI, including: ARM7TDMI(-S), ARM710T, 
ARM720T, ARM740T, and ARM7EJ-S. The most powerful edition is the ARM7EJ-S, 
which operates at 133 MHz and its power consumption is at 0.14 mW/MHz [218]. 
 
Reference [219] uses a testbed in which ARM7TDMI is running at 60 MHz. The 
cryptographic codes were created and compiled by the tester and the results show that at 
60 MHz clock speed, AES 128 and 256 had the throughput of 926 kbps and 680 kbps 
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respectively. SHA-256 and SHA-512 had the throughput of 640.8 kbps and 401.6 kbps 
and the delay of 1.524 s/byte and 2.431 s/byte respectively, almost 180 times slower 
than our T2500-2GHz implementation.  
 
The ECDSA 224 signature generation time on the ARM7TDMI platform requires 142.6 
msec, which is 54 times slower than our T2500-2GHz implementation. 
 
4.7.2.2 Power tradeoffs of Suite-B on Handheld Platforms 
 
As mentioned, the deployment of security mechanisms is always involved with extra 
battery consumption figures and in the case of wireless handheld devices that are 
expected to run on a single battery for a few days without being recharged, such extra 
power consumption figures may become critical and a few milliWatts difference between 
two cryptographic algorithms or the frequency of the deployment of two different 
algorithms, could have major impacts on the wireless handheld devices battery life-times. 
 
Here are a few observations in terms of power consumption figures: 
 
Limited memory and processing power: Due to power consumption limitations, many 
handheld devices are equipped with relatively weaker processors compared to those used 
in laptops and desktops. Most of these processors operate between the 20 – 800 MHz 
CPU clock speeds [215, 216, 217, 218, 219], therefore the number of instructions 
executed per unit of time are also lower than those observed in laptops and desktops. The 
same applies to the onboard memory systems. Most wireless handheld systems feature 
small RAM modules, often less than 256 MB [215]. 
 
Suite-B algorithms power consumptions versus file/message sizes: The size of the 
plaintext affects the performance (speed) of the Suite-B operation and as a consequence, 
the power consumption figures become dependent on the file/message size. As the 
file/message size increases, the consumption power figures per byte increases as well, 
however the average consumption power figures for the message per byte decreases. 
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Therefore in long run, the system consumes less power for performing Suite-B 
algorithms on larger file/message sizes. The actual dependency of the power consumption 
figures to the file size depends on the hardware platform (e.g., processor, CPU speed, 
RAM) and other software and protocol related parameters. 
 
Battery life-time versus Suite-B algorithms deployment: The deployment of Suite-B 
cryptographic algorithms has a negative effect on the battery life-time. Again depending 
on the platform in use, the effect can be different. For instance; HP iPAQ 4150 uses a 3.7 
V, 1000 mAh Lithium Ion battery and can work up to 12 hours on a full-charged battery. 
If we assume AES-128 is deployed (part of the Suite-B algorithms) and we assume AES 
is used 20% of the times. Such a deployment will reduce the battery-life from 12 hours to 
9 hours 11 seconds. The same calculation would result 8 hours and 6 minutes of battery-
life for the deployment of SHA-256. For ECDSA-256 signature that is used once every 
10 second (as an example) on the ongoing traffic, it will reduce the batter life from 12 
hours to 8 hours 9 minutes. As you notice, ECDSA-256 is a relatively more 
computational intensive algorithm and its deployment impacts the batter life greatly. 
 
Suite-B algorithms deployment impacts on the throughput: Throughput is the 
performance parameter that will be impacted the most by the deployment of Suite-B 
cryptographic algorithms. As it was investigated in this thesis, the deployment of Suite-B 
did not impact the security/QoS performance of the system based on the laptop platform. 
However this is not the case for wireless handhelds, as it was mentioned in this section, 
Suite-B algorithms (i.e., AES, ECDSA, SHA) may be up to 1000 times slower than those 
operating on a laptop platform. For instance, reference [220] shows that the deployment 
of SHA-256 can decrease the throughput of the deployed platform (Actel CoreMP7 
Fusion FPGA based on ARM7) almost 20 times. SHA-512 impacts the throughput almost 
27 times. Using a 2 MB RAM, AES-128 and AES-256 reduce the throughput 11.37 and 
15.43 times respectively.  
 
Minimum handheld system requirement for Suite-B algorithms deployment: The delay, 
power consumption, and performance reductions figures associated to the deployment of 
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Suite-B algorithms in wireless handheld devices should be considered based on the 
battery-life and minimum performance requirements (e.g., mandated by the running 
applications). Therefore the required minimum system depends on the type of application, 
minimum bandwidth, maximum delay, and maximum extra consumption power that the 
system should be able to handle.  
 
4.8 Existing Solutions 
 
The system designed and discussed in this thesis is unique and there is no system to-
date that provides the same services/functionalities. However in this subsection, existing 
systems and solutions with similar functionalities will be considered.  
 
Reference [221] introduces a web-based application system (WebIBC), which 
integrates the a public-key cryptographic scheme into the ongoing traffic. WebIBC is a 
software-based system that provides encryption, integrity, and integrates public key 
cryptography and integrates them into the web applications. The public key system in 
WebIBC is provided by an identity-based cryptography. This system features a 512-bit 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography based on ECDH and ECDSA, which are implemented using 
a JavaScript Crypt Library. The WebIBC computation engine features other 
cryptographic building blocks, including AES-128, SHA-1, and a big integer module 
(MULtiply “MUL”) algorithm. This system accepts 3 different block sizes of data; 0.5, 
2.0, and 10.0 KB. The resulted overheads produced by the system are all over 1000 bytes 
per packet, which are higher than the overhead figure in the worst-case scenario in 
system discussed in this thesis. A more detailed comparison is given in Table 5.1. 
 
Reference [222] proposes a secured lightweight architecture (SA2pMP), which is also 
software-based (implemented using Java ME “Micro Edition”) and deploys a lightweight 
cryptographic scheme for a two-party mobile secure payment system. This system is a 
combination of a symmetric key and a public key systems based on ECDSA-192, AES-
256 and other multi-factor authentication mechanisms. This system offers non-
repudiation, authentication, integrity, and confidentiality services and is efficient when 
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implemented in a mobile platform without causing additional delays and is well-suited to 
protect two-party payment transactions over a resource-limited mobile network. The 
SA2pMP is emulated using three different software systems, including: Java Wireless 
Toolkit 2.5.2 for CLDC, Nokia S60 rd Edition, and Sony Ericsson SDK 2.5.0.3 Z800 
emulators. The simulations were running on the IBM IntelliStation M Pro PC, with 
Pentium 4 CPU 2.80GHz and 2GB RAM and the operating system is Windows XP 
Professional SP3. The hardware platform used in these simulations has higher benchmark 
values compared to the hardware platform used for in this thesis (Intel® T2500-2GHz 
CPU and a 2 GB RAM on a Windows XP Service Pack 2 platform) [223]. 
 
All three emulators exhibit signature sign/verify times of more than 700 msec, which 
are much higher than the delay figures observed in the system discussed in this thesis. A 
more detailed comparison is given in Table 5.1. 
 
Reference [224] discusses a secure architecture (software-based implementation) for 
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET) applications that is built around an authentication 
protocol, including the related computational and experimental analyses. This system is 
based on a security protocol that is optimized for VANET scenarios and is not only 
capable of providing communication means between ad-hoc entities, it also offers strong 
security mechanisms. The performance measures are done on a Centrino machine with 
the clock speed set at 1.5 GHz and the security algorithms deployed are based on 
ECDSA-192, ECDSA-256, and AES-128. For ECDSA-256, the signing time is 3 msec 
and the verification time is 4.2 msec, which are higher compared to the signing and 
verification delays measured in our system (2.63 and 3.89 msec, respectively). According 
to the Reference [223], Centrino-based platforms have higher benchmark values 
compared to T2500 platform.  
 
Depending on various authentication schemes used in reference [224], the message 
sizes may change from 100 to 800 bytes. These overhead figures are relatively lower 
compared to those measured in the system considered in this thesis due to the fact that no 
multimedia data are included in the message structure discussed in reference [224]. The 
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maximum delay figures are also variable, ranging from 20 ms to 50 ms, which are higher 
than the maximum delay figure calculated in our system (i.e., 20.12 msec). A more 
detailed comparison is given in Table 5.1. 
 
Therefore by analyzing the existing systems and comparing the performance measures, 
delay/overhead figures, and/or the supported capabilities, our system outperforms the 
existing solutions in various levels and criteria. Table 5.1 sums up the comparison 
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In this chapter, we reflect the analytical and experimental results based on the QoS and 
security models that were presented in chapter 3. We showed that the performance 
parameters specified in chapter 3 (e.g., end-to-end delays, packet overheads, etc.) are 
within acceptable ranges and the analytical and experimental data match. 
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In particular, we discussed four operational modes:  
1. Method 1: In this method, Suite-B at the application layer is used packed in the 
core UDP payload. No security options at the Network and MAC layers are 
available. 
2. Method 2: In this method, Suite-B at the transport layer is used. 
3. Method 3 In this method, Suite-B at the network layer is used based on IPSec. 
4. Method 4: In this method, core UDP payload (mentioned in Method 1) is used 
with a MAC layer encryption technique (e.g., WPA-AES). 
 
The thorough analyses showed that when applying application layer Suite-B algorithms 
on full multimedia traffic (voice, video, and text), the payload will be 986 bytes and the 
end-to-end delay is 19.64 msec, which is acceptable for VoIP purposes. 
 
Experimental results using Labview setup show similar results with a maximum 2.44% 
tolerance for the end-to-end delay and 1.77% tolerance for the received payload overhead.  
 
We also considered Suite-B algorithm deployment in handheld devices, which mostly 
use one of the ARM processors families. Due to the limitations in power and 
computational capabilities, the performances of these handheld have proven to be much 
less compared to the performance of our laptop T2500-2GHz platform. However the 
delays and power consumption figures resulted from the Suite-B deployment are within 














In Chapter 2, we considered current and past approaches to wireless multimedia 
transporting security and QoS services of the following areas: QoS, Security Traffic 
classifications, Wireless multilayer approach, Wireless cross layer design, and Non 
repudiation multimedia-based wireless systems., which paved the path to introducing the 
QoS and security models. 
 
In Chapter 3, we introduced QoS and security models and we discussed the design and 
implementation of an application layer non-repudiation wireless system, which featured a 
cross-layer technique validated by a traffic classification analysis. The main feature was 
to support full-multimedia capabilities (e.g., text, voice, and video) while offering highly 
secure mechanisms, supporting various algorithms, including a non-repudiation technique. 
We used real traffic sniffing tools to capture and analyze both wireless and wired traffic 
payloads. Then we applied classical traffic classification tools to find confidence interval 
for the flow durations and packet sizes for both wired and wireless traffic payloads. The 
average packet size for wired traffic was 652 and for wireless traffic was 197 bytes. 
 
The end-to-end communication between end-point entities (e.g., patient, doctor, etc.) 
starts with a key agreement scheme. The deployed cryptographic algorithms are based on 
Suite-B and the key agreement algorithm offered by Suite-B is Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) scheme. Following the key agreement algorithm, traffic flows between 
Party A and Party B will include several Suite-B security parameters, which including: 
AES-128 for encryption, AES-GCM (Galois/Counter Mode) for authentication and 
encryption, which is a 128-bit block cipher. ECDSA-256 offers digital signature 
functionality, and SHA-512, offers a hashing mechanism. These mechanisms are initially 
deployed at the application layer, which are accompanied by a cross-layer adaptive 
Forward Error Correction scheme, based on Reed Solomon algorithm at the application 
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layer. Figure 4.1 shows the cross-layer QoS/Security model used in this system. The 
Suite-B algorithms were also considered at the transport and network layers.  
 
In the application layer, multimedia communication data (i.e., voice, video, and text) 
are in terms of messages and are fed into the adaptive encoder, which is also fed from the 
lower layer security/QoS modules. The encoded multimedia data is fed into the AES-
GCM and the output is used as an input to the ECDSA algorithm and SHA function.  
 
The system operates using cross layer parameters (CLPs) feedbacks from lower layers. 
These include RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indicator) and Signal to Noise Ratio 
(SNR) at the physical layer, WMM (Wireless Multimedia) at the MAC layer, DSCP 
(Differentiated Services Code Point) at the network layer, and 24 bits related to security 
capabilities, which adds up to 48 bits for the CLPs (Cross Layer Parameters). 
 
The CLPs were used in the Adaptive Forward Error Correction (AFEC) based on the 
Reed Solomon schemes (ARS). 
 
The experimental results were based on the Crypto++ Library 5.6.0 cryptographic 
algorithms run on an Intel® T2500-2GHz CPU and a 2 GB RAM using a Windows XP 
Service Pack 2 platform and on a Labview testbed, which showed similar results with a 
maximum 2.44% tolerance for the end-to-end delay and 1.77% tolerance for the received 
payload overhead. 
 
The rest of the thesis talked about the security analysis that discussed the strengths and 
weaknesses of the Suite-B algorithms used and the possible attacks on the system. 
 
Table 4.11 shows the application layer delay and overhead figures related to Suite-B 
algorithms. Figure 4.11 shows the experimental results for the overhead and delay figures. 
 
Therefore the theoretical analysis, as well as experimental results, show consistent 
outcomes in terms of overhead and delay figures. The end-to-end delay figures are 
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bounded to approximately 20 msec, which works well for most VoIP systems and are 
within the acceptable range. The overhead figures are between 100 to 1000 bytes, which 
work well in most wireless networks, however high overheads (above 200 bytes) may 
pose as a challenge for networks undergoing heavy traffic periods or congestions, in 
which case the cross-layer system will start to affect the codec schemes to reduce the 
overhead accordingly. 
 
We also studied the Suite-B algorithm deployment in handheld devices, which mostly 
use one of the ARM processors families. Due to the limitations in power and 
computational capabilities, the performances of these handheld have proven to be much 
less compared to the performance of our laptop T2500-2GHz platform. However the 
delays and power consumption figures resulted from the Suite-B deployment are within 
acceptable ranges and are not posing as bottlenecks. 
 
5.1 Details of the Contributions 
 
The contributions of this thesis are listed in the following categories: 
 
Application Layer Provisioning: In this thesis, we designed a system in which various 
QoS and security related parameters are exported from different layers and imported at 
the application layer. In this thesis, we covered details on a well organized QoS and 
security enabled application layer-based system, which incorporated multimedia-enriched 
traffic in the presence of various security-enabled data with a non-repudiation support.  
 
QoS-based Cross Layer Design: In the structure of the proposed system, a cross-layer 
design approach was deployed, which served for both application layer-based QoS and 
security purposes. In such a cross-layer QoS-based system, a number of QoS-related 
parameters (e.g., Received Signal Strength Indicator “RSSI”, Signal to Noise Ratio 
“SNR”, Wireless Multimedia, “WMM”, and Differentiated Services Code Point “DSCP”) 
were gathered from three layers and imported at the application layer. The current values 
of these three parameters defined the quality of the wireless link and were used to 
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determine the quality of the multimedia encoder. This way, an adaptive multimedia 
encoder/decoder system was designed, which was used to adapt its coding quality to the 
quality of the environment and to adjust the encoder bit-rate and the integrated Forward 
Error Correction (FEC) scheme accordingly. The values of these three parameters were 
transmitted alongside the rest of the data to the receiver and the receiver used them to 
determine the correct decoding procedures. 
 
Security-based Cross Layer Design: For this, a number of layered-based (e.g., physical, 
MAC, and network layers) security parameters were gathered from various layers, which 
were accompanied with other gathered QoS-related parameters and fed into an 
application layer security-based module. In particular, we deployed a multilayer Suite-B 
cryptographic system to address various security requirements in the application, 
transport, and network layers and to study the impacts to the overhead and delay figures 
of such a deployment. 
 
Multimedia-based Adaptive Non-Repudiation System: As mentioned, the cross-layer 
parameters were imported at the application layer from lower layers. An adaptive 
mechanism was presented at the application layer, which processed the cross layer 
information and its outputs were directly used in the encoder (at the sender), decoder (at 
the receiver) systems, and in the Forward Error Correction (FEC) scheme, adapting to 
network conditions.  
 
Following the functions of the encoder and the FEC module, Suite-B algorithms were 
applied to the multimedia traffic.  
 
Finally, a thorough analysis was performed to investigate the performance of this 
system under various security and QoS conditions. 
 
Security System Analysis: The security model of this system was discussed in chapter 3. 
This included a thorough consideration of the security schemes, mechanisms, and 
protocols used as well as security analyses of the system. 
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QoS Support: Through analyses and experimental results using C++ based 
cryptographic codes and Labview testbeds, QoS capabilities offered by the system were 
investigated under various traffic flows, containing; multimedia data, hashed data, cross-
layer information, and digital signature.  
 
Analytical versus Experimental Results: The average analytical value for end-to-end 
delay was shown to be 19.64 msec on average on 930 byte overhead when video, audio, 
and text were transmitted simultaneously. According to the experimental results, the 
average delay was 20.12 msec with the standard deviation of 0.081 msec, which resulted 
an average 2.44% (and 5.40% maximum) differences between analytical and 
experimental results, which validated our assumptions. The fluctuations in the 
experimental results were due to channel variations and retransmissions. 
 
Figure 4.6 presented the overhead comparisons between the analytical and experimental 
results. It was shown that the analytical resulted yield 930 bytes of total overhead, 
whereas the experimental results showed an average of 946.5 bytes with 3.19 bytes 
standard variance and an average of 1.77% (and 2.69% maximum) increase compared to 
the analytical results.  
 
Power tradeoffs of Suite-B on Handheld Platforms: The deployment of the Suite-B 
algorithms were investigated in wireless handheld platforms, mostly using ARM 
processors. It was shown that the reduced throughput, added power consumption figures, 
and the added delays where much more than that of the laptop platforms. Therefore 
depending on the application, delay, throughput, and power consumption limitations, 




This section is dedicated to the discussions on the applicability and other features of the 
designed system.  
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Applications – The two main features of this system are QoS (e.g., minimum bandwidth, 
maximum delay, etc.) and security (in particular, non-repudiation) and this system can be 
used in scenarios where the actions of any of the involved parties are to be logged for 
future reference. One of these scenarios, as mentioned, is in the medical field where a 
doctor may require such a system to record his/her actions in regards to the patients, as 
well as the patients (in particular, remote patients) who may require this system to ensure 
the authenticity of the medical instructions they receive. 
 
Another application where this system can be used in is in the stock exchange market, 
where both the buyers and the brokers require such a service to provide assurance against 
the denial of the actions taken by the opponents.  
 
The third application that can rely heavily on this system is in remote education, where 
students may be taking part in remote monitoring examinations and the administrative 
staff can handle remote examinations in a different geographical location by checking the 
digital signatures of the students taking part. 
 
Adoptability – A major component of this system is based on an application layer 
provisioning scheme, which can be implemented purely using software codes with no 
hardware components. Therefore this system can be adopted by any wireless handheld 
(e.g., BlackBerry and iPhone) to provide non-repudiation services in the presence of QoS 
measures. There are already a few applications running on BlackBerry/iPhone devices 
offering similar functionalities (e.g., S/MIME Support Package, SolidPass, etc.) however 
they do not offer simultaneous QoS/security provisioning services. 
 
Required Layered Hardware Modifications – To evaluate the required hardware 
modifications based on the four methods of deployments discussed in this thesis 
(application, transport, network, and MAC layers), a closer look to the components 
deployed in each method reveals the hardware modifications required in each method (at 
each layer). At the application layer (method 1), as mentioned in the adoptability 
subsection, all components (i.e., audio/video codecs, Suite-B algorithms, and A-FEC) are 
software-based, therefore no hardware-related modification is required.  
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At the transport layer (method 2), RFC 5246 (The Transport Layer Security “TLS” 
Protocol Version 1.2) and RFC 5430 (Suite B Profile for Transport Layer Security 
“TLS”) [120, 179] cover the entire Suite-B security protocol handshakes and the 
application data transfer at the transport layer. Therefore no new modification is required 
beyond RFCs 5246 and 5430.  
 
At the network layer (method 3), again RFC 4306 (Internet Key Exchange “IKEv2” 
Protocol) and RFC 4869 (Suite-B Cryptographic Suites for IPSec) cover the entire 
security protocol handshakes and application data the transfer at the transport layer. 
Therefore no new modification is required beyond RFCs 4306 and 4869.  
 
Method 4 (MAC layer), as mentioned, uses method 1 and the conventional MAC layer 
security (WPA/WPA2) schemes, therefore no hardware modifications are required for 
this method either. 
 
Therefore for the deployment of the entire system based on the methods described, no 
additional hardware-based modifications are required. 
 
Limitations of the System – The following limitations are to be considered when 
deploying this system: Codec bit-rate limits – The lowest bit-rates for the audio and video 
codecs are 5.3 kbps and 24 kbps respectively and the highest bit-rates are 64 kbps for 
both codecs, which may be adequate for a relatively good quality voice reproduction, 
however may not result acceptable video reproductions if certain visual details are 
required. Channel/signal qualities change rate – In the current implementation, cross-
layer parameters are probed once every second at the application layer. Therefore if the 
channel/signal qualities change more rapidly, the system may not operate as efficiently as 
less rapid signal/channel quality changes.  
 
Security/QoS Interactions – The only interactions security and QoS have on one 
another is during the cross-layer probing. The cross-layer design imports both QoS and 
security related parameters at the application layer and the A-FEC and codec qualities are 
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determined based on the imported cross-layer parameters. However the security protocols 
and the Suite-B algorithms are performed independently from the QoS side of the system. 
For instance when the Bit Error Rate (BER) increases due to the increase of the noise 
level, this impacts the SNR value, in which case will decrease the SNR’s individual 
Impact Factor and as a consequence, the total IF index will be impacted, which impacts 
the A-FEC scheme and deployed codecs. However this does not impact the operations of 
the security side of the system. 
 
5.3 Future Work 
 
For the future work, the following areas may be investigated: 
 
Biometric Authentication Measures for Non-Repudiation Techniques: Biometric 
Authentication (BA) and Biometric Encryption (BE) schemes should be used to 
transform user initiated biometric data into untraceable biometric information. A few 
biometric measures used for authentication and encryption/decryption mechanisms, 
include: Face, fingerprints, iris colors and patterns, hand/finger geometries, voice, 
dynamic signature, keystroke dynamics, gait, and DNA schemes. The information 
contained in biometric measures is unique and irrevocable. 
 
Therefore the future direction may involve binding physical characteristics of a 
biometric feature (e.g., voice, fingerprint) into encryption keys, which could be used to 
encrypt and decrypt messages. 
Multimedia-based Non-Repudiation Services using Wireless Handhelds: More and 
more applications and services are being offered through wireless handheld devices. The 
same analytical and experimental study included in this thesis could be carried out 
involving a wireless handheld device instead of a laptop system. The results could be 
used to provide general guidelines for the deployments of such devices. 
 
mLearning and mHealth on 3G networks: Following the same future direction for 
deploying wireless handhelds, Smartphones running on 3G (3rd Generation Mobile 
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Networks) could also be used and the same   On the same analytical and experimental 
study included in this thesis could be carried out using such a platform/network. 
Currently there is a major interests in the academia to investigate the effectiveness of 
mLearning (Mobile Learning) and mHealth (Mobile Health), which could be integrated 





























A.1 Digital Signatures 
 
A.1.1 Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) 
 
The DSA system is comprised of three parts: Key generation, signing, and verifying, 
which are discussed here [225]: 
 
DSA key generation: A 160 bit prime number q is selected and a random number t is 
selected so that it satisfies the condition of 0 ≤ t ≤ 8. A random number p is selected so 
that it satisfies these two conditions: 2511+64t < p < 2512+64t and q is divisible by (p -1). 
Select  as Zp* generator and set g =  (p-1)/q mod p and select a so that it satisfies the 
condition: 1 ≤ a ≤ q -1 and compute b = ga mod p. The public key is (p, q, g, b) and the 
private key is a. 
 
DSA signing: Assume the message m is to be signed using DSA. The number k is so 
selected that it satisfies the condition: 0 < k < q and assume H(m) is the hash function 
applied to the message m. For the hashing function, Federal Information Processing 
Standard (FIPS) recommends the use of SHA-1. Then r and s are computed as follow: r = 
(gk mod p) mod q and s = k-1 (H(m) + a.r) mod q. The signature is (r, s). 
 
DSA verification: To verify a DSA signature, first the following condition should hold: 
0 < r < q and 0 < s < q. Then we compute the followings: w = s-1 mod q, z = w·H(m) mod 
q, y = r·w mod q, v = (gz·by mod p) mod q. If v = r it validates the signature. If not then 
the signature is invalid. 
 
A.1.2 RSA 
The RSA system is comprised of three parts: Key generation, signing, and verifying, 
which are discussed here [225]: 
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RSA key Generation: Two randomly large distinct same-size prime numbers; p and q 
are selected. We compute n = p.q and  = (p – 1).(q –1) and select a random integer e, 
which satisfies the condition: 1 < e < ,  and gcd (e, ) = 1, where gcd is the greater 
common divisor finder function. Both n and  are sufficiently large enough and e is 
randomly selected to ensure RSA function is a one-way trapdoor function (the private 
key as being the trapdoor). Then we compute d with the condition that: 1 < d <   and e.d 
 mod . The public key is (e, n) and the private key is a (d, p, q). 
 
RSA signing:  Assume the message m is to be signed using RSA. The condition that 0 < 
m < n must hold and then we computer s = md mod n, where s is the signature. Then (s, 
m) are sent to the receiver. 
 
RSA Signature Verification – The receiver uses the (e, n) public key and computes se 
mod n, which is equal to (md mod n)e mod n  = m. 
 
A.1.3 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 
 
ECDSA Key Generation Algorithm: Alice follows the following steps: 
1. Select a random integer number of d, which is a member of the set: [2, n – 2]. 
2. Calculate Q = P x d.  
3. Alice’s private and public keys are: d and (E, P, n, Q) 
 
ECDSA Signature Generation Algorithm: Alice signs the message m through the 
following algorithm: 
1. Select a random integer number of k, which is a member of the set: [2, n – 2]. 
2. Calculate k x P = (x1, y1), a point on the elliptic curve, and r = x1 mod n. 
Assuming x1 is a binary number representation if x1 GF (2k). If r = 0, then go 
to Step 1. 
3. Calculate k-1 mod n. 
4. Calculate s = k-1 (d.r + H (m)) mod n, where H (m) is the SHA value of m. If s = 
0, then go to Step 1. 
 167 
5. (r, s) pair is the message m’s signature. 
 
ECDSA Signature Verification Algorithm: Bob verifies Alice’s signature, message pair 
(r, s, m), through the following algorithm: 
1. Calculate f = s-1 mod n and H (m). 
2. Calculate g1 = H (m) . f mod n and g2 = r . f mod n.  
3. Calculate P x g1 + Q x g2 = (x1, y1) and v = x0 mod n. 

























A.2 Traffic Classifications 
 
A.2.1 Traffic Classification Parameters 
 
In this section we introduce a number of network traffic parameters. These parameters 
are mostly considered in the study of packet and traffic classification techniques. 
 
A.2.1.1 Packet Size 
 
Packet size is one form of traffic classification.  Most of the traffic volumes on the 
Internet can be categorized into either, very small (mouse) packets or very large (elephant 
or heavy tailed) packet sizes. The large packet size is usually associated with higher 
usage of a link.  Basically 20% of the connections on the Internet are responsible for 80% 
of the traffic passing through a single point [226, 227, 228], mostly via elephant packets. 
 
Zipf’s law is used to specify a more generalized form of packet size traffic 
classifications. In the packet size scenario, Zipf’s law characterizes the frequency of 
occurrence of certain packet sizes as a function of its rank in the frequency table [229].  
This means that there exists an imbalance in the network due to the fact that 20% of the 
connections carry 80% of the traffic payloads and the rest of the 80% of the connections 
are for small packet traffic payloads.  
 
Traffic Engineering (TE) [230] is a term applied to a systematic process in which traffic 
flows are arranged in “classified” groups to simplify the transmission management 
throughout networks and decrease the probability of congestions. TE, by nature, is well 
positioned to deal with very large volume traffic payloads through the aggregation of 
traffic.  However TE tends not to perform as efficiently when dealing with mice flows. 
The drawback to TE in regards to traffic classification is the fact that traffic in large and 
random environments (e.g., the Internet) would exhibit volatility in several flow 
specifications, namely; volume and bandwidth [230]. Fluctuations of these network 
parameters reduce the efficiency of TE in the process of traffic classifications.  
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In many cases, flows exhibit inherent bandwidth fluctuations. As mentioned, this 
creates complications in the traffic classification process, leading to frequent 
reclassification, thus reduction in the classification performance. These fluctuations are 
due to the following factors [230]: 
 
Connection termination following the link exhaustion - The duration of a connection 
can be modeled as a stochastic variable dependant on the following parameters [231, 
232]: The protocol in use, the current (kth) connection arrival time, the current connection 
(kth) time duration, and client/server performance metrics (e.g., round-trip delay, client 
delay, server delay) for client/server based applications such as FTP. 
 
The effects of these parameters contribute to the creation of a median time for the flow.  
This median time for elephant flows (also known as heavy-hitters) will be higher since 
according to reference [233], the longer the connection duration (heavy-hitters), the 
higher the probability for the link to continue its connection. 
 
Burstiness Effect - Multimedia traffic, especially video data, can be affected by the 
burstiness of traffic flows, reflected by a number of parameters, such as [233]: Peak-to-
average ratio (PAR) and the temporal auto-covariance function (ACF). 
 
Burstiness is a time sensitive parameter, which can be modeled as a stochastic variable. 
It is more probable to be an issue in heavy-hitter connections compared to mouse flows. 
 
Bandwidth Fluctuations - Bandwidth fluctuations occur relatively frequently in wireless 
networks compared to wired networks. In wired networks, bandwidth fluctuations may 
happen due to various reasons, such as, a sudden increase of user demands or a 
congestion period.  
 
The reasons behind bandwidth fluctuations in wireless networks are mostly related to 
the PHY and MAC layers issues, including: handoff and handover between Access Points 
(APs), limitations of available bandwidth in multi-user environments, physical limitations 
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(e.g., reflections, refractions, multipath), vulnerability to various interferences, and the 
dependency of performance to the client’s distance to the server (AP). 
 
A.2.1.2 Heavy Hitters (Elephants) versus Mice Packets 
 
Heavy hitters can be identified by both their large packet sizes and long duration 
connections. It has been presented in the literature [234, 235] that there are strong 
correlations between the rates of streams and their packet sizes mainly based on the 
protocols in use.  
In wired connections, from a packet size point of view, packets are usually between a 
few tens of bytes up to 1514 bytes. Depending on the Maximum Transmission Unit 
(MTU), large files being transmitted are usually broken down into various fragments. 
Based on captured real traffic payloads, we notice that control packets (packets 
containing control commands), which do not usually have any data payloads, are less 
than 200 bytes. Data packets are usually above 200 bytes.  
 
Wireless traffic starts from 14 bytes (e.g., ACKs, CTS) with no data payloads, up to 
1530 bytes, in IEEE 802.11 a/b/g networks, which is a limit by which fragmentation 
occurs. Based on our real traffic analysis, we label packets with over 400 bytes in lengths 
as heavy hitters. 
 
Mice Flows - Mice flows are those with relatively low sizes transmitting for a short 
duration. The duration limit is less than the time required for the accumulation of 10 KB 
data and the packet sizes are usually less than 500 bytes each. 
 
Elephant Flows - Elephant flows on the other hand are flows, which usually last more 
than a few minutes carrying relatively large packet sizes (often larger than 1 KB each).  
Therefore for a typically elephant flow, more than 3 MB of data on average is 







The time duration of packet streams is another form of packet classification. Depending 
on the application, a short lived packet stream can last from a few microseconds up to a 
few minutes. Long-lived packet streams, on the other hand, can last from a few minutes 
up to several hours. Statistics [234, 235] show that there are direct links between larger 
packet sizes and longer durations. Based on captured real traffic from connections 
conveying multimedia data, most control packets (e.g., Beacons, ACKs, CTSs) are light 
connections (tortoises) and other packets forming connections (e.g., connection requests, 
confirmations, data transmission, acknowledgement teardowns), are considered heavy 
hitters (dragonflies). 
 
A.2.2 Traffic Analysis – Flow-based Approach 
 
In an IP network, a flow is defined as a unidirectional series of IP packets with unique 
source/destination addresses, port numbers (assuming TCP or UDP to be the transport 
layer protocol) and protocol number [234, 236, 237]. 
 
The main focus of this section is to discuss application specific classes of traffic. 
However it is important to talk about a few basic and fundamental definitions first. 
 
Four main parameters associated to every flow are: size, duration, rate, and burstiness. 
There is a correlation between size and rate and in regards to small/medium flow sizes, 
due to different timeout mechanisms, the strong correlation between size and rate is more 
likely a pervasive artifact. Such an argument might require the usage of a larger packet 
size or the deployment of a larger initial window to improve TCP performance. This will 
increase the chance that more data is sent in one round trip time “RTT” before the 
timeout occurs. 
 
As mentioned, there is a strong correlation between flow size and rate. Therefore size 
can be chosen based on the availability of bandwidth [238]. 
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A.2.2.1 Flow-Level Metrics 
 
Reference [236] classifies flows according to their sizes, durations, and inter-arrival 
times. These are defined as followed [236]: 
 
A.2.2.1.1 Flow Size  
 
Flow size is the total number of bytes transferred between a server and a wireless client 
during a single connection. From the client point of view, it does not matter if a new 
server provides services (handover happens with a new IP address) while the connection 
is still ongoing. However this measurement is usually done per server/client pair [239, 
240, 241]. 
 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networking has gained much popularity in the recent years. The 
statistical flows for both P2P and Internet have well been modeled and bounded between 
Pareto and Weibull distributions [236], and their probability density functions (pdf) can 


























































































The distribution for the web-flow sizes includes a long-tailed distribution. A 
probability distribution is called long-tailed when high probability regions are far from 
the median or mean. 
 
 
A.2.2.1.2 Inter-Arrival Time between Flows 
 
This is the time between any two consecutive flow arrivals. Inter-arrival times in 
flows are practically independent from each other and are distributed exponentially 
according to Poisson process. IP traffic on top of TCP or UDP, also has uncorrelated 
inter-arrival flow times (also true in regards to the flow lengths), therefore it can be 
modeled by a combination of algorithmic scaled normal distributions [242]. 
 
A.2.2.1.3 Flow Duration 
 
This is calculated from the start of the initial handshake of the flow until the last data 
packet has left the sender followed by the tear-down of the link related to the flow. At 
this level we also deal with both mice and elephant flows.  
 
In the section related to the flow size, a time range for both mouse and elephant flows is 
calculated. According to the definition, as mentioned, a typical mouse flow can be as 
short as a few microseconds (based on current 802.11 bandwidth limit of 54 Mbps) up to 
several minutes. A typical elephant flow lasts from an hour to several days and could 
transmit up to several thousand terabits of data in a single flow. 
 
A.2.2.1.4 Flow Fluctuation Patterns 
 
In general, one can categorize flow fluctuation patterns as: Slowly varying continuous 
data flow, fast varying continuous data flow, traffic with common periodic trends, short-
lived bursts, and noise. 
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Slowly varying continuous data flows are long-lived connections generated from a 
steady source where relatively high correlation among successive data is observed.  
Therefore, only small variations are observed in a short period of time.  An example 
would be the data transmitted from thermal sensors. 
 
Fast varying data flows are long-lived flows with rapid fluctuates over a relatively short 
period of time.  In these types of flows, high variations are observed with low 
correlations among successive data.  An example of this would be data transmission 
across a busy LAN. 
 
Common periodic trends are long-lived traffic patterns which are observed to be 
periodic in nature, such as web server traffic and scheduled backup data. 
 
Short-lived bursts are also a part of most data network traffic.  As mentioned before, a 
long established busy LAN connection may exhibit fast varying data flow, however over 
a short period of time, such a connection may include short-lived bursts resulting from 
rapidly fluctuating traffic payloads. A burst can be characterized as a fluctuating data 
stream over a relatively short period of time. 
 
Background noise is an inevitable part of any network traffic. A high SNR (Signal-to-
Noise Ration) value ensures relatively high level of signal and low level of noise. 
 
It should be noted that the network traffic categories mentioned are applicable per flow 
and per aggregation of flows.  
 
 
A.2.3 Traffic Control 
 
Depending on the nature of the flows, either the majority being mice, elephant, or a 
combination of both, networks will deal with conditions differently. For instance if the 
majority of the flows are mice and the network has undergone congestion periods, 
dropping packets will do little in dealing with the congestion control. In general, such a 
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network will exhibit random behaviors with high adaptability to sudden changes, which 
can be a favorable issue for time-sensitive applications. Telnet and HTTP transfer 
streams tend to be of mice flow type [237]. 
 
In a network where most of the flows are elephant, depending on the protocol in use, it 
can be tolerant against congestion, in particular if the majority of the traffic is based on 
TCP, as TCP features a built in congestion avoidance mechanism. TCP (e.g., FTP 
applications) and UDP (e.g., video applications) flows are examples of elephant flows 
[237]. 
 
Flow duration increase may increase the Long Range Dependence (LRD, also known as 
long memory, measured by the Hurst parameter) as well. LRD is an autocorrelation value 
of a data stream, which approaches a constant value (normalized to 1) as the number of 
data bits increases. If the limit in equation A.3 exists for a real number of r, then  (s) is 
the autocorrelation function and Xt is the LRD stationary process (Figure A.1 (adapted 
from [243]), equation A.3). 
 
...,2,1;)(lim  krkk    Equation A.3 
 
Figure A.1 Autocorrelation function in an elephant flow merging to the value r 
 
Therefore for a typical elephant flow, equation A.3 should hold. The following 
definitions are related to LRD: 
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Hurst parameter - is an indicator parameter, which increases as the traffic volume and 
traffic burstiness increase.  
 
Self similarity - is a statistical property, fractal-like, to examine produced data for 
similar patterns over a scale of time. Some of its properties include: slow decaying 
variance, long-range dependence, and Hurst effect. 
 
A.2.4 Traffic Analysis – Application-Specific (QoS/Security) 
 
The purpose of this section is to study traffic classifications from different QoS and 
security requirement perspectives. These types of classifications can be applied to 
different layers, including application, network, and lower layers (MAC and PHY), 
which makes it a fairly complex task to do. Therefore in this section we try to present 
different aspects of QoS and security from a traffic classification point of view. 
 
A.2.4.1 QoS Classes of Traffic 
 
QoS is an essential part of a non-best-effort traffic classification, which is important to 
ensure priority data, in particular; multimedia applications running on stringent wireless 
links, are handled with proper priority in a timely manner (limited upper delay). These 
multimedia applications (data containing both audio and video), based on the delay 
tolerability, can be grouped in the following categories (disregarding the security 
mandates) [244, 245]: 
 
Streaming - Clients request audio/video files from servers and pipeline reception over 
the network. Streaming data can be interactive, in which case the user can control some 
operations (e.g., pause, resume, fast forward, rewind, etc.). 
 
Unidirectional Real-Time (Half-Duplex): Functions similar to TV and radio devices 
(e.g., mobile-TV), however data delivery direction is from the network to the device. It is 
a non-interactive service, which involves only listening and/or viewing. 
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Interactive Real-Time (Full-Duplex): Two-way traffic, similar to a phone conversation 
and videoconferencing (e.g., talking/listening broadcasting/viewing at the same time). 
This class has a more stringent delay requirement compared to real-time streaming and 
unidirectional, which requires normally less than 150 msec of delay for both audio and 




























A.3 Other Application Layer Schemes 
 
Following any application layer process, appropriate action parameters are created and 
transported back to the related layer.  
 
A.3.1 Deep Packet Classification (DPC) 
 
One application layer mechanism that has recently gained quite a bit of interest among 
researchers is the deployment of the Network Based Application Recognition (NBAR) 
[246, 247] concept. NBAR is capable of recognizing packets with complex fields and 
attributes combinations. NBAR is able to identify if a packet belongs to certain traffic 
stream by performing a deep-packet inspection and with an appropriate policy scheme, 
specific packets can be dealt with accordingly. An entity that works with NBAR is the 
Protocol Description Language Module (PDLM), which is an application signature. 
Another entity that NBAR works with is the Cisco Express Forwarding (CEF) that 
cooperates with NBAR facilitating deep-packet classifications. 
 
A.3.2  QoS API 
 
The QoS API provides a standard interface to add new QoS components before dealing 
with layered QoS structures [248]. QoS API is able to request bandwidth requirements 
particular to a specific application at the application layer. This includes facilities to 
unnecessary latency for streaming audio and video applications. QoS API also deals with 
the network layer QoS (e.g., RSVP “Resource Reservation Protocol”). 
 
A.3.3 Application Layer Dynamic Services  
 
In the application layer QoS-based approach, one can set the default application and 
service QoS parameters for various application classification policies (user basis, service 
class basis, etc.). For application run in a broadband wireless access such as WiMAX, the 
application type; QoS parameters and the classification rule must be passed to the MAC 
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layer to initiate dynamic service creation process to send Dynamic Service Addition 
(DSA) (Request/Response) and Dynamic Service Change (DSC) messages to BS. 
 
When the service flow creation is completed, whether it succeeded or failed, the MAC 
must send the result to the application layer. Upon receiving the report, the application 
may generate error message to the user or continue to run the application accordingly.  
 
The application should be able to monitor the QoS status and may send a message to 
the MAC to initiate DSC-Request message to change the QoS parameters if necessary. 
 
The application should receive a message to initiate Dynamic Service Deletion (DSD) 
request/response commands to delete the service flow when the application is terminated. 
 
A.3.4 QoS Push and Pull 
 
 A non-push, non-pull QoS model is referred to a static scenario in which QoS is set 
irrespective to service status, which usually contributes to the waste of bandwidth. In 
such a scenario, when the session is initiated, it will be impossible to change QoS 
variable while the session is still active. Therefore in order to change QoS requirements, 
the session has to be torn-down first, which is called pre-provisioned service flow [249]. 
 
As a contrast, a non-static QoS system is called dynamic QoS in which QoS can be 
requested at the initiation of the service and deleted when session terminates, which 
makes optimal use of bandwidth. In dynamic QoS schemes, it is possible to renegotiate 
QOS in the middle of an active session. There are two types of dynamic QoS schemes: 
Push and pull schemes. In the pull model, QoS requirements are pulled by the user/user 
equipment, which are requested upon service initiation. In the push model, the 
application client triggers an application service which in turn pushes QoS request from 
the network, where network server requests QOS upon service initiation. In Push model, 
the user (UE) requires no knowledge of QoS, which is easy to implement and operate 
using dynamic QoS and renegotiation scheme. Since the Application Servers are trusted 
entities and UE/Application clients are authorized by the Application Servers, the QoS 
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request can be trusted, hence avoiding DoS attacks and theft of service. Many servers 
already support this model. However it could be relatively slow compared to the pull 




A.4 Graphs, Tables, and Charts 
 
Table A.1 Different data rates for different video applications 
Algorithm 
 











DPCM, DCT, MC 
 
H.261 
88x72, 176x144, 352x288, 704x576 




8x8 DCT, CIF, SIF 
 
MPEG-1 
352x288, 352x240, 25 fps (PAL),                       
CBR, MPEG-1, Audio, Layer 2 
VCD 











8x8 DCT, CIF, SIF 
 
MPEG-2 
MPEG-1, Low (352x288), Main 
(720x476), SD (1440x1152), HD 





CIF, 4CIF, 16CIF 
 
H.263 
126x96, 176x144, 352x288, 
704x576, 1408x1152 – up to 72 fps 
10-64 (audio) 
24-20,480 
4x4 DCT, 8x8 
DCT 
H.264 Similar to MPEG-4 64-983,040 





Table A.2 VoIP codec bandwidth requirements 
Codec Data Rate (kbps) Coding Technique Bandwidth (kbps) 
G.711 (A-, -law) 64 PCM 68-96 
G.722 48, 56, 64 ADPCM 88 
G.722.1 24, 32 ACELP 42, 52 
G.722.2 23.85 ACELP 42 
G.723.1 5.3, 6.4 ACELP/MPC-MLQ 26, 27 
G.726  24, 32 ADPCM 48, 64 
G.728 16 LD-CELP 78 
G.729 6. 4, 8, 11.8 CS-ACELP 31.2 
G.729a  8 CS-CELP 40 
AMR-WB (G.722.2) 6.6-23.85 ACELP 36-49 
AMR-WB+ 5.2-48 ACELP 7.2-50 
AMR-NB 4.75-12.2 ACELP 36-44 
GSM EFR  12.2 ACLEP 30 
GSM FR 13.3 RPE-LTP 31 
































1 2.412 X X   X 
2 2.417 X X   X 
3 2.422 X X   X 
4 2.427 X X   X 
5 2.432 X X   X 
6 2.437 X X   X 
7 2.442 X X   X 
8 2.447 X X   X 
9 2.452 X X   X 
10 2.457 X X X X X 
11 2.462 X X X X X 
12 2.467  X  X X 
13 2.472  X  X X 
























34 5.170   X 
36 5.180 X X  
38 5.190   X 
40 5.200 X X  
42 5.210   X 
44 5.220 X X  
46 5.230   X 
48 5.240 X X  
52 5.260 X X  
56 5.280 X X  
60 5.300 X X  
64 5.320 X X  
100 5.500  X  
104 5.520  X  
108 5.540  X  
112 5.560  X  
116 5.580  X  
120 5.600  X  
124 5.620  X  
128 5.640  X  
132 5.660  X  
136 5.680  X  
140 5.700  X  
149 5.745 X   
153 5.765 X   
157 5.785 X   
161 5.805 X   
165 5.825    
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Table A.7 Ethernet bidirectional flows ordered by heavy hitter end point bytes (based on Table A.2) 
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Table A.11 Wireless Network Component Statistics 
Network Total Packets        100.000% 
Network Total Broadcast         33.059% 
Network Total Multicast          1.922% 
Network Average Utilization (percent)        0.279 
Network Average Utilization (bits/s)  300,868.339 
Network Current Utilization (percent)        0.204 
Network Current Utilization (bits/s)  220,352.000 
Network Max Utilization (percent)        0.435 
Network Max Utilization (bits/s)  469,968.000 
 
Errors Total       2.510% 
Errors CRC       2.510% 
Counts Physical Addresses       356 
Counts IP Addresses     6 
Counts IPv6 Addresses     0 
Counts AppleTalk Addresses    0 
Counts DECnet Addresses     0 
Counts IPX Addresses     0 
Counts Protocols          36 
Size Distribution    <    64        57.947% 
Size Distribution    64-127       13.713% 
Size Distribution   128-255       16.414% 
Size Distribution   256-511       11.926% 
Size Distribution   512-1023   0.000% 
Size Distribution  1024-2047   0.000% 
Size Distribution  2048-2346   0.000% 
Size Distribution    >= 2347    0.000% 
Wireless Wireless Networks        11 
Wireless Weak Wireless Networks        28 
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks          0 
Wireless Access Points         13 
Wireless Clients          50 
Wireless Trusted Access Points    0 
Wireless Known Access Points    0 
Wireless Unknown Access Points        13 
Broadcast Storm             126 
Severe Broadcast Storm              67 
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Wireless - Too Many Physical Errors               114 
Wireless Access Point - Broadcasting ESSID        11 
Wireless Access Point - Missing     1 
Wireless Access Point - Mixed Mode    2 
Wireless Access Point - Physical Errors      111 
Wireless Access Point - Too Many Retries       78 
Wireless Access Point - Weak Signal        27 
Wireless Authentication Denied     1 
Wireless Channel Overlap      8 
Wireless Client - No Response to Probe Request       13 
Wireless Client - Physical Errors    9 
Wireless Client - Probe Response Not Accepted     118 
Wireless Client - Too Many Retries    3 
Wireless Client - Weak Signal     5 
Wireless Deauthentication Attack        17 
Wireless Duration Attack          15 
Wireless Excessive Probe Requests        18 
Wireless Excessive RTS      5 
Wireless Low Signal-to-Noise Ratio        19 
Wireless Reassociation Denied     0 
Wireless RF Interference      0 
Wireless RF Jamming       0 
Wireless Security Error      0 
802.11 Analysis Average Signal Strength       16.453 
802.11 Analysis Average Signal dBm      -83.358 
802.11 Analysis Average Noise              6.261 
802.11 Analysis Average Noise dBm            -93.739 
802.11 Analysis 802.11 Data              45.29% 
802.11 Analysis 802.11 Management                  48.57% 
802.11 Analysis 802.11 Control              3.63% 
802.11 Analysis Retry            53.78% 








Table A.12 Packets details 
 Protocol    Bytes Packets 
 
 802.11 Null Data   879792  25901 
 Beacon   3781251  18506 
 Deauthentication   209400   6980 
 Probe Responses   958448   5173 
 Acknowledgment    21448   1532 
 Probe Requests    60297   1112 
 SSDP     311110     876 
 Request     57750    825 
 LSAP-01     27000    663 
Clear to Send     8596    614 
 Name Svc     64950    542 
 Cisco Discovery   138355    371 
 802.11 QoS Null Data    9150    305 
 Request to Send     4520    226 
 802.11 TKIP Data    15703    110 
 802.11 WEP Data     7228     64 
 Authentication      756     22 
 Association Requests    1727     12 
 Association Responses     621      6 
 Contention-Free End     100      5 
 802.1x       736      4 
 Reassociation Responses     254      2 
 Reassociation Requests     268      2 
 EAP Response       48      1 
 UDP          0      0 
 SNAP          0      0 
 NetBIOS         0      0 
 IP          0      0 
 802.1x EAP-Packet        0      0 
 ARP          0      0 
 802.11 QoS Data        0        0 
 802.11 Management        0      0 
 802.11 Data         0      0 
 802.11 Control        0      0 
 IEEE 802.11         0      0 
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Table A.13 Line traffic parameters during various times/dates 
Traffic Parameter Parameter Values Traffic Parameter Parameter Values 
Packets 32,147 Packets 19,524 
Bytes 21,745,794 Bytes 15,501,610 
Monitor Duration 411 sec Monitor Duration 270 sec 
Average packets/sec 78.059 Average packets/sec 72.294 
Average Mbit/Sec 0.422 Average Mbit/Sec 0.459 
Average bytes/sec 52,802.949 Average bytes/sec 57,399.443 
Average packet size 676 bytes Average packet size 793 bytes 
    
Traffic Parameter Parameter Values Traffic Parameter Parameter Values 
Packets 16,956 Packets 13,794 
Bytes 13,466,250 Bytes 11,507,313 
Monitor Duration 429 sec Monitor Duration 169 sec 
Average packets/sec 39.506 Average packets/sec 81.371 
Average Mbit/Sec 0.251 Average Mbit/Sec 0.543 
Average bytes/sec 31374.942 Average bytes/sec 67,882.096 
Average packet size 794 bytes Average packet size 834 bytes 
    
Traffic Parameter Parameter Values Traffic Parameter Parameter Values 
Packets 16,653 Packets 21,746 
Bytes 13,179,228 Bytes 9,887,008 
Monitor Duration 242 sec Monitor Duration 499 sec 
Average packets/sec 68.804 Average packets/sec 43.511 
Average Mbit/Sec 0.436 Average Mbit/Sec 0.158 
Average bytes/sec 54,451.554 Average bytes/sec 19,782.727 
Average packet size 791 bytes Average packet size 454 bytes 
    
Traffic Parameter Parameter Values Traffic Parameter Parameter Values 
Packets 16,380 Packets 25,210 
Bytes 6,052,500 Bytes 14,647,180 
Monitor Duration 430 sec Monitor Duration 488 sec 
Average packets/sec 38.021 Average packets/sec 51.581 
Average Mbit/Sec 0.112 Average Mbit/Sec 0.240 
Average bytes/sec 14,048.944 Average bytes/sec 29,968.867 
Average packet size 369 bytes Average packet size 581 bytes 
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Figure A.2 Labview 8.5 Suite-B testbed graphical user interface 
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